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AREA SUMMARIES
2015 PATENT DECISIONS OF
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
CRAIG E. COUNTRYMAN*
The Federal Circuit's patent law decisions in 2015 reflected several notable
trends. The court decided many novel questions of statutory interpretation,
encountered its first round of appeals from the new post-grant Patent Office
Proceedings, and continued to wrestle with difficult questions regarding
patent-eligibility. Several decisions began implementing the Supreme Court's
new directives regarding claim construction, indefiniteness, attorney fees, and
inducement. This Article collects and summarizes the Federal Circuit's 2015
patent decisions and analyzes what many of them mean for the future.
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INTRODUCTION
The Patent Act is largely a statute from another era, one in which
congressional pronouncements left large interstices for federal
judges to fill. Novelty, obviousness, written description, enablement.
Judges have historically developed and refined these patentability
concepts as they see fit, for the statute provides little guidance or
restriction on their authority. Patent law has mostly been common law.
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However, 2015 saw the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit resolving many difficult questions of statutory interpretation.
Several questions related to the America Invents Act (AIA),' which
was enacted in 2011, had its post-grant review proceedings begin in
2012,2 and switched the United States to a first-to-file system in 2013.
Appeals requiring the Federal Circuit to interpret the AIA are starting
to work their way through the system, and the first crop was ripe for
decision this past year. These cases presented many difficult questions
about how post-grant proceedings should be conducted (for example, is
claim construction to be performed under the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard?) and the types of issues in post-grant
proceedings that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review. These
decisions are just the beginning: as the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office begins to issue first-to-file patents, the AIA's new provisions on
prior art will raise many more disputes in the years to come.'
The AIA was not the only source of statutory construction
decisions. The Federal Circuit interpreted plenty of other existing
statutory requirements, including the scope of the Hatch-Waxman
Act's safe harbor provision;' the scope of infringement under 35
U.S.C. § 271(g) (2012);6 claim interpretation under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(f);7 whether the Patent Act authorizes a laches defense;' the
International Trade Commission's authority to address inducement,9
digital communications,0 and certain domestic industry;" and the
Patent Office's application of the patent term adjustment provisions
1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29,125 Stat. 284 (2011).
2. See id. § 6, 125 Stat. at 305-13.
3. See id. § 3, 125 Stat. at 285.
4. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012), which introduced several new provisions
and substantially revised the wording of others from the 1952 Patent Act.
5. See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., 809 F.3d 610, 618-22
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (interpreting the safe harbor provision, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e) (1));
Shire LLC v. Amneal Pharms., LLC, 802 F.3d 1301, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (same);
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Elan Pharm., Inc., 786 F.3d 892, 894 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (same).
6. Momenta, 809 F.3d at 615-18.
7. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
8. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag SCA Personal Care, Inc. v. First Quality Baby
Prods., LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1317-21 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
9. Suprema, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
10. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 810 F.3d 1283 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
11. Lelo Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 786 F.3d 879 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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for Patent Office delay.12 In addition, the Federal Circuit issued its
first decision interpreting the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act," which established a new expedited pathway for
biosimilars.14 Split panels decided many of these issues, with different
judges giving different weight to the statutory text, purpose, and
legislative history. Appellate advocates often think about Federal
Circuit judges' leanings on patentability, claim construction, or
deference to the tribunal below. Last year's cases show that advocates
must also consider each judge's approach to statutory interpretation.
The AIA has not only raised new statutory interpretation issues, but
it has significantly impacted the Federal Circuit's docket. The
Federal Circuit has been flooded with new Patent Office appeals from
inter partes review proceedings, many of which are now replacing a
co-pending, but stayed, district court case. The result has been a
significantly increased workload: the Federal Circuit had almost 200
more Patent Office appeals pending in September 2015 than in the
previous year.' The Federal Circuit has dealt with this, in part, by
affirming without opinion in a significant percentage of these appeals."
The few precedential reversals in post-grant proceedings show that the
loser in an inter partes review will face difficulty on appeal.
Another continued area of importance is decidedly non-statutory-
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged in Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank International"
12. Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Lee, 778 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Mohsenzadeh v. Lee,
790 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Lee, 791 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
13. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 111-148,
§§ 7001-03, 124 Stat. 119, 804-21 (2010).
14. Amgen Inc. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2015), appeal
docketed, No. 15-1195 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2016).
15. Compare Year-to-Date Activity as of September 30, 2015, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-
court/statistics/ytd-activity_9_30_15.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016) (noting that 340
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) appeals were pending at the
time), with Year-to-Date Activity as of September 30, 2014, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/fdes/the-court/statistics/
ytd%20activity%2009.30.14.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016) (noting that 162 Patent
Office appeals were pending at the time).
16. See, e.g., Opinions and Orders, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions-orders?populate=&field-origin-value=PATO&field
report type-yalue=N&field-date-dropdown=last_6_months (listing all cases
affirmed without opinion in the last six months pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 36);
see also Fed. Cir. R. 36 (allowing the Federal Circuit to enter a judgment of
affirmance without opinion when any of three listed conditions exist).
17. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
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that § 101's text makes any "process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter"' eligible for a patent, yet insisted that this
includes an "implicit" (read, judicially created) exception for patents
that preempt abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural
phenomena." This past year saw the Federal Circuit again struggling
to apply the Supreme Court's guidance, invalidating a patent to an
admittedly "groundbreaking" type of genetic testing," despite the
unease of several judges. This struggle also reflected in the Federal
Circuit's invalidating a patent on a computer-based invention as an
abstract idea," although it seemed unlike many of the business-based
ideas (e.g., hedging) that the Supreme Court has previously targeted
as patent-ineligible."
Many of the Federal Circuit's other decisions are best described as
business as usual. On claim construction, the Supreme Court's
decision in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc." has had
little practical effect, as most constructions are decided based on the
intrinsic evidence, meaning they still receive de novo review. Other
Supreme Court decisions have also had minimal effect: Nautilus, Inc.
v. Biosig Instruments, Inc." impacted one indefiniteness decision,"
while Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc." and Highmark,
Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc." had little influence on
18. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
19. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354.
20. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir.
2015), reh'g denied, 809 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
21. Allvoice Devs. US, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 612 F. App'x 1009, 1018 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 697 (2015).
22. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (affirming the rejection of
a patent application for risk hedging, or protection against risk, as an unpatentable
abstract idea and because allowing such a patent would "pre-empt use of this approach in
all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea").
23. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) (holding that the Federal Circuit must apply the clear
error standard of review when reviewing a district court's findings on subsidiary
factual matters).
24. 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (holding that a patent is invalid for
indefiniteness if "its claims ... fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled
in the art about the scope of the invention," and eliminating the previous "insolubly
ambiguous" standard).
25. See Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautlius, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 375, 377 (2015) (explaining that following the Nautilus decision, the
Federal Circuit has held only one claim indefinite under the new standard).
26. 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014) (relaxing the standard for attorney fees).
27. 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) (changing the standard of review for fee shifting
decisions to abuse of discretion, rather than de novo).
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decisions regarding attorney fees." The Supreme Court's
pronouncements have seemed unimportant to the bottom line
because, on remand, the Federal Circuit reinstated its original
judgments in both Teva and Nautilus.29 This is not to say that the new
standards have no impact. But change on those issues, to the extent
it has occurred at all, has been incremental, not groundbreaking.
There have been plenty of other doctrinal developments, however,
to capture the interest of the patent bar. New decisions on the bread-
and-butter doctrines of patent law-obviousness, the on-sale bar,
written description, inducement, exhaustion, and laches-add plenty
of new wrinkles to the doctrines. They also help give us a clue into
the performance and leanings of the Federal Circuit's new members.
With the confirmation of Judge Kara F. Stoll this year, a majority of
active judges are now President Obama's appointees, appointed
within the last few years. Those judges often provided critical votes in
this year's split decisions, and they will help shape patent law for
many years to come.
I. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
A. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court's decision in Teva resolved the question that
had split the Federal Circuit for almost two decades-what is the
appropriate standard of review for claim construction? Teva held
that, although claim construction is an ultimate issue of law, subject
to de novo review, it can also implicate underlying factual questions
that are subject to clear error review under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) (6).o The Court added, however, that when claim
construction turns solely on the intrinsic evidence it is a purely legal
issue: "[W] hen the district court reviews only evidence intrinsic to
the patent (the patent claims and specifications, along with the
patent's prosecution history), the judge's determination will amount
solely to a determination of law, and the Court of Appeals will review
that construction de novo."a
28. See Arthur Gollwitzer III, A Look Back at the Supreme Court's 2013-2014 Term-Is
More "Reform"Needed?, 16 ENGAGE 49, 50 (2015).
29. Teva Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 569 (2015).
30. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
31. Id. at 841.
7752016]
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It noted that, in some cases, the district court may "consult
extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the
background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art
during the relevant time period,"32 but only in situations where the
parties offer competing experts or dictionaries must the district court
make factual findings." And even if the parties' experts raise a
factual dispute over a term's meaning in the relevant art, "the district
court must then conduct a legal analysis: whether a skilled artisan
would ascribe that same meaning to that term in the context of the
specific patent claim under eview."4
The Supreme Court gave an example to illustrate the difference.
The case involved whether the claim term "molecular weight" was
indefinite, because it was unclear which of several potential meanings
was intended. Teva argued that the skilled artisan would
understand "molecular weight" in a certain way, but Sandoz argued
that Teva's explanation was wrong because it conflicted with Figure 1
of the patent." Teva offered an explanation that harmonized its
proposed meaning with Figure 1, providing expert testimony to show
that the way the data was generated could cause the curve to shift."
The district court credited Teva's expert, and this was "a factual
finding-about how a skilled artisan would understand the way in
which a curve created from chromatogram data reflects molecular
weights," to which the Federal Circuit had to defer unless clearly
erroneous." Nevertheless, whether "[F]igure 1 did not undermine
Teva's argument that molecular weight referred to the first method
of calculation (peak average molecular weight)" was a "legal
conclusion"" reviewable de novo, although it would seem that the
factual finding would dictate the answer to the legal question." The
Supreme Court thus vacated the Federal Circuit's judgment of
indefiniteness and remanded for further consideration under the




35. Id. at 835-36.
36. Id. at 842-43.
37. Id. at 843.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Cf id. at 841-42 ("[I]n some instances, a factual finding may be close to
dispositive of the ultimate legal question of the proper meaning of the term in the
context of the patent.").
41. Id. at 843.
776 [Vol. 65:769
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The Federal Circuit's decision on remand reveals how little Teva's
reframing of the standard of review may matter, because it reinstated
the judgment of indefiniteness.12 The panel majority focused on the
intrinsic evidence, which gave no guidance on which measure of
molecular weight to use, and which in fact created confusion because
the applicant identified two different molecular weight measures in
other, related applications." The majority stressed that parties cannot
transform the interpretation of the patent into a legal question by
having experts offer opinions about the intrinsic evidence:
To the extent that Teva argues that the meaning of "molecular
weight" in the context of patents-in-suit is itself a question of fact, it
is wrong. A party cannot transform into a factual matter the
internal coherence and context assessment of the patent simply by
having an expert offer an opinion on it. The internal coherence
and context assessment of the patent, and whether it conveys claim
meaning with reasonable certainty, are questions of law. The
meaning one of skill in the art would attribute to the term
molecular weight in light of its use in the claims, the disclosure in
the specification, and the discussion of this term in the prosecution
history is a question of law.... To the extent that Teva or the
dissent suggests that the specification's disclosure of SEC would
"infer" that this claim term, molecular weight, in this patent refers
to Mp, such an inference is part of the legal analysis, not a fact
finding to be given deference. Determining the meaning or
significance to ascribe to the legal writings which constitute the
intrinsic record is legal analysis. ... Determining the significance of
disclosures in the specification or prosecution history is also part of
the legal analysis. Understandings that lie outside the patent
documents about the meaning of terms to one of skill in the art or
the science or state of the knowledge of one of skill in the art are
factual issues."
The majority thus proscribed a limited role for fact-finding and
concluded that, even accepting the district court's findings, the
claims were indefinite because the intrinsic evidence did not give
enough guidance about which meaning of molecular weight was
intended. Judge Haldane Robert Mayer dissented, explaining that
he would have given more weight to Teva's expert testimony that
"molecular weight" had a clear meaning to the skilled artisan and
42. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
43. Id. at 1341-45.
44. Id. at 1342 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 1344-45.
2016] 777
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that, at a minimum, a remand was required to allow the district court
to reconsider the issue and rnake new findings after Nautlius."
The upshot ,is that. Teva will likely change little, especially in
garden-variety claim construction cases. Teva did not disturb the
Phillips approach to claim construction, which gives primacy to the
intrinsic evidence.4 7 So the Federal Circuit can simply review claim
construction de novo based on the intrinsic evidence and dismiss any
extrinsic evidence as legally irrelevant, as it did in the Teva remand.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit's claim construction decisions this year
suggest that it is mostly business as usual." For example, where
evidence was even arguably "extrinsic," the Federal Circuit still
applied de novo review because there was no dispute over its content
and "what remains is what, if any, significance it might have for the
ultimate claim construction, which is a question of law."" Likewise, the
mere fact that the district court hears extrinsic evidence does not change
the outcome unless the district court actually makes factual findings."o
46. Id. at 1346-49 (Mayer,J., dissenting).
47. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317-19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
48. See, e.g., TomTom, Inc. v. Adolph, 790 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(refusing to give deference to "findings regarding the distinctions [an inventor]
made in the specification and file history between his invention and prior art"
because these were part of the intrinsic evidence); Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn,
Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("In this case, because the intrinsic record
fully determines the proper construction, we review the [Patent Trial and Appeal]
Board's [(Board)] claim constructions de novo."); Cadence Pharms. Inc. v. Exela
PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Because the district court's
claim constructions were based solely on the intrinsic record, the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Teva does not require us to review the district court's claim
construction any differently than under the de novo standard we have long
applied."); MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 780 F.3d 1159, 1180 (Fed. Cir.)
("Because the district court's construction relies only on intrinsic evidence, we review
its construction de novo."), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 270 (2015); Pacing Techs., LLC v.
Garmin Int'l, Inc., 778 F.3d 1021, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Because the only evidence
at issue on appeal and presented to the district court in this claim construction was
intrinsic, our review of the constructions is de novo."); FenF, LLC v. SmartThingz,
Inc., 601 F. App'x 950, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("We review the district court's claim
construction de novo because the intrinsic record-the claims, the specification, and
the prosecution history-fully informs the proper construction in this case."); In re
Papst Licensing Dig. Camera Patent Litig., 778 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("In
this case, we review the district court's claim constructions de novo, because intrinsic
evidence fully determines the proper constructions.").
49. Info-Hold, Inc. v. Applied Media Techs. Corp., 783 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
50. See Shire Dev., LLC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 787 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2015) ("The [Supreme] Court did not hold that a deferential standard of review is
triggered any time a district court hears or receives extrinsic evidence. Here, there is
no indication that the district court made any factual findings that underlie its
778
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The only decision where the new standard changed the result was
the remand decision in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics
North America Corp." The panel originally applied de novo review,
reversed the district court, concluded the term "voltage source
means" was subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) because it did not connote
sufficient structure, and invalidated the patent as indefinite because
the specification did not disclose corresponding structure.12
Although the patentee's "expert testimony suggests that some
structure for performing the recited function is implied," it did not
"cure the absence of structural language in the claim itself," did not
"establish that the term 'voltage source' was used synonymously with a
defined class of structures at the time the invention was made," and,
in fact "suggests a lack of a defined class of structures.""
On remand, however, the panel reached the opposite result by
finding no clear error in the district court's treatment of the expert
testimony.5 The panel thought it legally appropriate to rely on
extrinsic evidence because it was not being used to contradict the
patent." The panel then noted the district court had found, based
on the testimony, that the term would be understood by skilled
artisans to connote a "class of structures," and concluded that this
finding was supported by the record." Contrary to its prior decision,
the panel determined that the "expert testimony support[ed] a
conclusion that the limitations convey[ed] a defined structure to one
of ordinary skill in the art," and found the term was not subject to
§ 112(f) "[b]ecause the district court's factual findings
demonstrate [d] that the claims convey [ed] sufficient structure.""
constructions. . . ." (citations omitted)); see also CardSoft, LLC v. VeriFone, Inc., 807
F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("But as we have repeatedly held after Teva, it is not
enough that the district court may have heard extrinsic evidence during a claim
construction proceeding-rather, the district court must have actually made a factual
finding in order to trigger Teva's deferential review.").
51. 790 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated
the prior en banc opinion in Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Electronics North
America Corp., and remanded for reconsideration in light of Teva. See Lightening Ballast
Control, LLC v. Universal Lighting Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015).
52. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 498 F. App'x 986,
987 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
53. Id. at 991-92.
54. 790 F.3d at 1338-39.
55. Id. at 1338.
56. Id. at 1339.
57. Id.
7792016]
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Lighting Ballast blurred the line between law and fact: whether the
expert testimony is legally sufficient to establish that the term
"voltage source" connotes sufficient structure appears as though it
should be subject to de novo review. The expert's testimony was
unchanged-he said the term connoted a rectifier or a battery,
depending on whether AC or DC current was involved." Perhaps the
panel was retracting its earlier de novo interpretation that this
testimony merely referred to examples, and accepted the district
court's interpretation that it referred to a closed class of structures.
Another consideration that might be at play is, as discussed below,
the Federal Circuit's eliminating of the "strong presumption" that the
word "means" in a claim invokes § 112(f)," which had tipped the
balance in the prior panel decision."o But Lighting Ballast didn't say
that it was this change to the presumption that tipped the balance.
Ultimately, Teva changed little in the vast majority of Federal
Circuit claim construction appeals this year. The future may be
different. Parties will likely start presenting more extrinsic evidence,
and district courts will likely start making more explicit factual
findings to try to protect their claim construction rulings. In
particular, parties can submit expert evidence about what a term
means generally in the art, and then argue that the same meaning
should apply as a legal matter in the context of the patent. If the
district court credits that expert evidence, and there is nothing in the
patent to contradict the testimony or suggest a different meaning,
that factual finding might be dispositive on appeal, as it was in
Lighting Ballast. On the other hand, the Teva remand decision
suggests that the Federal Circuit will be skeptical of experts who try to
interpret the patent itself. And the court may always choose to apply
de novo review by finding that the intrinsic evidence resolves claim
construction, without needing to consult extrinsic sources.
B. Methodology
The Federal Circuit issued over twenty claim construction opinions
in 2015. Rather than addressing the particulars of each, it is more
useful to group them by a few common themes.
58. Id. at 1335, 1339.
59. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(en banc).
60. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 498 F. App'x 986,
991 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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One major trend was the continued application of the framework
articulated in Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC,61
under which claim language gets its plain meaning to the skilled
artisan unless the "exacting" standard for either lexicography or
disavowal is met." Many cases applied these principles to adopt
broad constructions of disputed terms." But three decisions found
61. 669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
62. Id. at 1367-68.
63. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 805 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (affirming a broad construction that was consistent with the claim
language and not limited by the specification of the patentee's statements in prior
litigation), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016) (No. 15-993);
Imaginal Systematic, LLC v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 805 F.3d 1102, 1111-12 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (construing the term "vision guidance system" in a negative limitation broadly,
based on ordinary meaning and the specification, and affirming the underlying non-
infringement judgment); Atlas IP, LLC v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 804 F.3d 1185, 1189
(Fed. Cir. 2015) ("There is no reason to read that particular embodiment into the
claim language."); Inline Plastics Corp. v. EasyPak, LLC, 799 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) ("Here, the preferred embodiment is not described as having certain
unique characteristics of patentable distinction from other disclosed embodiments.
Nor are other embodiments inadequately described in relation to the principles of
the invention. Absent such traditional aspects of restrictive claim construction, the
patentee is entitled to claim scope commensurate with the invention that is
described in the specification."); TomTom, Inc. v. Adolph, 790 F.3d 1315, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (reversing an overly narrow construction of the claim language and,
although finding some parts of the preamble that provided an antecedent basis
limited, holding that other parts were not limiting); Williamson v. Citrix Online,
LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("The district court erred in construing
these terms as requiring a 'pictorial map.' First, the claim language itself contains no
such 'pictorial map' limitation. ... While the specification discloses examples and
embodiments where the virtual classroom is depicted as a 'map' or 'seating chart,'
nowhere does the specification limit the graphical display to those examples and
embodiments."); Info-Hold, Inc. v. Applied Media Techs. Corp., 783 F.3d 1262, 1267
(Fed. Cir. 2015) ("We find that the claim term 'transmit' and the specification
support a construction that is neutral as to whether the message playback device or
the server initiates the transmission. Nothing in the word 'transmit' suggests a
limitation on initiation: there is no linguistic ambiguity to resolve. And the
specification confirms the term's neutrality as to initiation."); Cadence Pharms. Inc.
v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("We agree with the
district court that the plain and ordinary meaning of 'buffering agent' is 'an agent
that helps the formulation resist change in pH.' We see nothing in the intrinsic
record to warrant adding requirements of effective concentration or resistance to
material change. The statement in the specification that the concentration of the
buffer 'may be' between 0.1 and 10 mg/ml is not limiting .... Moreover, the fact
that during prosecution applicants added the term 'buffering agent' in response to a
rejection does not show that the phrase requires a minimum concentration or
resistance to material change."); In re Papst Licensing Dig. Camera Patent Litig., 778
F.3d 1255, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("[W]e see nothing to take that embodiment
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that the "exacting" standard for disclaimer was met: two based on the
specification,' and the other based on the prosecution history.65  In
each of those cases, the disclaimer involved the patentee either
repeatedly distinguishing prior art or using claim language in a
definitional way.66 By contrast, the mere absence of disclosure in the
written description does not constitute disclaimer.
Plain meaning is not a license to expand the claims beyond their
proper scope. In particular, a term's plain meaning must be
determined based on the whole intrinsic record, and they have
reviewed the entire specification and prosecution history to
determine that meaning.' A dictionary cannot be used to establish
outside the reach of the usual rule that claims are generally not limited to features
found in what the written description presents as mere embodiments, where the
claim language is plainly broader.").
64. Openwave Sys., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 808 F.3d 509, 517 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("There
is no doubt a high bar to finding disavowal of claim scope through disparagement of
the prior art in the specification. In this case, however, it is difficult to envisage how,
in light of the repeated disparagement of mobile devices with 'computer modules'
discussed above, one could read the claims of the patents-in-suit to cover such
devices."); Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int'l, Inc., 778 F.3d 1021, 1025 (Fed. Cir.
2015) ("The characterization of a feature as 'an object' or 'another object,' or even
as a 'principal object,' will not always rise to the level of disclaimer.... However, the
'843 patent goes further .... Immediately following the enumeration of the
different objects of the present invention, the '843 patent states that '[t]hose [listed
[nineteen] objects] and other objects and features of the present invention are
accomplished, as embodied and fully described herein, by a repetitive motion pacing
system that includes .. . a data storage and playback device adapted to producing the
sensible tempo.' With these words, the patentee does not describe yet another object
of the invention-he alerts the reader that the invention accomplishes all of its
objects and features (the enumerated [nineteen] and all others) with a repetitive
motion pacing system that includes a data storage and playback device adapted to
produce a sensible tempo." (citations omitted)).
65. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 679-80 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) ("[A]pplicant stated that the disparate nature 'refers to' an absence of
common keys or record ID columns of similar value or format. An applicant's use of
the phrase 'refers to' generally indicates an intention to define a term . ... Taken in
its entirety, the prosecution history is clear that the applicant was relying on the
provided definition of 'disparate databases' ..... Though it is true that the applicant
distinguished Jones on other grounds as well, this does not prevent us from using
this particular distinction overJones to construe the phrase 'disparate databases."').
66. Openwave, 808 F.3d at 512; Vasudevan, 782 F.3d at 679; Pacing Techs., 778 F.3d at 1024.
67. In re Papst, 778 F.3d at 1267 ("This assertion does not suggest a disclaimer of
any sort; it merely asserts an absence of something in the written description.").
68. Atlas IP, LLC v. Medtronic, Inc., 809 F.3d 599, 608 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("The
district court relied entirely on what it viewed as the 'plain meaning' of the claim
language. The court thought the meaning so plain that it did not even discuss any of
the contextual considerations that are often central to claim construction. That was
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plain meaning when it conflicts with the intrinsic record." Claim
differentiation cannot be used to broaden a claim in a manner
inconsistent with its plain meaning,70 and has limited utility in
situations where additional evidence points strongly in the other
direction.' Moreover, when the claim's plain meaning is ambiguous,
it is appropriate to look to the specification for guidance.7 ' Although
we usually think that a "plain meaning" construction is broader, the
Federal Circuit sometimes narrows the construction when applying its
plain meaning.
erroneous. The claim language does not have the decisive plain meaning the district
court found, and contextual considerations point compellingly the other way."
(internal citation omitted)); Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P'ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1322-
23 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("The terms used in patent claims are not construed in the
abstract, but in the context in which the term was presented and used by the
patentee, as it would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the field
of the invention on reading the patent documents.").
69. Kaneka Corp. v. Xiamen Kingdomway Grp. Co., 790 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) ("Claim construction begins with the language of the claims ....
Extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions, for example, may be useful when
construing claim terms, 'so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any
definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents' . . . . A
construction that excludes all disclosed embodiments, such as the district court's
construction of the term 'sealed tank,' is especially disfavored." (citations omitted)).
70. Enzo Biochem Inc. v. Applera Corp., 780 F.3d 1149, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
("Thus, as claim 1 is limited to indirect detection by its own plain meaning, it would
be inappropriate to use the doctrine of claim differentiation to broaden claim 1 to
include a limitation imported from a dependent claim, such as direct detection.").
71. CardSoft, LLC v. VeriFone, Inc., 807 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
("Because the ordinary meaning of 'virtual machine' is clear in light of the
specification and prosecution history, claim differentiation does not change its
meaning."); Medtronic, 809 F.3d 599, 607 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("[W]e have been cautious
in assessing the force of claim differentiation in particular settings, recognizing that
patentees often use different language to capture the same invention, discounting it
where it is invoked based on independent claims rather than the relation of an
independent and dependent claim, and not permitting it to override the strong
evidence of meaning supplied by the specification.").
72. Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc., 808 F.3d 1313, 1317
(Fed. Cir. 2015) ("As properly understood, the district court's construction is
supported by the claims and specification. The specification does not expressly
define 'proximate end.' Yet every figure that depicts the disputed connection shows
the container packer piston-and-cylinder unit connected to the container packer at
the container packer's extreme edge.").
73. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming narrow construction where "the language of the claim
itself suggest[ed] that the machine readable instructions [were] used to physically
separate the hard-copy prints," "the specification consistently describe[d] the
machine readable instruction form as a hard-copy document and thus in no way
contradict[ed] the plain meaning of the claim language," and "the prosecution
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The Federal Circuit also addressed an important practical point,
reaffirming that the district court is not required to further construe a
claim term composed of common English words where the court resolves
the parties' dispute by rejecting the defendant's narrower construction.74
Finally, a court assessing whether there is a substantive change to a
claim's scope based on amendments during reexamination simply
compares the scope of the original and amendment claims, without
regard to why the amendment was made.
All these decisions warrant more scrutiny by lawyers who face new
cases with similar claim terms or who want more detail on the facts
that led the Federal Circuit to apply the principles discussed above.
What is becoming increasingly clear, however, is that a solid majority
of Federal Circuit judges are now using the Thorner approach to
guide their claim construction. Thorner was hardly a new test-but it
cleverly collected principles that the Federal Circuit had been
applying for years in a succinct way, which once again reasserts the
primacy of the claim language. District court litigants, especially
those wanting broad constructions, will want to frame their
arguments in precisely that manner. Litigants who want to rely more
heavily on the specification would be well-advised to contest that the
history suggest[ed] that the machine readable instructions must be in hard copy");
Shire Dev., LLC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 787 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
("These constructions do not reflect the ordinary and customary meaning of the
claim terms in light of the intrinsic evidence and are impermissibly broad."); Enzo
Biochem Inc. v. Applera Corp., 780 F.3d 1149, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Thus,
construing the phrase to allow for a single-component system, as the district court
did here, would read out the phrase 'component of a signalling moiety' and would
thus impermissibly broaden the claim.").
74. Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
("At the claim construction stage, the district court rejected Samsung's argument
that ongoing activity is -required-the heart of the parties' disagreement-and
declined to further construe the term because it was a 'straightforward term' that
required no construction .... Because the plain and ordinary meaning of the
disputed claim language is clear, the district court did not err by declining to
construe the claim term.").
75. R+L Carriers, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 801 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
("Under the statute and our prior case law, it is irrelevant why an amended claim is
narrowed during reexamination, or even whether the patentee intended to narrow
the claim in a particular way. If the scope of the amended claim is not 'substantially
identical' to the scope of the original claim-based on a normal claim construction
analysis-per § 252, that fact affects intervening rights. See 35 U.S.C. § 307(b)
(2012). The fact that the reason for the amendment during reexamination might
not have been for the purpose of narrowing the claim in a particular way does not
matter. And, the court is not charged with assessing why a claim might have been
narrowed as a predicate to determining whether it has been narrowed.").
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term has a single plain meaning (or perhaps any plain meaning at
all), or else they will need to meet the "exacting" standards for
lexicography or disavowal.
C. Section 112(671
The Federal Circuit also issued several decisions construing a
particular type of claim term-means-plus-function limitations
subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(6). The major development was that the en
banc court scaled back the presumption that a claim element with the
word "means" is subject to interpretation under § 112(6). Some context
on what § 112(6) is and why it matters may help put the issue in context.
The statute, quoted below, permits an applicant to recite a claim
element in a generic, functional manner (i.e., as a "means" for
carrying out a particular function), but limits the claim's scope to the
structures disclosed in the patent's specification:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.78
In effect, the statute allows the patent applicant to use a
shorthand-rather than muddying the claim with structural detail,
the applicant can use a label that incorporates the specification's
more specific structures by reference.
The parties usually have different incentives about whether to
argue a claim term is subject to § 112(6). A patentee may want to
avoid asserting that the claim is governed by § 112(6) because this
limits the claim's scope-if the defendant's accused product does not
have one of the structures disclosed in the specification (or an
equivalent), then there is no infringement. In addition, a patentee
whose specification does not include specific structure detail (or, in
the case of some software patents, a specific algorithm) may want to
avoid § 112(6) treatment because the claim will then be invalid as
76. 35 U.S.C. § 112(6). The AIA amended 35 U.S.C. § 112 to break it into
subsections with letters, so what used to be 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) is now officially 35
U.S.C. § 112(f). But this Article refers to the old terminology here because many of
the cases still use it.
77. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en
banc in relevant part).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) (2006) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012)).
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indefinite." On the other hand, a patentee who wants to avoid prior
art and has a detailed specification may want § 112(6) treatment.
Precedent had debated the effect of the patentee's choice to either
explicitly include or exclude the words "means for" in a claim.
Earlier cases held that the use of the term "means" in the claim
created a presumption that § 112(6) applied, while omission of the
term "means" created a presumption that it did not apply.so But they
applied the presumption flexibility because the ultimate inquiry was
whether claim language connoted sufficient structure from which
one could conclude that the patentee was not trying to use a
shorthand label and incorporate the specification by reference."
More recent cases, however, took a more rigid view, describing the
presumption as "a strong one that is not readily overcome,"" even
adding that "[w]hen the claim drafter has not signaled his intent to
invoke § 112, 1 6 by using the term 'means,' we are unwilling to apply
that provision without a showing that the limitation essentially is
devoid of anything that can be construed as structure. "83
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC" reversed this trend, overruling the
"strong" presumption and the "essentially devoid of structure"
requirement." The en banc majority was concerned that the
presumption had allowed patentees to sneak through too many
overly broad, functional claims by omitting the word "means":
Our consideration of this case has led us to conclude that such a
heightened burden is unjustified and that we should abandon
characterizing as "strong" the presumption that a limitation lacking
79. See, e.g., Aristocrat Techs. Austl. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1332
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
80. See, e.g., Personalized Media Commc'ns, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d
696, 703-04 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
81. Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Merely
because a named element of a patent claim is followed by the word 'means,'
however, does not automatically make that element a 'means-plus-function' element
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 6.. . . The converse is also true; merely because an
element does not include the word 'means' does not automatically prevent that
element from being construed as a means-plus-function element.").
82. Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Ams. Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
83. Flo Healthcare Sols., LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see
also Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining
that the Federal Circuit has "'seldom' held that a limitation without recitation of
'means' is a means-plus-function limitation").
84. 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
85. Id. at 1348-49.
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the word "means" is not subject to § 112, para. 6. That
characterization is unwarranted, is uncertain in meaning and
application, and has the inappropriate practical effect of placing a
thumb on what should otherwise be a balanced analytical scale. It
has shifted the balance struck by Congress in passing § 112, para. 6
and has resulted in a proliferation of functional claiming untethered
to § 112, para. 6 and free of the strictures set forth in the statute."'
Instead, the en banc majority reinstated the presumption as it had
been applied before the more recent case law."
The court then held that the limitation "distributed learning
control module" was subject to § 112(6)." Although the term did
not use the word "means," the word "module" was effectively a
synonym for "means," and "is simply a generic description for
software or hardware that performs a specified function.""
Moreover, the prefix "distributed learning control" did not connote
structure, even as read in light of the specification."o Although the
claim included high-level detail about the module's inputs and
outputs, it did not concretely explain how it interacted with the other
elements in a way that would permit inferences about its structure."
Expert testimony that a skilled artisan could program a computer to
perform the claimed functions was irrelevant and did not create
structure that was missing from the claim itself." The claim was thus
indefinite, as the specification did not disclose any corresponding
structure for the limitation either.9 '
Judge Jimmie V. Reyna wrote separately, and, although he agreed
with the en banc majority on this point, he expressed concern about
focusing the presumption only on claims that use the term "means,"
when the same concerns about functional claims apply to many
others that do not use that word."
Judge Pauline Newman dissented, arguing that the statutory
language clearly required a patentee to recite an element as a "means
for" performing a function to invoke § 112(6) treatment because the
86. Id. at 1349.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1349-51.
89. Id. at 1350.
90. Id. at 1351.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1352-54.
94. See id. at 1357-58 (explaining that the statute's interchangeable use of the
words "means" and "step" suggests that the presumption should be equally applicable
to either word) (ReynaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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statute refers to an "element ... expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function."" The majority was injecting
uncertainty into what claims are covered by § 112(6), Judge Newman
argued, because instead of simply consulting the claim language,
parties can no longer be sure whether § 112(6) applies until they have
a judicial interpretation of the language."6 She expressed no view on
the ultimate question of validity, explaining that it was a different issue
than whether the claim is subject to § 112(6) treatment.9 7
Two subsequent decisions seem to suggest that the presumption's
effect has largely disappeared. The first, Lighting Ballast, held that the
term "voltage source means," is not subject to § 112(6)." That
opinion may be of limited use, though, because it was decided a week
after Williamson, yet it did not mention the presumption at all, nor
did it cite Williamson. The second decision, Media Rights Technologies,
Inc. v. Capital One Financial Corp.,' as discussed further below, held
that the term "compliance mechanism" was subject to § 112(6).100
This opinion suggests that the new law may make a difference: it
distinguished prior case law, which had otherwise suggested the term
should be subject to § 112(6), because that case law applied the now-
overruled "heavy presumption.""o' It is thus notable that the Federal
Circuit has applied this weaker presumption to both find a "non-means"
claim subject to § 112(6) and a "means" claim not subject to § 112(6).
II. VALIDITY
A. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
Section 101 continues to present the most difficult set of invalidity
issues facing the Federal Circuit. The statute provides that "any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof' is patent-eligible if it
meets the other statutory requirements.02 But the Supreme Court
has held that this seemingly broad statutory text contains an "implicit
exception," namely that "[1]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
95. Id. at 1359 (Newman,J., dissenting) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) (2012)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1362-63.
98. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 790 F.3d 1329,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1226 (Feb. 29, 2016).
99. 800 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1173 (2016).
100. Id. at 1373.
101. Id.
102. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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abstract ideas are not patentable."0 The purpose of this judicially
imposed exception is to prevent "pre-emption" of basic "building
blocks of human ingenuity," which would prevent further scientific
advancement.0 4  Of course, no one writes patents that explicitly
recite one of these basic principles-no one says, "I claim E = mc."
So the courts have to assess whether a patent has come too close to
tying up the principle itself, or is instead a new, patent-eligible
application of that principle. And therein lies the challenge.
The Supreme Court has announced a two-step approach for
answering such questions. "First, we determine whether the claims
at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts."0 5
If so, the Court then considers the claim elements, both individually
and "as an ordered combination," to determine if there is an
"inventive concept" that is "sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself."'0o
Applying this two-step test can be a challenge because the Supreme
Court's precedent deals with relatively easy cases. We know that
patenting old business practices is not allowed, even if they are newly
implemented on generic computer equipment.0 7 We know that you
cannot patent isolated DNA, but can patent non-naturally occurring
portions of a DNA sequence. 10 And we know that you can patent a
method of simply thinking about a naturally occurring correlation
between drug metabolite levels and toxicity or efficacy.'09 But, in
each of these cases, the "abstract idea," law of nature, or naturally
occurring thing was pretty easy to define, and the patent plainly
preempted its use.
103. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014)
(quoting Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2116 (2013)).
104. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354.
105. Id. at 2355.
106. Id. at 2355 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132
S. Ct. 1289, 1294, 1298 (2012)).
107. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 597-98, 612 (2010) (finding a computer
program "instructing buyers and sellers how to protect against risk of price
fluctuations" non-patentable because it was an abstract idea rather than a "process");
Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2356-60 (holding that the method claims requiring generic
computer implementation failed to render the abstract idea of risk hedging patent
eligible).
108. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119-20.
109. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296-1302.
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Some of the Federal Circuit's 2015 cases dealt with similarly
straightforward situations. Two dealt with patents to pricing methods
using computers. In particular, OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc."o held that claims that "describe the automation of the
fundamental economic concept of offer-based price optimization
through the use of generic-computer functions" were invalid because
"relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or
more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.""'
Likewise, Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc."'
invalidated claims "directed to the abstract idea of determining a
price, using organizational and product group hierarchies," where
"the function performed by the computer at each step [was] purely
conventional," the claims "d[id] not improve some existing
technological process," and the claims "[were] not rooted in
computer technology to solve a problem specifically arising in some
aspect of computer technology.""' Both cases fit comfortably within
Alice Corp.'s prohibition against patents on implementing previously
known business activities onto a generic computer.
Another similarly simple issue was presented in Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA),"' which invalidated method claims to
computer-implemented budgeting."' Under Alice Corp. step one,
"the patent claims are directed to an abstract idea: tracking financial
transactions to determine whether they exceed a pre-set spending
limit (i.e., budgeting).""' That the claims required using a
"communication medium," (e.g., the Internet and telephone
networks) did not render them any less abstract. " Moreover, the
claims had no "inventive concept" under Alice Corp. step two. "The
recited elements, e.g., a database, a user profile . .. and a
communication medium, are all generic computer elements.
Instructing one to 'apply' an abstract idea and reciting no more than
generic computer elements performing generic computer tasks does
not make an abstract idea patent-eligible.""' A human could have
110. 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 701 (2015).
111. Id. at 1362-63.
112. 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S.
Mar. 11, 2016) (No. 15-1145).
113. Id. at 1333-34.
114. 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
115. Id. at 1368.
116. Id. at 1367.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1368.
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done the same calculations in real time with "pencil and paper,"
further underscoring the insignificance of the computer limitations. "9
Intellectual Ventures also dealt with a separate patent, however, that
presented a somewhat closer case. The claims recited a system for
customizing web page content based on the user's navigation history
and other known information.'20 Under Alice Corp. step one, the
Federal Circuit determined that "customizing information based on
(1) information known about the user and (2) navigation data" was
an abstract idea, citing old examples of tailoring newspaper inserts
based on a customer's address and targeting television advertisements
based on the time of day (e.g., toy commercials during Saturday
morning cartoons and beer commercials during Sunday afternoon
football) .12' The Federal Circuit was certainly right that this idea was
old, and, at a high level of generality, it looks like a business method.
But is the idea really "abstract"?
At Alice Corp. step two, the claim's recitation of generic hardware
and software did not provide an inventive concept because "merely
adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of
the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract
idea." 2 2 The patentee's reliance on unclaimed limitations to make
its claims seem more concrete could not save their validity. This is a
warning to litigators not to argue for overly broad claim constructions
that leave them without a hook to save the claims from abstractness,
and to patent prosecutors, who must write at least some dependent
claims with meaty limitations tied to any specific improvement the
patentee has made.
Intellectual Ventures is also notable because it distinguished DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,'12 the only Federal Circuit case in
recent years to uphold claims against a § 101 challenge:
The patent at issue in DDR provided an Internet-based solution to
solve a problem unique to the Internet that (1) did not foreclose
other ways of solving the problem, and (2) recited a specific series
of steps that resulted in a departure from the routine and
conventional sequence of events after the click of a hyperlink
advertisement. The patent claims here do not address problems
unique to the Internet, so DDR has no applicability.124
119. Id. at 1368-69.
120. Id. at 1369.
121. Id. at 1369-70.
122. Id. at 1370.
123. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
124. Intellectual Ventures, 792 F.3d at 1371 (citations omitted).
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Defendants will certainly cite this passage in future cases to limit
DDR's applicability.
Another decision that further tested the limits of abstractness was
Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,1 15 which invalidated claims
to a method that enabled users to preserve information they entered
into a web browser when the user hit the "back" or "forward"
buttons."' The Federal Circuit's articulation of the "abstract idea" to
which the claims were directed was striking-"the idea of retaining
information in the navigation of online forms."" That does not
sound terribly "abstract." It is not a fundamental economic principle
or known business practice. Moreover, the court's observation that
the claim involved conventional Internet browsers, web forms, and
back and forward buttons seems to miss the point. The claims were
directed to solving a problem caused by that existing functionality, a
problem to which there was apparently no "conventional" solution.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit's result may be understandable,
because the claims covered any way of preserving the entered data
without specifying any details, even though that step was supposedly
the crux of the invention.12 8  That seems too broad, although you
have to wonder if § 112, rather than § 101, would be a better vehicle
for addressing that overbreadth issue than.
The most controversial § 101 case, however, dealt with a patent to a
natural phenomenon. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.12 1
invalidated a patent to detecting paternally inherited fetal DNA in
the mother's bloodstream.s0  Everyone agreed that this was a
remarkable invention that allowed for less invasive prenatal testing, as
researchers had previously thrown out this part of the sample, instead
examining genetic material obtained from the fetus or placenta,
which was riskier to extract.'"' Nevertheless, the panel invalidated the
125. 790 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
126. Id. at 1348.
127. Id.
128. Id. The Federal Circuit also invalidated dependent claims that added further
limitations about what the system displayed but again did not appear to limit how the
system maintained the information that the user inputted into the webpage. Id. at
1349 ("The additional limitations of these dependent claims do not add an inventive
concept, for they represent merely generic data collection steps or siting the
ineligible concept in a particular technological environment.").
129. 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh'd denied en banc, 809 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
130. Id. at 1379-80 (disregarding amici suggesting "distinctions among natural
phenomena" based upon potential for future innovation).
131. Id. at 1373, 1379-80; see also id. at 1380-81 (LinnJ., concurring).
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claims under Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc. 'S1s2 two-step test. 13  The claims were directed to a natural
phenomenon because the circulation of paternally inherited fetal
DNA in the mother's blood was nature's handiwork, and the patent
did not involve altering any of that genetic information in any way.131
Moreover, they lacked any "inventive concept," because the only
additional elements involved using known, conventional techniques
for detecting and amplifying the DNA." The panel refused to
conduct any separate, freestanding inquiry into preemption because
Mayo's two-step framework already accounts for any such
considerations."' It also stressed that "the absence of complete
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility," and refused
"to draw distinctions among natural phenomena based on whether
or not they will interfere significantly with innovation in other fields
now or in the future."'"' It did not matter that the patentee's
invention was scientifically significant, because this alone does not
confer patent-eligibility38 :
While Drs. Lo and Wainscoat's discovery regarding cffDNA may
have been a significant contribution to the medical field, that alone
does not make it patentable. We do not disagree that detecting
cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum that before was discarded as
waste material is a positive and valuable contribution to science.
But even such valuable contributions can fall short of statutory
patentable subject matter, as it does here.139
The claims were therefore invalid.
Judge Richard Linn joined the panel decision under compulsion of
Mayo, but wrote separately to express his concern about the breadth
of Mayo's second step.14 0 "This case represents the consequence-
perhaps unintended-of that broad language in excluding a
meritorious invention from the patent protection it deserves and
132. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
133. Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 1375-76.
134. Id. at 1376 ("It is undisputed that the existence of cffDNA in maternal blood
is a natural phenomenon.").
135. Id. at 1377-78.
136. Id. at 1379 ("Where a patent's claims are deemed only to disclose patent
ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case,
preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.").
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1379-80.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring) ("I join the court's opinion ... only because
I am bound by the sweeping language of . .. Mayo.").
7932016]
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
should have been entitled to retain."' Mayo had dismissed all "post-
solution activity" as irrelevant to patentability, even though it was
unnecessary to do so, because the Court could have simply treated
those steps as well-known and routine as doctors were already
administering the drug, measuring metabolites, and adjusting
dosages."' "The Supreme Court's blanket dismissal of conventional
post-solution steps leaves no room to distinguish Mayo from this case,
even though here no one was amplifying and detecting paternally-
inherited cffDNA using the plasma or serum of pregnant mothers."43
"While the instructions in the claims at issue in Mayo had been widely
used by doctors-they had been measuring metabolites and
recalculating dosages based on toxicity/inefficacy limits for years-here,
the amplification and detection of cffDNA had never before been done.
The new use of the previously discarded maternal plasma to achieve
such an advantageous result is deserving of patent protection.""'
One could go even further than Judge Linn in distinguishing Mayo
because the Mayo claims did not actually require the doctor to adjust
drug dosage-they prevented doctors from so much as thinking
about the claimed correlation.'15  In particular, Prometheus had
accused a Mayo doctor of infringement merely because she had once
seen a test report that showed the claimed correlation and might
have thought about it during her research into completely different
diseases."' By contrast, the Ariosa claims would not preempt
researchers from looking for other sources of fetal genetic material
that might provide information-they would only prevent the use of
paternally inherited DNA from the mother's bloodstream.
Ariosa and several amici urged rehearing en banc, but the full
court denied the request."' Several judges issued separate opinions,
however, asking for further Supreme Court guidance."' Judge Alan
Lourie, joined by Judge Kimberly Moore, agreed that Mayo required
invalidation of Ariosa's claims, but argued that the claims here were
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1380-81.
143. Id. at 1381.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1380-81.
146. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., Inc., Civil No. 04cv1200
JAH (RBB), 2008 WL 878910, at *12 n.10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev'd, 581 F.3d
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010), rev'd, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
147. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2015).




not the type of nature law or abstract idea that should be
unpatentable.'4 1 "The claims rely on or operate by, but do not recite,
a natural phenomenon or law." 5 o Instead, they are "directed to an
actual use of the natural material of cffDNA," "recite innovative and
practical uses for it, particularly for diagnostic testing," and recite an
activity (testing paternal inherited DNA) that was "not routine and
conventional."15 ' Although the claims might seem overly broad or
vague, any concerns here could be addressed with "the finer filter of
§ 112." 112 Moreover, the patents did not involve an abstract idea-
" [t]here is nothing abstract about performing actual physical steps on
a physical material."151 "And if the concern is preemption of a
natural phenomenon, this is, apparently, a novel process and that is
what patents are intended to incentivize and be awarded for." 5
Judge Timothy Dyk also wrote separately to identify a potential
problem with the Mayo/Alice Corp. two-step approach. He thought
the approach "works well when the abstract idea or law of nature in
question is well known and longstanding," and, in such
circumstances, "there is no basis for attributing novelty to that aspect
of the claimed invention."" He also thought the approach "works
well with respect to abstract ideas," because "claims to business
methods and other processes that merely organize human activity
should not be patent eligible under any circumstances."5 6
Nevertheless,
there is a problem with Mayo insofar as it concludes that inventive
concept cannot come from discovering something new in nature-
e.g., identification of a previously unknown natural relationship or
property.... [A]n inventive concept can come not just from
creative, unconventional application of a natural law, but also from
the creativity and novelty of the discovery of the law itself. 5 7
This was not to say that a newly discovered natural law should be
patentable in its entirety-the claim should be "limited to a specific
application of the new law of nature discovered by the patent
149. Id. at 1284-85 (LourieJ., concurring).
150. Id. at 1286.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1286-87.
154. Id. at 1287.
155. Id. at 1288-89 (DykJ., concurring).
156. Id. at 1289.
157. Id.
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applicant and [actually] reduced to practice."' And, with that in
mind, Judge Dyk did not think his approach would change the result
here given the breadth of Ariosa's claims."
Judge Newman dissented to the denial of rehearing.6 o She agreed
with Judges Lourie, Moore, and Linn that the claims should be
patentable but did not think that Mayo precluded this result."'
Whether or not Mayo drew an appropriate line in that case,
particularly in view of the specificity of the diagnostic method that
was developed, this decision does not require the drawing of a
different line on quite different facts. In the case now before us,
the claimed method was not previously known, nor the diagnostic
knowledge and benefit implemented by the method. 6 2
In her view, the claims covered not the scientific fact that fetal DNA
circulates in the mother's blood, but "a new diagnostic method of
using this information."' "Precedent does not require that all
discoveries of natural phenomena or their application in new ways or
for new uses are ineligible for patenting; the [Federal Circuit] has
cautioned against such generalizations."'6
We will have to wait to see whether the Supreme Court once again
intervenes to address the concerns in these opinions. It seems like
the Court will have to do so soon. As Judge Lourie put it, "[a] 11
physical steps of human ingenuity utilize natural laws or involve
natural phenomena," so "those steps cannot be patent-ineligible
solely on that basis because, under that reasoning, nothing in the
physical universe would be patent-eligible."' The same can be said
for abstract ideas, because every patent claim can be reduced to any
"abstract idea" if you rephrase it at a high enough level of generality.
Current law threatens to swallow the whole of patent law. Something
should be done. Soon.
B. Anticipation
The Federal Circuit addressed four interesting anticipation issues
in 2015. The first was in Ineos USA LLC v. Bery Plastics Corp.,' which
158. Id. at 1291.
159. Id. at 1293.
160. Id. (NewmanJ., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1294.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1285 (LourieJ., concurring).
166. 783 F.3d 865 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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dealt with the patentability of a composition claim that specified a
range of concentrations for each ingredient.1 7 The claim required a
composition with a lubricant in the amount of 0.05%-5% by weight.'
The issue was whether the prior art similarly disclosed a range or
instead disclosed particular points within the range because "[w] hen
a patent claims a range, as in this case, that range is anticipated by a
prior art reference if the reference discloses a point within the
range."'69 By contrast, if "the prior art discloses its own range, rather
than a specific point, then the prior art is only anticipatory if it
describes the claimed range with sufficient specificity such that a
reasonable fact finder could conclude that there is no reasonable
difference in how the invention operates over the ranges."' Here,
the prior art disclosed the latter, because it disclosed lubricants in
quantities of "at least" 0.1%, 0.2%, or 0.4% by weight, but "[did] not
exceed" 5% by weight, and those terms denoted three ranges.171
However, the claim was still invalid because the patentee put in no
evidence that the claimed range operated differently than the prior
art range.'72  The patent said that the lubricant made it easier to
unscrew a bottle cap, and there was no evidence that the claim range
was different than the prior art in that regard; testimony that the
claimed range reduced manufacturing costs and eliminated
blemishes was irrelevant."' Another claim limitation required 0-
0.15% of a secondary lubricant, and the prior art disclosed this
because it had no secondary lubricant and thus disclosed a point in
the range-0%." Finally, the prior art disclosure of a small genus of
fatty acids disclosed a third disputed claim limitation, which required
a specific fatty acid that fell within that genus."
A second case dealt with how the Patent Office can use the
applicant's specification when assessing anticipation. In re Morsa"6
held that the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (Board or PTAB)
correctly used the specification's description of the skilled artisan's
167. Id. at 867.
168. Id.




173. Id. at 870-71.
174. Id. at 871.
175. Id. at 871-72.
176. 803 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
7972016]
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
knowledge to find that a prior art reference was enabling.'7 7 "There
is a crucial difference between using the patent's specification for
filling in gaps in the prior art, and using it to determine the knowledge
of a person of ordinary skill in the art.""17 The former is permitted,
while the latter is off-limits. Judge Newman dissented, arguing that
"gaps in the prior art cannot be filled by the invention at issue." 171
Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co."s turned on whether
the prior art reference disclosed a sufficiently small genus to
anticipate a claim to the species.'8  Substantial evidence supported
the Board's conclusion that it did.'" The claims required a
combination of a cutting insert with a ruthenium binder and a PVD
coating.'3 The prior art disclosed ruthenium as one of five metals
and three coating techniques (which included PVD but not in the
working examples).'8 The patentee argued that this resulted in over
10,000 possibilities (if you counted combinations with multiple
metals or multiple coatings).1' However, the defendant's evidence
showed that a skilled artisan would have envisioned only the
combinations with one metal and one binder, especially because the
prior art patent had a claim to that arrangement.'16  That cut the
total number of combinations significantly, which was enough to
anticipate, even though all of the prior art patent's working examples
involved other metals and coatings."
Finally, In re DiStefano"' dealt with the "printed matter doctrine,"
under which a limitation covering "(a) printed matter that (b) is not
functionally or structurally related to the physical substrate holding
the printed matter" gets no patentable weight.'" With respect to the
177. Id. at 1377.
178. Id. at 1378.
179. Id. at 1381 (Newman,J., dissenting).
180. 780 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
181. Id. at 1382.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1378.
184. Id. at 1380.
185. Id. at 1381-82.
186. Id. at 1382-83.
187. Id. The Federal Circuit also held the same prior art rendered the claims
obvious: "While references that anticipate an invention can, theoretically, still not
make it obvious, that is the rare case." Id. at 1385 (citation omitted). This was not
the rare case given the evidence discussed above, and any unexpected results were
not due to the claim invention, given that the prior art already disclosed this
combination. Id.
188. 808 F.3d 845 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
189. Id. at 848.
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first prong, "a limitation is printed matter only if it claims the content
of information."o190 The doctrine dates to an 1869 case, which held
that coupons with various kinds of stamps and figures were not
patentable."'1 As the Federal Circuit's predecessor court put it in
1931, "[t]he mere arrangement of printed matter on a sheet or sheets
of paper, in book form or otherwise, does not constitute any new and
useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvements thereof.""9 ' The rule is limited "to
matter claimed for its communicative content."" Applying these
principles, the Federal Circuit reversed an anticipation rejection for a
patent to a method of designing web pages because a limitation to
the "origin" of certain "web assets" (e.g., 'Java applets") was not
printed matter.' "Although the selected web assets can and likely
do communicate some information, the content of the information is
not claimed."' The Board thus committed legal error in not giving
those limitations any patentable weight. 1
C. On Sale Bar
The Federal Circuit decided an on sale bar case this year that could
have a major impact on patentees who outsource their
manufacturing, especially pharmaceutical companies. In Medicines
Co. v. Hospira, Inc.,"' the panel determined the patentee's purchase
of its patented product from an outside manufacturer more than a
year before its filing date was an invalidating sale." Citing D.L. Auld Co.
v. Chroma Graphics Corp.,'" the panel rejected the patentee's arguments
that there was no sale, even though the patentee always retained title to
its product, and was only paying for manufacturing services:
We find no principled distinction between the commercial sale of
products prepared by the patented method at issue in D.L. Auld Co.
and the commercial sale of services that result in the patented
product-by-process here. The Medicines Company paid Ben Venue
for performing services that resulted in the patented product-by-
190. Id.
191. Id. at 849 (citing Ex parte Abraham, 1869 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 59).
192. Id. (quoting In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 851.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 791 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015), vacated, 805 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
198. Id. at 1372-73.
199. 714 F.2d 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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process, and thus a 'sale' of services occurred .... As in D.L. Auld
Co., the sale of the manufacturing services here provided a
commercial benefit to the inventor more than one year before a
patent application was filed. Ben Venue's services were performed
to prove to the FDA that The Medicines Company's product met
the already-approved specifications for finished bivalirudin
product. Additionally, Ben Venue marked the batches with
commercial product codes and customer lot numbers and sent
them to The Medicines Company for commercial and clinical
packaging, consistent with the commercial sale of pharmaceutical
drugs. This commercial activity was not insignificant; The
Medicines Company admits that each batch had a commercial
value of over $10 million.200
The panel further relied on Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc.,or which
held that there is no "supplier" exception to the on-sale bar.
202
The panel also rejected the patentee's argument that the case
involved an "experimental" use.20 s The products it purchased
satisfied all the claim limitations, so it did not matter whether the
patentee knew at the time that it was within the claims.
201 "[I]f a
product that is offered for sale inherently possesses each of the
limitations of the claims, then the invention is on sale, whether or not
the parties to the transaction recognize that the product possesses the
claimed characteristics. "20' The panel also observed that there can be
no experimental use after a reduction to practice, and that, although
reduction to practice does not occur until the inventor appreciates
what he has done, that was not the situation here.
20 ' The claims were
thus invalid as a matter of law.
The Federal Circuit has subsequently granted rehearing en banc,
with the briefing and argument to occur in 2016. The Federal
Circuit's en banc order lays out several questions:
(a) Do the circumstances presented here constitute a commercial
sale under the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)?
(i) Was there a sale for the purposes of § 102(b) despite the
absence of a transfer of title?
200. Meds. Co., 791 F.3d at 1371 (citations omitted).
201. 270 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
202. Id. at 1357; Meds. Co., 791 F.3d at 1371.
203. Meds. Co., 791 F.3d at 1372.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1371 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1319
(Fed. Cir. 1999)).
206. Id. at 1372-73.
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(ii) Was the sale commercial in nature for the purposes of
§ 102(b) or an experimental use?
(b) Should this court overrule or revise the principle in [Special
Devices], that there is no "supplier exception" to the on-sale bar of
35 U.S.C. § 102(b)?20 7
The questions reflect both unease with the panel's result and the
analytical difficulty of figuring out how to reverse it. The panel's rule
creates a disparity between patentees with in-house manufacturing
capabilities (and will never have an on-sale bar problem) and
patentees who outsource it (and must be constantly vigilant). There
is no reason to treat those two situations differently. Moreover,
targeting a patentee's purchase of its patented invention from a
supplier does not seem to fit with the purposes of the on-sale bar,
which are to ensure an inventor promptly files its patent application
once it is commercially exploiting the invention and to prevent
removal of existing knowledge from public use.0 8  A patentee's
purchase of its patented product from a supplier does not remove
any knowledge from the public domain-only its subsequent sales to
customers would do that. Here, although the panel noted that the
products at issue were for eventual commercial distribution, there is
no evidence that happened more than a year before the patent filing.
So the transactions in this case should not have been invalidating
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
But what is the best way to design the doctrine to achieve that
result? The easiest way would be to create a "supplier exception" to
the on-sale bar and overrule Special Devices. But there is no support in
the statutory text for such an exception-§ 102(b) refers to any
transaction in which the invention is "on sale."20" The text is not
limited to situations where the patentee is the seller (rather than the
buyer), or circumstances where someone is selling the product to an
end-customer. Maybe a historical analysis would reveal that the on-sale
bar was traditionally applied to sales to end users, allowing the argument
207. The Meds. Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 805 F.3d 1357, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam).
208. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) ("A similar reluctance to
allow an inventor to remove existing knowledge from public use undergirds the on-
sale bar."). See generally Frank Albert, Reformulating the On Sale Bar, 28 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 81 (2005) (discussing the current state of the on sale bar, its
practical impact on commercial activity, its weaknesses, and proposed reformulations
to the on sale bar).
209. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1952).
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that Congress should be understood to have codified that
understanding in the 1952 Patent Act. But the statute does not say that.
Another option is limiting a "sale" under § 102(b) to situations in
which a transfer of title occurs. There is some support for this
proposition, as the Federal Circuit has tied a "sale" to the transfer of
"title or property" in other contexts.21 o But it seems overly
formalistic, and it raises the question of whether you can have a
transfer of "property" (e.g., the batches of drug here) without a
transfer of title. Requiring a title transfer might also be overly
inclusive and carve otherwise commercial transactions outside of the
"on sale" bar-could a patentee now avoid the bar by providing its
customers a product yet retaining title? That seems unlikely, and
anyway, the invention would likely still be in "public use," so the
transaction would still be invalidating.
The last option is experimental use, but this is also tricky because
although the batches were initially tested for FDA approval, they were
ultimately resold to outside customers." Perhaps such a dual-
purpose transaction could be dealt with by exempting the initial
transaction, but then treating the patentee's subsequent sales to
customers as commercial sales potentially subject to § 102(b), if they
are more than a year before the patent filing. Even if you circumvent
that initial problem, there can still be no experimental use before the
inventors had already reduced their invention to practice because
they appreciated that it worked for its intended purpose.
So the path to setting aside the panel's decision may be
challenging. But we must hope that the Federal Circuit will find a
way because it makes no sense to punish patentees for outsourcing
their manufacturing.
D. Public Use
The Federal Circuit sustained a district court's finding of no
invalidating public use in Delano Farms Co. v. California Table Grape
210. See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2014) ("We have stated that 'the ordinary meaning of a sale includes the concept of a
transfer of title or property.' (quoting NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418
F.3d 1282, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005))); see also U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF.
LAw COMM'N 2012) ("A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price."); Sale, BLACK'S IAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining "sale" as
"[t]he transfer of property or title for a price").
211. See The Meds. Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 791 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Each
lot was marked with a commercial product code and a customer lot number, and was
released to The Medicines Company for commercial and clinical packaging.").
[Vol. 65:769802
2015 PATENT DECISIONS
Commission." The patentee displayed the patented grapes before the
critical date, but it did not allow visitors to take any plant material or
view the plants in the field.21 ' Although a grower obtained some
unauthorized samples, he understood that he was expected to keep
the grapes secret, grafted less than fifty vines of the patented grapes,
and did not sell any before the critical date.' He gave a few to his
cousin, but he told his cousin that they should "keep it to
themselves."" The cousin grew a couple hundred vines but did not
sell them.216 The grower also showed his marketer the grapes, but
the marketer did not sell any until after the critical date, and hid
their identity even afterward."
None of these events constituted an invalidating prior public use.2 18
"The question in a case such as this one is thus whether the actions
taken by the inventor (or, as in this case, a third party) create a
reasonable belief as to the invention's public availability."21 " Here,
the third party grower and his cousin "knew that they were not
authorized to have the plants and that they needed to conceal their
possession of the plants.""22 The marketer likewise understood the
economic incentives for keeping the plants secret; it did not matter
that there was no explicit confidentiality agreement given this
"expectation of secrecy. "221 Finally, the grower's plants were not
publicly accessible by virtue of being viewable from public roads
because they were unlabeled, there were a very limited number
relative to other unpatented varieties on the land, and no member of
the public actually recognized what they were.222
E. Obviousness
The Federal Circuit's 2015 obviousness jurisprudence showed that,
although obviousness is ultimately a legal question, the lower court's
underlying findings of fact often dictate the outcome. Most of the
Federal Circuit's decisions do not warrant extended discussion because
212. 778 F.3d 1243, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1245-46.
215. Id. at 1246.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1250.
219. Id. at 1247.
220. Id. at 1248.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1249-50.
2016] 803
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
they dealt with case-specific disputes about underlying facts.13  But
three decisions warrant further examination-one dealing with an
important issue for pharmaceutical inventions, another dealing with
the scope of "analogous art," but a third showing that, occasionally, fact
findings cannot stave off a finding of obviousness.
The first, Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.,224 underscores the importance
of the district court's factual findings. The patents at issue covered
an improved composition for treating glaucoma (and methods of
using that composition) that significantly reduced the side effects
from a prior art formulation while maintaining efficacy.' The
223. See, e.g., Spectrum Pharms., Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 802 F.3d 1326, 1333-36 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (affirming an obviousness finding by rejecting the patentee's argument of
no motivation to combine and lack of enabling disclosures); Shire LLC v. Amneal
Pharms., LLC, 802 F.3d 1301, 1306-09 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming a grant of
summary judgment for non-obviousness where the prior art did not disclose one of
the claim elements because it included generic chemical formulas that covered
hundreds of potential compounds and did not identify the claimed compound as
part of a "finite and limited class"); Ivera Med. Corp. v. Hospira, Inc., 801 F.3d 1336,
1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing a grant of summary judgment for obviousness
based on factual issues regarding motivation to combine and secondary indicia);
Dome Patent L.P. v. Lee, 799 F.3d 1372, 1379-82 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming an
obviousness finding where the district court found evidence supporting findings of
motivation to combine, weak commercial success, and no reference that taught away
from the claimed invention); Insite Vision Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 783 F.3d 853, 860
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming non-obviousness and observing that "[w]hether a person
of ordinary skill in the art would narrow the research focus to lead to the invention
depends on the facts"); Cadence Pharms. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364,
1373-76 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming non-obviousness where the Patent and
Trademark Office had already rejected the same argument, and finding that the
district court did not clearly err in finding no motivation to combine or the presence
of secondary indicia, even though the claims covered the patented product only by
equivalents); Senju Pharm. Co. v. Lupin Ltd., 780 F.3d 1337, 1342-53 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (affirming an obviousness finding where there was no clear error in the district
court's findings on the content of the prior art, the composition claims at issue
contained no limitation on their function (rendering many arguments against
motivation to combine irrelevant), no teaching away, and any increase in corneal
permeability was not unexpected but was instead routine optimization);
MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 780 F.3d 1159, 1166-68 (Fed. Cir.) (affirming
a non-obviousness judgment on one patent where substantial evidence supported a
jury finding of no motivation to combine, but reversing a non-obviousness finding on
another patent where the patentee's testimony turned only on unclaimed
limitations), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 270 (2015); In re Imes, 778 F.3d 1250, 1253-55
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing obviousness and anticipation rejections where no
substantial evidence supported the Board of Patent Appeals' finding that a reference
disclosed one of the claimed limitations).
224. 796 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
225. Id. at 1298-99.
[Vol. 65:769804
2015 PATENT DECISIONS
claims required 0.01% of the active ingredient and 200 parts per
million (ppm) of another excipient (BAK); some claims also
included limitations on efficacy and side effects.22 ' The prior art
disclosed broad ranges for both of these excipients (0.001%-1%
active ingredient, and 0-1000 ppm BAK), along with a prior product
that had 0.03% active and 50 ppm BAK 22 1
The issue, then, was whether the claims were obvious, given that
they were directed to a formulation that fell within the broad prior
art range. A prior decision, Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Tolmar,
Inc.,22 ' had adopted a strict legal test, observing that, in such
circumstances, the issue is whether there is a motivation to select the
claimed composition from the range, and that "where there is a
range disclosed in the prior art, and the claimed invention falls
within that range, the burden of production falls upon the patentee
to come forward with evidence that (1) the prior art taught away
from the claimed invention; (2) there were new and unexpected
results relative to the prior art; or (3) there are other pertinent
secondary considerations."22 ' Galderma invalidated the claims there,
reversing a non-obviousness finding, and took a cramped view of
teaching away and unexpected results.o
The Allergan court, however, determined that Galderma did not
compel an obviousness finding.2 1 For one thing, "the prior art
ranges [were] broader than the range in Galderma, and the record
show[ed] that the claimed amounts of the two different ingredients
could and did materially and unpredictably alter the property of the
claimed formulation."2 2 Allergan even hinted that the prior art ranges
might be so broad "that they do not teach any specific amounts or
combinations," and thus did not shift the burden of production to the
patentee to come forward with teaching away, unexpected results, or
secondary indicia, but it did not reach the issue because the patentee
had met its burden on those issues in any event.233
Allergan discerned no clear error in the district court's finding that
the prior art taught away from using 200 ppm BAK given potential
226. Id. at 1300.
227. Id. at 1304.
228. 737 F.3d 731 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2740 (2014).
229. Id. at 737-38.
230. Id. at 738-39, 741.
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safety issues with so large an amount.3 ' The defendants' expert had
described BAK as "from Satan" and a "natural-born killer," and prior
art associated it with many eye disorders, thus discouraging the
skilled artisan from using a higher concentration than was necessary;
the prior art suggested that 50 ppm was adequate for this drug, so a
skilled artisan would be discouraged from using more.3 Although a
few different drugs had safely used 200 ppm BAK, the district court
correctly found that these drugs formed a complex with BAK,
resulting in less "free" BAK to damage the eye, and found that there
were indeed some problems associated with these formulations.3 In
addition, the district court did not clearly err in finding that
increasing the amount of BAK might actually decrease penetration of
the active ingredient into the eye, the opposite result that was needed
to achieve the inventors' goal.
Allergan also determined that unexpected results demonstrated
non-obviousness, making an important legal point in the process.3
Prior decisions had distinguished between an "unexpected difference
in degree" (e.g., a percentage change in a known property) and an
"unexpected difference in kind" (e.g., an entirely new property),
finding only the latter probative of non-obviousness.239 Using that
framework, Galderma had dismissed percentage changes in side
effects and efficacy as irrelevant differences in degree.24 0 However,
Allergan found two unexpected differences in kind-(1) that the
inventors demonstrated BAK would have the "opposite" impact on
corneal permeability from what was expected, and (2) that the
claimed formulation's reduction of side effects was "an unexpected
difference in kind, viz., the difference between an effective and safe
drug and one with significant side effects that caused many patients
to discontinue treatment."241' The second conclusion is particularly
notable because it dispels any suggestion that Galderma was erecting a
per se rule against considering any improvement in a known parameter.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1305-06.
237. Id. at 1306.
238. Id. at 1306-07.
239. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 752 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed.
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2050 (2015); Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc.,
737 F.3d 731, 739 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2740 (2014).
240. Galderma, 737 F.3d at 739.
241. Allergan, 796 F.3d at 1307.
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Allergan made another important legal point on unexpected
results-they cannot be dismissed as "merely the inherent properties
of an otherwise obvious formulation."12 2 Here, the prior art did not
disclose the claimed formulation, taught away from it, and gave the
skilled artisan no motivation to select it. As a result, "[t]he
unexpected properties of the claimed formulation, even if inherent
in that formulation, differ in kind from the prior art, thereby
supporting a conclusion of nonobviousness."243  This was different
from prior cases, where claims were invalid because they merely
recited an unknown property of an otherwise obvious formulation.24 4
Rather, " [h] ere, the previously unknown and unexpected properties of a
new and nonobvious formulation constitute additional, objective
evidence of nonobviousness."2 15
The second decision of interest, Circuit Check, Inc. v. QXQ Inc.,246
reversed a judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of obviousness
(reinstating the jury's non-obviousness finding), where the jury
reasonably found that a key piece of prior art was not "analogous" to
the claimed invention.2 " The claims covered an interface plate used
to test a circuit board that included alignment holes marked in a
particular way.2" The dispute was whether prior art marking
techniques for rock carvings, engraved signage, and machining were
analogous.4 Substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that it
was not.21o "Prior art is analogous if it is from the same field of
endeavor or if it is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem the
inventor is trying to solve.""2 1 Here, the prior art was from a different
field, and the jury heard testimony that it was not pertinent to the
problem to be solved.5 That was sufficient to support the verdict-
the issue was not just whether a skilled artisan would have known
about the art, but whether he actually would have looked to it to solve
the problem at hand:
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. (citing In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Santarus, Inc. v.
Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
245. Id.
246. 795 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
247. Id. at 1337.
248. Id. at 1333.
249. Id.
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Just because keying a car, for example, is within the common
knowledge of humankind does not mean that keying a car is
analogous art. An alleged infringer should not be able to
transform all systems and methods within the common knowledge
into analogous prior art simply by stating that anyone would have
known of such a system or method. The question is not whether
simple concepts such as rock carvings, engraved signage, or
Prussian Blue dye are within the knowledge of lay people or even
within the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art.
Rather, the question is whether an inventor would look to this
particular art to solve the particular problem at hand. Here,
Circuit Check put forward evidence that an inventor would not
have considered the disputed prior art when trying to improve
marking. It is not hard to arrive at that conclusion.2 5 3
The court thus reinstated the jury's non-obviousness finding.
A third case, though, shows that when a simple mechanical
invention is involved and the relevant facts are not disputed, the
Federal Circuit is not shy about invalidating the claims as a matter of
law. ABT Systems, LLC v. Emerson Electric Co.2 " reversed ajury finding
of non-obviousness by applying an approach similar to the Supreme
Court's KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.' decision.' The claims
were to a central air conditioner that ran a fan periodically after the
preselected cooling cycle, and included other limitations.5 The
prior art included "single-shot" devices (where the fan ran only
during the cooling cycle) and "periodic" devices, and, when
combined, it had all the elements.' The main dispute was whether a
skilled artisan would have combined the "single-shot" prior art with
the "periodic" prior art.' The Federal Circuit found a motivation to
do so based on the "nature of the problem to be solved" by both the
prior art and the claimed invention-avoiding air stagnation during
periods when the heating or cooling system was not running.2 *
None of the secondary indicia changed this result. There was no
evidence of commercial success linked to the invention, because the
patentee did not submit market share data or advertisements
253. Id. at 1335-36.
254. 797 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
255. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
256. ABTSys., 797 F.3d at 1362.
257. Id. at 1353.
258. Id. at 1358.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1360-61.
808 [Vol. 65:769
2015 PATENT DECISIONS
stressing the claimed features.6 ' Instead, it had evidence only of
general press releases announcing its product.26 2 Prior licenses
were irrelevant because there was no evidence they were taken
based on the merits of the invention.2" Finally, there was no
long-felt need because the benefits the patentee stressed-which
turned on the length of frequency of periodic fan operation-
were not actually claim limitations. 2
F. Written Description and Enablement
The Federal Circuit decided four written description cases, which
clarified interesting legal principles, and, generally, emphasized the
factual nature of the inquiry. Two of these cases also involved
related enablement challenges; these issues will be discussed
together where appropriate.
Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. addressed the validity of claims to a
particular ophthalmic formulation (and method of using it to treat
glaucoma) that required the formulation to result in substantially
equivalent efficacy to the prior formulation, but with less of an
undesired side effect.' The specification identified the exact
formulation claimed but did not include any clinical data or explicit
discussion of the formulation's efficacy or safety, prompting the
defendants to argue that this limitation was not adequately
described.2" The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, noting that
the defendants had argued-for obviousness purposes-that the
claimed efficacy and safety necessarily resulted from that claimed
formulation." "A claim that recites a property that is necessarily
inherent in a formulation that is adequately described is not invalid
as lacking written description merely because the property itself is not
explicitly described."" The Federal Circuit noted, however, that a
pre-filing clinical protocol that included data supporting the claims
was irrelevant because it was outside the specification.6
Allergan also rejected a similar enablement challenge. One of the
defendants argued that the claims could not be enabled if the
261. Id. at 1361.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1361-62.
264. Id. at 1362.
265. 796 F.3d 1293, 1307-09 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
266. Id. at 1308.
267. See id. at 1308-09.
268. Id. at 1309.
269. Id.
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specification lacked clinical data showing their efficacy, and further
complained that the claims could not be both non-obvious and
enabled.2 70 The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments. On the
first point, "[a] patent does not need to guarantee that the invention
works for a claim to be enabled," and "efficacy data are generally not
required in a patent application."27  Here, it was enough that the
claims disclosed the exact claimed formulation, both in vitro and in
vivo animal data that demonstrated the principle ultimately relied
upon for the invention, and examples of similar compositions with
increased efficacy and reduced side effects.7 1 "In view of those
disclosures, we agree with the district court that the skilled artisan
would not have questioned the utility of the claimed formulation and
would be able to make and use the claimed invention without undue
experimentation."2 7 1 Moreover, there was no conflict between non-
obviousness and enablement because the former turned on the prior
art disclosures, while the latter was based on the additional
knowledge disclosed in the patent specification:
The obviousness inquiry turns on what the prior art would have
taught a person of ordinary skill in the art and whether the claimed
invention would have been obvious in view of the prior art. As
indicated, the claims here would not have been obvious because,
among other reasons, the prior art taught that BAK would not
increase the permeability of bimatoprost. In contrast, the
enablement inquiry turns on whether the skilled artisan, after
reading the specification, would be able to make and use the claimed
invention without undue experimentation, based on the ordinary
skill in the art.274
The court thus upheld the claims' validity.
Inphi Corp. v. Netlist, Inc.2 71 corrected a misunderstanding about
what is required to show adequate written description of a "negative"
claim limitation.2 7' An earlier decision in Santarus, Inc. v. Par
Pharmaceutical, Inc.277 observed that "[n]egative claim limitations are
adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to
270. Id. at 1310.





275. 805 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
276. Id. at 1357.
277. 694 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
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exclude the relevant limitation."12 " The parties in Inphi erroneously
read Santarus to stand for the inverse proposition as well, i.e., that a
negative limitation is not supported when the specification does not
give such a reason.27" The Inphi court rejected this argument.2 1o
Instead, it was sufficient for the specification to describe features in
the alternative, and, here, the patent mentioned and distinguished
between the various signal types, thus supporting claims that
explicitly excluded some of those signal types.281
Cubist Pharmaceuticah, Inc. v. Hospira, Inc.2 12 affirmed a finding of
adequate written description after a bench trial, despite a mistake in
the specification about the structure of the claimed compound.28 1 "It
was enough that the specification disclosed relevant identifying
characteristics that distinguished daptomycin [the claimed
compound] from other compounds and thus showed that the
inventors had possession of daptomycin, even though they may not have
had an accurate picture of the entire chemical structure of that
compound."2 4  The Federal Circuit also found it significant that the
claims were narrow and covered exactly what the inventors made; in
doing so, the court distinguished a prior case where the inventors were
unclear on the chemical structure but had broad genus claims."
Finally, Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc."' reversed a
summary judgment of no written description, concluding that the
patentee's expert offered sufficient, non-conclusory testimony to go
to a2jury."' "The fact that these portions of the specification do not
speak in haec verba of accessing 'disparate databases' does not
eliminate as a genuine issue of material fact the existence of at least
278. Id. at 1351.
279. Inphi, 805 F.3d at 1355.
280. Id. at 1356 ("The Santarus court found that the patent-at-issue's express
recitation of (dis)advantages was sufficient to provide a reason to exclude the claim
limitation at issue. That court did not hold, however, that such recitations were
required to satisfy the written description requirements of § 112, paragraph 1 for
negative claim limitations. Nor do we see any reason to now articulate a new and
heightened standard for negative claim limitations.").
281. Id. at 1357.
282. 805 F.3d 1112 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
283. Id. at 1118, 1121-22. The Federal Circuit also rejected the arguments that
(1) a certificate of correction fixing some drawings in the specification and claims
was not of "minor character" and thus invalid and (2) the corrected claims violated
the "recapture" rule. Id. at 1117-18, 1121-22.
284. Id. at 1120.
285. Id.
286. 782 F.3d 671 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
287. Id. at 682-83.
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some discussion, and, therefore, possession, of the accessing of
disparate databases, as claimed.""2 Inventor admissions about what
the specification did not disclose were irrelevant because the claims
did not require what was supposedly lacking from the specification.8
Vasudevan also reversed a summary judgment of no enablement,
and, as with written description, found that the patentee's expert
raised sufficient disputes about the underlying facts.29 o The panel
also noted that "the effort it took the inventor to reduce the
invention to practice does not conclusively show a lack of
enablement" because patents only have to enable what is claimed, not
necessarily everything that is required for a commercial product,
which is what the inventor was making in this case.
G. Indefiniteness
The Federal Circuit continued to grapple with several
indefiniteness issues after the Supreme Court's decisions in Nautilus,
Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc. One interesting theme is that the Federal Circuit
maintained its original result in both cases, suggesting that the
Supreme Court's refraining of the indefiniteness standard has had
little effect on the results. Another interesting trend is that most of the
cases reversed findings of indefiniteness, treating the skilled artisan as
someone who could readily figure out what the claims meant.292
For example, the Nautilus panel maintained its decision that a
claim to a heart rate monitor requiring a "spaced relationship"
between two electrodes was not indefinite.9 The panel explained
that the Supreme Court had held the prior "insolubly ambiguous"
standard "too imprecise," and to "now steer by the bright star of
'reasonable certainty,' rather than the unreliable compass of
'insoluble ambiguity.' 294 The panel quoted with approval a district
court opinion in which Judge William C. Bryson, sitting by
designation, had remarked that the Supreme Court's decision "does
not render all of the prior Federal Circuit and district court cases
288. Id.
289. Id. at 683.
290. Id. at 684-85.
291. Id. at 684.
292. This sub-section will focus on the Federal Circuit's decision in Nautilus, as its
decision in Teva has been discussed in detail above.
293. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 569 (2015).
294. Id. at 1379.
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inapplicable.""2  The panel then confined its review to the intrinsic
evidence, which permitted it to review the issue de novo and reverse
the district court's judgment of indefiniteness.29 6  It then block
quoted the portions of its prior opinion that found adequate
guidance in the specification and prosecution history and again
found the term definite.
Eidos Display, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp.2"8 reversed another
summary judgment of indefiniteness, this one involving a patent to a
manufacturing process for LCDs with circuitry in which there was "a
contact hole for source wiring and gate wiring connection
terminals."9" The district court thought the term indefinite because
it was unclear whether this phrase required one shared hole for both
connection terminals, or two separate holes, one for each connection
terminal."oo But the Federal Circuit determined that a skilled artisan
would understand that phrase to plainly require separate holes
because that was the known industry practice (and this part of the
claim was not the point of novelty), the specification uniformly
taught separate holes, and the priority application and original claims
suggested there were separate holes.30 ' The Federal Circuit capped
its analysis with a clever analogy: " [A] person familiar with cars, when
reading the sentence 'I am going to create an electric car for the
United States and United Kingdom,' would likely expect different
electric cars to be created, one set with the steering wheel located on
the left for driving in the United States, and another set with the
steering wheel on the right for driving in the United Kingdom."30 2 So
claims must be read in the context of the skilled artisan's knowledge,
and there is no indefiniteness problem if the claim language would
be clear based on what the skilled artisan knows.
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,3 o3 sustained a finding that the
term "substantially centered" was not indefinite where the patentee's
expert explained that the patent provided sufficient guidance to
295. Id. at 1381 (quoting Freeny v. Apple Inc., Case No. 2:13-CV-00361-WCB, 2014
WL 4294505, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2014)).
296. Id. at 1382-84.
297. See id.
298. 779 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 502 (2015).
299. Id. at 1368.
300. Id. at 1364.
301. Id. at 1368.
302. Id. at 1365.
303. 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 1453 (2016).
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understand the term and identified particular parts of the
specification that supported his view.304
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc."' reversed yet another
summary judgment of indefiniteness, this one on a claim to surgical
shears with a means for limiting the "clamping pressure" within
certain parameters.so0 The district court had invalidated the claims
because it thought there was no specified method or location for
30measuring that pressure. But, after reviewing the specification's
description of an embodiment in which the pressure was measured,
along with the patentee's unrebutted testimony about the physics and
mathematics involved in the pressure measurements here, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the pressure should plainly be
measured at the midpoint of the clamped surface area, which, for the
shears here, was at the midpoint of both the tissue pad and the
308
clamping arm. It did not matter that the specification did not
describe this measuring method verbatim: "If such an understanding
of how to measure the claimed average pressures was within the
scope of knowledge possessed by one of ordinary skill in the art, there
is no requirement for the specification to identify a particular
measurement technique."so0 This was not a case like Honeywell
International, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,s3o which
invalidated claims where there were multiple ways to prepare a sample
that yielded different results when measuring the claimed parameter,
because the specification in Ethicon included sufficient information to
guide the skilled artisan as to what measurement to use, while in
Honeywell, the key information about the correct measurement method
was unpublished and not known to skilled artisans.311
But just when it seems as though Nautilus changed little, another
case, Dow Chemical Co. v. Nova Chemicals Corp." shows that it can, at
least sometimes, make a difference. The liability portion of the case
had previously been appealed to the Federal Circuit, which had
affirmed a finding of no indefiniteness, and the matter was now back
304. Id. at 1002-03.
305. 796 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
306. Id. at 1316-17, 1322.
307. Id. at 1316-17.
308. Id. at 1318-19.
309. Id. at 1319.
310. 341 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
311. Id. at 1341; Ethicon, 796 F.3d at 1331-32.
312. 803 F.3d 620 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh'g denied per curiam, 809 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir.
2015), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. Mar. 16, 2016) (No. 15-1160).
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after a second trial on damages.1 Nautilus was decided during the
intervening period, however, allowing the defendant to now argue
that the claims were indefinite under the new standard.' The panel
first held, as a procedural matter, that issue preclusion and the law of
the case doctrine did not bar revisiting the prior decision, given the
changed law." The panel first held "there can be no serious
question that Nautilus changed the law of indefiniteness," that this
"was indeed [its] very purpose," and, as it went on to explain, that the
new test changed the result here.1 6
The patents covered plastic compositions with improved physical
properties that required "a slope of strain hardening coefficient
greater than or equal to 1.3" and provided an equation in the
specification for calculating that slope.31' There were multiple ways
to measure the slope, and they yielded different results, at least one
of which could impact whether the claims were infringed.1 8 In
addition, the patentee's expert presented no evidence that his
proposed test (which would have produced the different result) is
what a skilled artisan would have picked, or would even have been
known to a skilled artisan.
So the Federal Circuit identified the issue as "whether the
existence of multiple methods leading to different results without
guidance in the patent or the prosecution history as to which method
should be used renders the claims indefinite."3 " Nautilus changed
the answer to this question. "Before Nautilus, a claim was not
indefinite if someone skilled in the art could arrive at a method and
practice that method."32 ' But now this standard was insufficient
because "the required guidance is not provided by the claims,
specification, and prosecution history."32 2  In other words, the
intrinsic record now must resolve any ambiguity, and it failed to do so
here. It would seem, though, that if the patentee had presented
expert evidence that skilled artisans would have used a particular
313. Id. at 623.
314. Id. at 625.
315. Id. at 628-31.
316. Id. at 630-31.
317. Id. at 631.
318. Id. at 633-34.
319. Id.
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method, then this should also have been enough, for the patent need
not repeat what was already known the in the art.
The rehearing petition in Dow, which accused the panel of
changing the law of indefiniteness, provoked several opinions.23
Judge Moore, joined by judges Newman, Kathleen O'Malley, Richard
Taranto, and Raymond Chen, wrote to stress that the panel had not
changed the fact that indefiniteness must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence, that it involves underlying factual findings
(after Teva required deference on appeal), and that extrinsic
evidence may be used to show the skilled artisan's knowledge.32 4 The
defendant had tried to defend the panel's ruling on the ground that
extrinsic evidence was irrelevant; but, these judges flatly rejected that
view: "Dow does not and cannot stand for the proposition that
extrinsic evidence cannot be used to establish the state of knowledge
of the skilled artisan, for example, whether one of skill in the art
would know which measurement echnique to employ to determine
the maximum slope of a curve."" They added that
[t]he burden of proving indefiniteness includes proving not only
that multiple measurement echniques exist, but that one of skill in
the art would not know how to choose among them. This knowledge
of the skilled artisan is part of the proof necessary for indefiniteness
and the burden of proving it is on the challenger of validity. 326
The same judges (exceptJudge Chen) also noted that they did not
necessarily agree with the panel's result; they just thought that any
problems were too case-specific to warrant en banc review."' They
were concerned that the panel decided the case on a ground never
argued by the defendant, that it delved into a very factual issue, and
that it did not appear to give sufficient deference to the jury's implicit
factual findings." But, as long the panel opinion was not seen as
changing the law, it was appropriate to let its result stand.
The original panel members-Chief Judge Prost and Judges Dyk
and Wallach-wrote briefly to note their agreement with Judge
Moore's statement of the law."' In particular, they agreed with the
323. Dow Chem. Co. v. Nova. Chems. Corp., 809 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
324. Id. at 1225 (Moore, J., concurring) ("It would be incorrect to argue that the
Dow decision changed this or that the intrinsic record alone must disclose which
measurement method to use.").
325. Id. at 1225.
326. Id. at 1227.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1227-28.
329. Id. at 1224 (Prost, C.J., Dyk, J., Wallach, J., concurring).
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point about extrinsic evidence, removing an ambiguity in the panel
opinion: "[W]e agree that if a skilled person would choose an
established method of measurement, that may be sufficient to defeat
a claim of indefiniteness, even if that method is not set forth in haec
verba in the patent itself."33 0
Judge O'Malley, joined by Judge Reyna, agreed with everyone else's
view of the law of indefiniteness but dissented because she thought
the panel should not have addressed the issue at all. 3s In her view,
the decision in the prior appeal conclusively resolved indefiniteness
and resulted in a final judgment.3 11 She thought that Robert Bosch,
LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp.3 required this result because it
held that a decision on liability was "final except for an accounting"
and immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) (2).3 The
further proceedings on damages, in her view, were entirely separate
because the district court, having certified just the liability phase for
appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), always retained
jurisdiction over that issue.335 When the prior panel affirmed the
liability judgment, that part of the case was done, and there was no
"remand" of it back to the district court or other action that might
keep it alive. Given that there was a final judgment on liability, the
majority's discussions of issue preclusion and law of the case were red
herrings.336  She also objected to the panel deciding the case on a
basis not raised by the appellant. 33
A pair of other decisions invalidated claims as definite where they
contained claim terms that were subject to § 112(6) and involved
software, but did not include sufficient corresponding structure
because there was no algorithm in the specification. In Eon Corp. IP
Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC,331 the patentee admitted that its
patent did not have an algorithm but tried to invoke the exception
that no algorithm is needed where no "special programming" is
involved.3 ' The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, explaining
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1228 (O'Malley,J., dissenting).
332. Id. ("[Tihere was no appeal before us that would justify this panel's decision
to reach those issues.").
333. 719 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).
334. Id. at 1319.
335. Dow Chem. Co., 809 F.3d at 1230 (O'Malley, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 1231-32.
337. Id. at 1230 (citing FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) (1) (B)).
338. 785 F.3d 616 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
339. See id. at 621 (citing In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639
F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
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that any programming beyond that coextensive with a microprocessor
or general purpose computer counts as "special programming,"
regardless of its relative simplicity. 4 o Here, it was undisputed that
some additional programing was needed, and the absence of an
algorithm thus rendered the claim indefinite. The skilled artisan's
knowledge could not be used to fill the gap because, again, the
specification disclosed no algorithm at all.
Likewise, the Federal Circuit in Media Rights Technologies, Inc. v.
Capital One Financial Corp."' affirmed an indefiniteness finding
involving the term "compliance mechanism" because there was no
disclosed algorithm.3 42 As an initial matter, the panel held that
§ 112(6) applied, despite the term not invoking the word "means."43
The specification lacked a structural description of this element
(referring only to its functions), and the word "mechanism" was
devoid of structure.344 The Federal Circuit distinguished a prior case
finding another non-means term not subject to § 112(6) based on the
fact that it applied the "heavy presumption" that has since been
overruled in Lighting Ballast. 3" Turning to indefiniteness, the court then
held there was unrebutted testimony that the specification's only disclosed
software code for two of the compliance mechanism's functions returned
only error messages.3 4 6 As a result, because the algorithm certainly could
not carry out the functions, the patent was indefinite.347
H. Broadening Reissue
ArcelorMittal France v. AK Steel Corp. 14 affirmed a judgment that two
reissue claims were impermissibly broadened but reversed on another
claim.34 ' The patentee had obtained the reissue while a prior appeal
340. Id. at 621-22 (describing the Katz exception as "narrow").
341. 800 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1173 (2016).
342. Id. at 1368 (affirming that the term "compliance mechanism ... is a means-
plus-function term that lacks sufficient structure").
343. Id. at 1371-72.
344. Id. at 1369.
345. Id. at 1373 (distinguishing Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Ams. Corp., 649
F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
346. Id. at 1375.
347. Id. ("[T]he specification fails to adequately disclose the structure to perform
all four of its functions.").
348. 786 F.3d 885 (Fed. Cir. 2015), appeal filed, 2015 WL 7903739 (Fed. Cir. Dec.
23, 2015) (No. 16-1357).
349. Id. at 887.
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from this litigation was pending.350 The original independent claim
required "a very high mechanical resistance," and the prior opinion
construed this as limited to "greater than 1500 MPa."3 5' The patentee
tried to be clever about expanding the scope by leaving the
independent claim alone, yet adding a dependent claim that
required mechanical resistance "in excess of 1000 MPa.""3 1 As a
result, both reissue claims were effectively broader (the independent
one was broader based on claim differentiation and 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(d)). The Federal Circuit rejected the argument that the
proper construction of the reissue's dependent claim was not
controlled by its prior opinion. In particular, the addition of the new
dependent claim was not "new evidence" that could permit revisiting
the interpretation of original claim one under either law of the case
or the mandate rule. 35 3
The district court erred, however, in holding that because some
claims of the reissue patent had been impermissibly broadened, all
reissue claims were invalid.354 Invalidity due to impermissible
broadening is evaluated claim-by-claim.5 There was no broadening
of claims 24 and 25 because these claims, added during reissue, had
the same scope as the original claim one.5
I. Obviousness-Type Double-Patenting
G.D. Searle LLC v. Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3 5' affirmed a judgment
invalidating claims for obviousness-type double patenting because it
concluded the safe harbor provision, 35 U.S.C. § 121,3" did not
apply.' The applicant received a restriction requirement for claims
to compositions, compounds, and methods of use.6 o It filed a
350. See id. at 887-88 (summarizing that ArcelorMittal amended its original
pleadings to substitute for the patent it prosecuted pending litigation as well as filed
additional patent infringement claims based on the newly prosecuted patent).
351. See id. at 887.
352. Id.
353. See id. at 889 ("Permitting a reissue patent to disturb a previous claim
construction of the original claim would turn the validity analysis ... on its head.").
354. Id. at 890.
355. See id. (basing the court's requirement to analyze each case uniquely on
"statute and our precedent").
356. Id.
357. 790 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
358. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012).
359. 790 F.3d at 1351.
360. See id. at 1352 (requiring Pfizer to select only one of the three classes of
claims in which Pfizer chose to prosecute only the compound claims initially).
2016] 819
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEw
divisional application and prosecuted composition claims."
6 It later
filed a continuation-in-part (CIP) for the application, chose to
prosecute the methods-of-use claims, and obtained those claims.
But in Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," the Federal Circuit
invalidated the CIP claims based on the earlier composition claims
because, unlike patents issued on a divisional application, a CIP's
claims are not protected from double-patenting by § 121's safe
harbor.3'" The patentee responded by obtaining a reissue patent that
re-designated the CIP application as a divisional, deleted the new
matter, and narrowed the claims so they did not cover any new
matter.6 It asserted the reissue in this case.
The reissue patent was invalid because it was still outside § 121's
safe harbor, which protects only claims in an original or divisional
application.36' The reissue was neither-it stemmed from an
application (the original CIP) that contained new matter and thus
could not be a divisional application..3 " Deleting the new matter
from the reissue did not change the character of the CIP through
which it claimed priority.3' Fairness to the public did not permit the
patentee to use reissue to retroactively re-designate the CIP as a
divisional.69 Moreover, the CIP descended from a PCT that also had
new matter and was not a divisional of the initial application.o
The safe harbor was also inapplicable for another independent
reason. The reissue claims and the prior art composition claims were
not "derived from the same restriction requirement."37' Instead, the
reissue's method claims stemmed from a separate restriction
requirement made during prosecution of the CIP.3 11 "When separate
restriction requirements are imposed on separate applications and
the record does not show that any of the various restriction
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
364. See id. at 1363.
365. See id. at 1358.
366. Id. at 1362 ("The difference between divisional [and continuation-in-part
("CIP") applications], moreover, was well known at the time that Congress enacted
the 1952 Patent Act.").
367. Id.
368. See id.
369. See id. at 1361 ("The inequity of this practice was well known by 1952.").
370. See G.D. Searle LLC v. Lupin Pharm., Inc., 790 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
371. Id. at 1356 (quoting Pfizer, 518 F.3d at 1360).
372. See id. at 1355.
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requirements carried forward from one application to the next, the
earlier restriction requirement cannot be viewed as having continued
in effect with respect to the later-filed application."" Here, nothing
suggested that the restriction requirement in the CIP was "carried
forward" from the restriction in the initial application.
III. INFRINGEMENT
A. Induced Infringement
1. Intent to induce
This year's main case on inducement is the Supreme Court's
decision in Commil USA, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,374 which held that a
good faith belief in non-infringement is a defense to inducement but
a belief in invalidity is not.17' The Court thought its first holding was
dictated by Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.," which had
addressed only whether a defendant must have actual notice of a
patent to be liable for inducement, but had used looser language and
required knowledge that "the induced acts constitute patent
infringement." 77  The Court gave no pragmatic reason for its
conclusion-it simply cited Global-Tech and Aro Manufacturing Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 78 even though neither case addressed
a situation where the defendant knew of the patent but thought the
claims did not cover its products.79
Nevertheless, Commil held that a good faith belief in invalidity was
different from a belief in non-infringement.3so Non-infringement
and invalidity were distinct defenses under the Patent Act," and
there was no basis for conflating them. Moreover, allowing a good
faith belief in invalidity to serve as a defense to inducement would
undermine the presumption of validity. The maxim that an invalid
patent cannot be infringed did not require a different result because
"invalidity is not a defense to infringement, it is a defense to
373. Id. at 1356.
374. 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015).
375. Id. at 1928 ("Were this Court to interpret [35 U.S.C.] § 271(b) as permitting a
defense of belief in invalidity, it would conflate the issues of infringement and validity.").
376. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
377. Id. at 2068.
378. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
379. See Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1927.
380. Id. at 1928 (" [I]nfringment and invalidity are separate matters under patent law.").
381. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (1)-(2) (2012).
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liability." 38 2 Finally, pragmatic reasons counseled against creating a
new defense, because it would complicate litigation, allow defendants
an easy out from liability, and make it difficult for juries, who "would
be put to the difficult task of separating the defendant's belief
regarding validity from the actual issue of validity."' Alleged
infringers already have ample options for contesting validity, either in
court or at the Patent Office. And, of course, mistake of law typically is
not a defense. The Court thus vacated the Federal Circuit's judgment,
which had ordered a new trial over the defendant's belief in validity.
384
The Supreme Court's decision is disappointing because it
significantly weakens a patentee's ability to enforce its patents where
customers are the direct infringers. The same practical arguments
against making a belief in invalidity a defense apply equally to a belief
in non-infringement. Almost any defendant (even the worst copyist)
can concoct at least one non-infringement defense, through claim
construction or otherwise. Moreover, a mistake about whether the
patent covers your product often implicates legal issues about claim
construction just as much as a validity defense would. The only
saving grace for plaintiffs might be that, just as the Supreme Court feared
for validity, juries will likely conflate the actual question of infringement
with the defendant's belief, and thus be inclined to return a general
verdict of inducement if they think the patent covers the product
The Supreme Court's approach will also raise vexing questions as
courts try to probe a good faith belief in non-infringement. Can a
defendant obtain summary judgment of no inducement simply by
putting in an affidavit or deposition testimony from a corporate
executive asserting that he believed the patent does not cover their
product? What evidence can a plaintiff realistically collect to rebut
such a statement? Most defendants are unlikely to keep non-
privileged documents that admit to infringement. Is it enough for
the plaintiff to simply argue that the jury can disbelieve the executive
(and find no good faith), because its infringement case is so clear?
382. Commi4 135 S. Ct. at 1929.
383. Id. at 1929-30.
384. On remand, the Federal Circuit agreed with one of Cisco's alternative non-
infringement arguments and granted judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of no
direct infringement, thereby ending the case entirely (absent further Supreme Court
review, which is unlikely on that case-specific question). Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco
Sys., Inc., 813 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 2015). So, ironically, the defendant is now better
off after having lost at the Supreme Court, and, had the Federal Circuit simply
reached this alternative issue in its prior opinion, then the inducement issue would
have been unnecessary to decide.
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There are also tough questions about timing. Say a defendant
learns of the patent in 2004 but does not develop a defense until it is
sued and hires trial counsel in 2006. Is it liable for activity from 2004
to 2006, but not afterward? What if the defendant loses a claim
construction ruling in 2008, which guts its non-infringement defense?
Is it liable from 2004 to 2006 and after 2008, but not 2006 to 2008?
What about the fact that a defendant still has the right to appeal that
Markman ruling-if the defendant still thinks it is right, does the
good faith belief extend even after a jury verdict of infringement and
a Federal Circuit appeal, until the Supreme Court denies certiorari?
And what about non-infringement defenses based on since-rejected
Markman positions: does the jury get to hear about those, and the
fact that the defendant still believes them in good faith and plans to
appeal? There are no easy answers to these questions, but at least
one Federal Circuit decision suggests that this may be where we are
headed, because it analyzed inducement liability separately for
different time periods.' Further Federal Circuit guidance on these
issues, however, will have to wait until later this year and beyond.
The Federal Circuit's only decision in this area was Info-Hold, Inc. v.
Muzak LLC,"" in which it vacated a summary judgment of no
inducement and identified disputed facts about whether the
defendant was willfully blind to infringement.' The plaintiff there
had repeatedly contacted the defendant about the patent, and,
during a conversation, the defendant inquired about the patent's
functionality, admitted its system was at least somewhat similar, and
agreed to follow-up.' But the defendant then ignored the plaintiffs
subsequent letters.' As a result, there was a fact issue about whether
the defendant "subjectively believed there was a high probability it
infringed the '374 patent and took deliberate actions to avoid
learning whether it actually did."9 o
385. See Bose Corp. v. SDI Techs., Inc., 558 F. App'x 1012, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
("Several points in time deserve independent analysis to judge SDI's good-faith belief
of invalidity.").
386. 783 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
387. Id. at 1367, 1373.
388. Id. at 1368.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 1373.
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2. Affirmative acts
Another notable inducement decision, Takeda Pharmaceuticals
U.S.A., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceutical Corp.,"' related to a different
element under § 271 (b)-the requirement that a defendant engage
in affirmative acts to encourage another's infringement.12 Disputes
over this element often arise in pharmaceutical cases because a
method-of-treatment patent may cover the use of a drug only for a
particular disease (or only in a particular way), yet the drug may have
non-infringing uses for treating other diseases. Congress has
developed a procedure through which a generic drug manufacturer
can "carve out" the infringing use from its label and market the drug
for only the non-infringing uses.39  The reality, though, is that
pharmacists freely substitute the generic drug for the branded
version for all uses, including the patented use.194 So, patentees
have tried to stop this chicanery by suing for induced infringement
and arguing that the defendant's sale of the product, coupled with
a wink-and-a-nod that it can be used in an infringing manner, is
enough for liability."'
Takeda took a hard line against that approach. The Federal Circuit
held that a defendant must "encourage, recommend, or promote
infringement," and that even a mere description of the infringing use
is not enough.3 9 ' Applying this standard, the court found no
inducement of a patent that covered using a drug to treat gout flares
where the only potential affirmative act was the product label's
statement that " [i]f you have a gout flare while taking [the drug], tell
your healthcare provider."3 " This did not amount to a direction to
actually use the drug for gout, and "vague label language cannot be
combined with speculation about how physicians may act to find
391. 785 F.3d 625 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
392. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) ("Whoever actively induces infringement of a
patent shall be liable as an infringer.").
393. See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670,
1676-77 (2012) (explaining the statutory scheme); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2) (A)-
(B) (2012) (detailing the required contents of an application for permission to
introduce a new drug into interstate commerce).
394. See Takeda, 785 F.3d at 633 (citing Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316
F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
395. See id. at 630 (summarizing the claim that Takeda believed a physician's
statements to a patient to take a generic drug to use for the same purpose as the
patented drug constitutes inducement).
396. Id. at 631.
397. Id. at 630.
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inducement.""' The Federal Circuit did not reach the question of
whether a showing that the label would "inevitably" lead physicians to
prescribe the drug for gout might suffice because the evidence here
could not support such an inference: "Speculation or even proof that
some, or even many, doctors would prescribe [the drug] for acute
flares is hardly evidence of inevitability.""' In particular, the panel
pointed to evidence of other non-infringing gout treatments.4 1o
Judge Newman dissented because she read the majority as holding
that "the provider of a known drug product, with knowledge that it is
likely to be used in direct infringement, can never be liable for
induced infringement" and thought the rule should be more closely
tailored to the facts of each case.401 She criticized the majority's over-
reliance on the drug's product label: "The FDA label is not a vehicle
of promotion of any use; it is a record of approved safety and efficacy
of the product as used in accordance with the label."402 Instead,
according to Judge Newman, the majority should have looked to
additional evidence presented by Takeda that showed "the doctor is
likely to prescribe the Takeda protocol, for that protocol is approved
by the FDA and is known to physicians who treat gout. "403
Takeda will impact not only "skinny label" pharmaceutical itigation
but also all types of inducement claims. Many software patents cover
methods of using a particular feature that could only be directly
infringed by the seller. Could a defendant avoid liability if its
products simply "described" the infringing feature but did not
"recommend, encourage, or promote" it? The decision could also
prove problematic for patents on electronic components that are
manufactured and sold abroad, but then incorporated into larger
end-products bound for the United States. The patentee's only
practical remedy is to sue the components' manufacturer for indirect
infringement, but can that party avoid liability by arguing that it does
not "recommend, encourage, or promote" U.S. importation of its
products, even if knows that its products enter the United States and
profits from them doing so? One would hope not, but defendants
will surely make the argument.
398. Id. at 632.
399. Id. at 633.
400. Id. at 632.
401. Id. at 636 (Newman, J., dissenting) (determining that liability for induced
infringement requires analysis of the "fact-specific circumstances").
402. Id. at 637.
403. Id. at 638.
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It seems like the legal analysis should take into account how the
defendant positions itself to make money. In the latter scenario, U.S.
importation expands the market for the defendant's component, so the
defendant certainly wants its products to come into the United States.
Likewise, a generic manufacturer might know that its product will be
used in both infringing and non-infringing ways and reap significant
revenue from the infringing use. Courts should be able to recognize
this reality and prevent defendants from profiting from such behavior.
B. Joint Infringement
The Federal Circuit once again revisited Akamai Technologies, Inc. v.
Limelight Networks, Inc.,404 resulting in a newly adopted en banc
standard for joint infringement. We can dispense with the long
history of this case, which involved a prior en banc decision,4 05
vacatur by the Supreme Court,406 and remand decision by the
panel,407 and instead focus on what the en banc court did in 2015.
Joint infringement had previously required proof that one entity
directed or controlled the performance of each step of a patented
method through either a principal-agent relationship or a
contractual arrangement.408 The en banc court expanded this test to
include other, less formal situations:
In the past, we have held that an actor is liable for infringement
under § 271 (a) if it acts through an agent (applying traditional
agency principles) or contracts with another to perform one or
more steps of a claimed method. We conclude, on the facts of this
case, that liability under § 271(a) can also be found when an
alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or receipt
of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented
method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance.
In those instances, the third party's actions are attributed to the
alleged infringer such that the alleged infringer becomes the single
actor chargeable with direct infringement.409
404. 786 F.3d 899 (Fed. Cir.), modified on reh'gen banc by 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam).
405. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
406. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
407. Akamai Techs., 786 F.3d at 915.
408. See, e.g., id. at 910; Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, 498 F.3d 1373, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir.
2007), overruled by Akamai, Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301
(Fed. Cir. 2012), rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
409. Akamai Techs., 797 F.3d at 1023 (en banc) (citations omitted).
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The court then reiterated that direction or control is a factual question,
reviewed for substantial evidence when submitted to ajury.410
Applying this new standard, the en banc court determined that
substantial evidence supported the jury's finding of direction or
control.4 1' The defendant, through contracts, conditioned
customers' use of its computer network on their performance of
some of the claimed method steps.1 Moreover, the defendant
established the "manner and timing" of its customers' performance
by providing them instructions and customer support such that
"customers can only avail themselves of the service upon their
performance of the method steps."41 1
The en banc court also stressed that its standard was flexible and
would apply whenever all the steps were attributable to a single act. 414
For example, another situation (previously flagged by the most recent
panel decision) that could give rise to joint infringement is one
"where the actors form ajoint enterprise.""' In that type of situation,
any participant could be charged with the acts of the other, so it gives
more flexibility, because the plaintiff could sue any participant for
the conduct as a whole.4 1' The court then articulated the following
four elements for a joint enterprise, which it drew from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts:
(1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the
group;
(2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group;
(3) a community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the
members; and
(4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise,
which gives an equal right of control.417
The en banc court then reiterated that "[s]ection 271 (a) is not
limited solely to principal-agent relationships, contractual
arrangements, and joint enterprise, as the vacated panel decision
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1022.
412. Id. at 1024-25.
413. Id. at 1025.
414. Id. at 1023.
415. Id. at 1022.
416. Id. at 1023.
417. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
1988)).
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held. Rather, to determine direct infringement, we consider whether
all method steps can be attributed to a single entity.""'
C. Doctrine ofEquivalents
The Federal Circuit continued to breathe new life into the doctrine
of equivalents this year by putting another stake in the heart of
vitiation. The concept of vitiation arose from the Supreme Court's
"all elements" rule, with the idea being that the scope of equivalents
cannot be extended so far that it would effectively read an element
out of the claim; for example, a claim element requiring a "majority"
could not be equivalent to an accused product with a "minority."4 19
But, in recent years, the Federal Circuit has stressed that vitiation is
not a separate doctrine and is instead another way of saying that the
accused product has an element substantially similar to what is
claimed.4"o This may at first seem a semantic quibble, but, by
reframing the inquiry in this way, the Federal Circuit has transformed the
issue back into a question of fact and away from being a question of law.
Two cases continued this trend in 2015. In Cadence Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Exela Pharmsci Inc.,21 the patent required the step of
"deoxygenation of the [aqueous] solution," which was construed to
require the active ingredient be dissolved before the deoxygenation
occurred, because otherwise you would not yet have a solution.22
The accused process, however, involved first deoxygenating the
solvent, and only then adding the active ingredient to form a
solution. 2  The panel affirmed a finding of equivalency based on
expert testimony that the order of the steps would have no impact on
the solution's final stability, which was the point of the patent. It
rejected the defendant's vitiation argument, been based on Planet
Bingo v. GameTech International, Inc.,424 which had found that
418. Id. at 1023 (footnote omitted).
419. Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1105-07 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) ("[I] t would defy logic to conclude that a minority-the very antithesis of
a majority-could be insubstantially different from a claim limitation requiring a
majority, and no reasonable juror could find otherwise.").
420. See, e.g., Ring & Pinion Serv. Inc. v. ARB Corp., 743 F.3d 831, 836 (Fed. Cir.
2014); VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Brilliant
Instruments, Inc. v. GuideTech, 707 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Charles Mach.
Works, Inc. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 723 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Deere & Co.
v. Bush Hog, 703 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
421. 780 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
422. Id. at 1370-72.
423. Id. at 1370.
424. 472 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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determining a winning combination after the game started could not
be equivalent to the claimed "predetermined winning
combination."4 25 In doing so, the panel reiterated that vitiation is not
a separate doctrine and told parties to stop using conclusory labels
like "opposite" or "antithesis" instead of relying on the specific facts:
"Vitiation" is not an exception or threshold determination that
forecloses resort to the doctrine of equivalents, but is instead a
legal conclusion of a lack of equivalence based on the evidence
presented and the theory of equivalence asserted....
Characterizing an element of an accused product as the
"antithesis" of a claimed element is also a conclusion that should
not be used to overlook the factual analysis required to establish
whether the differences between a claimed limitation and an
accused structure or step are substantial vel non. The
determination of equivalence depends not on labels like "vitiation"
and "antithesis" but on the proper assessment of the language of
the claimed limitation and the substantiality of whatever relevant
differences may exist in the accused structure.... Since a
reasonable trier of fact could (and, in fact, did) conclude that
Exela's process is insubstantially different from that recited in the
claims, the argument that a claim limitation is vitiated by the
district court's application of the doctrine of equivalents is both
incorrect and inapt.426
Likewise, Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc.4 " affirmed a jury
verdict that two enclosing prongs capable of lateral movement and
pivoting was equivalent to three enclosing prongs, two of which were
capable of lateral movement and pivoting, even though the claim
specifically required that "each" prong move and pivot.2 Again, the
panel stressed that "vitiation is not a separate argument from
insubstantiality," and pointed to testimony that the product
functioned in a similar manner to what was claimed.4 9
These cases create further ambiguity in a difficult area of the law.
The problem with vitiation has always been that, in some sense, any
doctrine of equivalents case involves "reading out" a claim
limitation-the only reason a patentee relies on equivalents is
because the claim element is not literally present in the accused
product. The doctrine of equivalents is always used to expand the
425. Id. at 1346-47.
426. Cadence, 780 F.3d at 1371-72.
427. 778 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. Medtronic Sofamor Danek
USA, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 893 (2016).
428. Id. at 1371-72.
429. Id. at 1372 n.3.
2016] 829
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
claim beyond its literal bounds. So the question seems to be, how
much of an expansion is too much, and at what point will the judge
step in and say the product is so far afield that it cannot be equivalent
as a matter of law? We have little guidance on that issue, and even
seemingly similar cases yield different results. Although Cadence tried
mightily to distinguish Planet Bingo, the same equivalency argument
applies to both cases, i.e., the order of the steps does not matter to
the ultimate outcome, whether it is creating a stable solution or finding
a bingo winner. Yet the doctrine of equivalents could be applied in
Cadence, yet not in Planet Bingo. One thing is certain, though: vitiation is
dead. This will make it more difficult for defendants to obtain summary
judgment of non-infringement unless they can find some other legal
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.
One recent case, Advanced Steel Recovery v. X-Body Equipment, Inc.,4"o
may provide such a limitation. The opinion was Judge Stoll's first
since joining the Federal Circuit, and it affirms a summary judgment
of no equivalents because the patentee failed to introduce evidence
that the relevant element in the accused product worked in
substantially the same way as what was claimed.4 31 The claim recited a
"container packing system" in which a "piston-and-cylinder unit" is
connected to the "proximate end" of a "container packer," but, in the
accused product, the unit was connected about thirty-five percent
down the packer's length.3 The patentee's expert opined that these
worked in substantially the same way because "in both cases, the
[product's] container packer rides along horizontal guides, and the
cylinder unit is hydraulically powered."4 3 ' The court found this
testimony insufficient, however, because those other features "are just
additional claim elements."4 34 That was insufficient as a matter of law
and violated the "all elements" rule:
A patentee, bearing the burden of showing equivalence, cannot
merely point to other claim limitations to satisfy the doctrine of
equivalents. Doing so runs afoul of the "all-elements rule"
articulated in Warner-Jenkinson. Advanced Steel's attempt to
establish that the Acculoader functions in substantially the same
way as the claimed invention by reference only to other claim
elements does not satisfy its burden on the doctrine of equivalents.
430. 808 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
431. Id. at 1314, 1320.
432. Id. at 1315-16.




It is undisputed that the Acculoader's piston-and-cylinder unit is
connected to the floor of the container packer approximately
[thirty-five percent] away from the extreme proximate end. While
the term "proximate end" by no means precludes some offset from
the absolute end, we find no error in the district court's conclusion
that "no reasonable jury could find this connection point to be
equivalent to the 'container packer proximate end."' In view of the
evidence of equivalence presented here and the narrowness of the
asserted claims, we find the range of equivalents does not extend to
the connection point in the Acculoader. To find otherwise would
ignore the precise and specific structural limitations in the claims.35
The panel noted that, although the district court had used vitiation
to reach this conclusion, it was sufficient simply to say that the
patentee had not met its burden on the "way" prong.4 36 Defendants
would thus be well-advised to reframe their non-infringement
arguments accordingly in future cases.
Another option for those seeking to limit use of the doctrine of
equivalents is to invoke prosecution history estoppel, as in Spectrum
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.43 The claim there required a drug
composition with "a quantity at least sufficient to provide multiple
doses of said mixture of (6S) and (6R) diastereoisomers in an amount
of 2000 mg per dose."438 The accused product involved significantly
lesser doses, and the court held that the patentee had disclaimed its
ability to argue such doses were equivalent. 3  The patentee had
amended the claims during prosecution to include that specific
quantity limitation and distinguished prior art based on quantities of
specific mixtures, which constituted "clear and unmistakable
expressions of the applicants' intent to surrender coverage of
quantities of the compound in lower doses.""o So the plaintiff was
legally barred from recapturing this subject matter through the
doctrine of equivalents.
D. Section 2 71(g)
The court decided one case, Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,441 interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(g), which
435. Id. at 1320-21 (citations omitted).
436. Id. at 1320.
437. 802 F.3d 1326, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
438. Id. at 1336.
439. Id. at 1338.
440. Id.
441. 809 F.3d 610 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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provides that it is an act of infringement to import or sell a product
in the United States that is "made by" a patented process abroad."
The key issue was the meaning of the statutory term "made by." The
patent covered a method of analyzing whether the defendant's drug
product contained impurities.4 ' A split panel held the product was
not "made by" the patented method, because "made" means
"manufactured," i.e., "the creation or transformation of a product,
such as by synthesizing, combining components, or giving raw
materials new properties."4" The term could not, by contrast,
"extend to testing to determine whether an already synthesized drug
substance possesses existing qualities or properties. "4 Here, the
patented method related only to the latter type of testing and did not
trigger § 271(g): "[A] product is not 'made by' a patented process
within the meaning of § 2 7 1(g) if it is used merely to determine
whether the intended product of a separate and perhaps separately-
patented process has in fact already been manufactured."44 6 It did
not matter that the FDA's regulations defined "manufacture" to
include "testing and quality control," because they relate to a
different statutory scheme.4 47
Judge Dyk dissented, arguing that the patented method was an
integral part of the drug product's manufacture and thus covered by
§ 271(g).` "The quality control process of the '886 patent is an
intermediate step to determine which batches of putative enoxaparin
must be discarded, and which batches may be incorporated in the
final drug product. It is distinctly part of the manufacturing process
of the product."" He noted that § 271 (g) is not limited to patents
that "cover the entire manufacturing process," and, after reviewing
442. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(g) (2012) ("Whoever without authority imports into the
United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which
is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if
the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of
such process patent.").
443. Momenta, 809 F.3d at 615.
444. Id. at 616. Responding to the dissent, the panel noted that purification may
meet this requirement because, "as a general matter purification processes transform
impure substances into more pure ones." Id. at 618 n.5.
445. Id. at 616.
446. Id. at 617.
447. Id. at 615.




the manufacturing process here, concluded that the patented
method was clearly one part of it. 450
IV. PATENT OFFICE APPEALS
The rise of inter partes review (IPR) has begun to significantly
impact the Federal Circuit's docket. Many defendants are now
opting to pursue their invalidity challenges through IPR, while
district courts are generally staying district court litigation pending
IPR.51 The Patent Office has been an attractive venue for
defendants-seventy-two percent of its final written decisions
invalidate all the challenged claims.5 ' The short-term result has
been to create a wave of Patent Office appeals at the Federal Circuit,
with the court deciding over sixty-five of them in 2015, and hearing
argument in dozens more.153 The long-term result may be that the
Federal Circuit sees a significantly greater percentage of appeals
coming from the Patent Office and a significantly fewer district court
appeals, as final written decisions invalidating the claims come to
replace summary judgment and post-trial decisions.
The most important practical fact about the Federal Circuit's post-
grant decisions has been its high affirmance rate. The court affirmed
in over eighty-nine percent of appeals from IPR and covered business
method (CBM) proceedings, and over half of those were summary
affirmances under Federal Circuit Rule 36, in which the court issues
no written opinion. 4  This should be no surprise based on historical
experience because the court's affirmance rate for other types of
Patent Office appeals (i.e., reexaminations and rejected applications)
450. Id.
451. See, e.g., Jonathan Stroud, NFC Technology LLC v. HTC America, Inc.: judge
Bryson's Sitting-By-Designation Guide to Securing Stays in Light of Inter Partes Reviews, 65
AM. U. L. REv. - (2016).
452. Disposition of IPR Petitions Completed to Date, Patent Trial and Appeal Board
Statistics, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (last updated January 30, 2016),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-11-30%20PTAB.pdf.
453. Statistics on file with author.
454. Statistics on file with author; see also Craig E. Countryman, Lessons from Fed.
Circ.'s 1st Wave of Post-Grant Appeals, IPLAw 360 (Dec. 16, 2015, 10:27 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/7 37577/lessons-from-fed-circ-s-1st-wave-of-post-
grant-appeals ("In its first [fifty-five] post-grant appeals, the Federal Circuit has
affirmed or dismissed (eighty-nine] percent of them, with most being summary
affirmances without opinion.").
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has been around ninety percent for the past few years."' The low
odds of success on appeal may discourage some IPR losers from even
trying their luck, which may help stem the tide of IPR appeals. On
the other hand, if the Patent Office invalidates the claims, then a
Federal Circuit appeal is probably the patentee's last hope, so most
patentees may still roll the dice even if the odds are against them.
Patent challengers, by contrast, have more of an option to forgo
appeal, because they might still have invalidity and non-infringement
defenses left to assert in district court.
Despite the high affirmance rate, the Federal Circuit has issued
several important decisions setting the ground rules for IPR and CBM
appeals. One important area has been setting the boundaries for
what issues the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review. Others
involve the standards for claim construction and obviousness.
Appellants are most likely to have success if they raise an interesting
legal issue-the Federal Circuit is unlikely to disturb any factual
findings when applying the deferential substantial evidence
standard-so the focus going forward will be on identifying those
types of issues.
A. Jurisdiction
The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over appeals from IPR
proceedings is governed by two statutes. Section 319 gives the court
jurisdiction to review the Patent Trial and Appeal Board's "final
written decision" on patentability at the end of the IPR,"' while
§ 314(d) says that the Board's institution decisions "under this
455. See, e.g., Table B-8: Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-
Month Period Ended September 30, 2014, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statitics/
appeals filedterminated-pending_2014.pdf (Eighty-nine percent affirmance rate
for FY 2014); Table B-8: Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-Month
Period Ended September 30, 2013, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/FYI 3/
appeals%20filed%20term%20pend%20
9 .30.13.pdf (Ninety-two percent affirmance
rate for FY 2013); Table B-8: Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-
Month Period Ended September 30, 2012, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/
AppealsFiledTerminated-andPending_2012 REV.pdf (Ninety percent affirmance
rate for FY 2012).
456. 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012) ("A party dissatisfied with the final written decision of
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board under section 318(a) may appeal the decision
pursuant to sections 141 through 144.").
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section shall be final and nonappealable.""' There was initial
controversy over the scope of the appeal bar because the words
"under this section" might seem to confine it to blocking review of
whether the substantive test for institution of IPR in § 314(a) was met,
rather than other procedural reasons for denying institution that
appear in statutory "sections" other than § 314. But St. Jude Medical v.
Volcano Corp." rejected that argument, holding that any institution is
made "under" § 314 (and thus subject to the appeal bar), even if it
also implicates a rule from another statutory section, such as the time
bar in § 315(b). 5 ' And GTNX, Inc. v. INTTRA, Inc.4 "6 reached a
similar conclusion for the analogous CBM appeal bar (in § 324(e)),
holding that it could not review a Patent Office decision terminating
a CBM proceeding that was blocked by § 325 (a).461
Subsequent decisions have addressed whether the appeal bar
blocks review of some interlocutory issues after the final written
decision issues. For example, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies`" held
that the Federal Circuit had no jurisdiction to address whether the
Board erred by instituting review on those claims on a ground not set
forth in the IPR petition." The Board had instituted review of
claims 10 and 14 based on a prior art combination that the petition
had not made for those claims but had made for dependent claim
17.4' The patentee said this violated 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (3), which
requires the petition to "identif[y] ... with particularity ... the
grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based."4 65 But the
court refused to consider the argument because, although it was
styled as a challenge to Board's final written decision invalidating the
claims, the argument actually attacked the institution decision, and
§ 314(d) therefore blocked review, even as part of an appeal from the
457. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) ("No Appeal-The determination by the Director
whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and
nonappealable.").
458. 749 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
459. Id. at 1376.
460. 789 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
461. Id. at 1313. GTNX also stands for the proposition that a Board decision
granting a motion to reconsider its institution decision (and thus terminating the
IPR) is still properly considered part of the institution itself and is therefore subject
to the appeal bar. Id. at 1311-12.
462. 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016).
463. Id. at 1271.
464. Id. at 1272.
465. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (3) (2012).
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final decision.4 The court was also unsympathetic because the
patentee was trying to capitalize on a technicality: "The fact that the
petition was defective is irrelevant because a proper petition could
have been drafted."67 In other words, the patentee was saying that
even if the claims were actually invalid on the merits, and even
though someone else could have drafted a petition that would have
justified invalidating them, the court should still set the judgment
aside. That is not an attractive argument.
A different panel took a more aggressive approach to judicial
review in Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., with a
majority holding that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review
whether the Patent Office correctly determined a patent was a
"covered business method" and thus reviewable in a CBM
proceeding.468 The jurisdictional statutes governing review of CBM
proceedings mirror the provisions for IPR, so they present the same
interpretative issues.4 The majority concluded that it had
jurisdiction to review any issue that went to the Board's power to issue
its final written decision, because the Board was not allowed to
engage in ultra vires acts.470 The Board only had power to issue a final
decision if the patent was actually a "covered business method," so
the Federal Circuit necessarily had jurisdiction to review that issue.
Unlike in Cuozzo, " [i]f a particular patent is not a CBM patent, there
is no proper pleading that could be filed" to bring it within the
Board's invalidation authority.472 The court also noted the "strong
466. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1273.
467. Id. at 1274.
468. Id. at 1309-10, 1329, 1336.
469. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 324(e) ("The determination by the Director whether to
institute a post-grant review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.")
and 35 U.S.C. § 329 ("A party dissatisfied with the final written decision of the
[Board] ... may appeal the decision."), with 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) ("The determination
by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be
final and nonappealable."), and 35 U.S.C. § 319 ("A party dissatisfied with the final
written decision of the [Board] ... may appeal the decision.").
470. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1319-21 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
471. Id.
472. Id. at 1320; see also id. at 1322. The majority also left open the possibility that
there might be a difference between Cuozzo and Versata if there were any differences
between the appeal bars in § 314(d) and § 324(e). Id. at 1322. As discussed below,
the Federal Circuit's later decision in Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc.
would seize on this as a potential distinction. 803 F.3d 652, 653, 656-57 (Fed. Cir.
2015). But the statutory language in the two provisions is identical, so it is difficult to
see how one could interpret one differently from the other.
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presumption" ofjudicial review of agency action.7 It did not matter
that the Board decided whether the patent was a "covered business
method" at the institution stage-the mere fact that the Board found
it more efficient to decide the question at the beginning of the
proceeding did not change the fact that it impacted the Board's
power to issue a final written decision.4 74
The Versata panel majority also held it had jurisdiction to review a
second, arguably institution-related issue; namely, whether the Board
had correctly concluded that it could address invalidity under 35
U.S.C. § 101 in a CBM proceeding.475  "The authority of the PTAB
under the relevant statutes to apply § 101 law to the claims under review
goes to the power of the PTAB to decide the case presented to it." "7 So,
the Federal Circuit could review the issue for the same reasons it could
review whether the patent was a "covered business method.",77
Judge Todd Hughes dissented from both jurisdictional rulings.478
He saw both questions as impacting the Board's "authority to institute
review," placing them squarely within § 324(e)'s appeal bar.4 79 Judge
Hughes recognized that the majority's rationale could theoretically
be extended to any challenge to the institution decision, noting that
"any limit on the Board's authority to institute review is indirectly a
limit on its authority to invalidate a patent: If the Board cannot
institute review in the first place, it cannot issue a final written
decision."' The result would be to eviscerate much of the appeal
bar, confining it to blocking only interlocutory challenges to the
institution decision, an interpretation that even the majority agreed
was wrong." Judge Hughes also thought the majority's holding
conflicted with Cuozzo, which he said "addressed just as much a predicate
question of authority to invalidate as we are presented with here."a4
Interestingly, Versata had also sought review of the Patent Office's
decision that the patent was a CBM by filing suit under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) attacking the institution
473. Versata, 793 F.3d at 1320.
474. Id. at 1323, 1339.
475. Id. at 1329.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 1337 (Hughes,J., dissenting in part).
479. Id. at 1340.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 1341.
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decision.48 3 The same panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of
that suit based on the appeal bar in § 324(e)."' The panel explained
that "since the attempt by Versata to obtain judicial review of the
PTAB's decision to institute a CBM review in this case was addressed
to the PTAB's determinations at the decision to institute stage, the
district court was correct in barring judicial review pursuant to
subsection 324(e).""' This result was significant for two reasons: (1)
it shows that an APA suit cannot be used to circumvent the appeal
bar, and (2) it shows that a party can obtain review over an agency's
power to act after a final decision but not in an interlocutory appeal.
A subsequent case dealt with the uneasy coexistence of Cuozzo and
Versata by shifting the balance toward Cuozzo. In Achates Reference
Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,48 6 the Federal Circuit held that it did not
have jurisdiction to review the Patent Office's refusal to deny
institution based on the time bar in § 315(d).' This might at first
seem a straight-forward application of St. Jude, but the panel went out
of its way to cabin Versata and limit it to the specific CBM
proceedings. Achates held that the time-bar did not go to the Board's
power to invalidate a claim, but instead was something that could
have been fixed with proper pleading, like the complaint in Cuozzo:
"[T]he § 315(b) time bar does not impact the Board's authority to
invalidate a patent claim-it only bars particular petitioners from
challenging the claim. The Board may still invalidate a claim
challenged in a time-barred petition via a properly-filed petition from
another petitioner."" Achates also viewed the time bar as
establishing a procedural rule, not as itself giving the Board the
power to invalidate a patent.8
So, the trend seems to be toward broad application of the appeal
bar in § 314(d), although that may not last because the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in Cuozzo and may alter the analysis.4 0
483. Id. at 1317.
484. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Lee, 793 F.3d 1352, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
485. Id.
486. 803 F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
487. Id. at 653.
488. Id. at 657.
489. Id.
490. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (presenting
the question "[w] hether the court of appeals erred in holding that, even if the Board
exceeds its statutory authority in instituting an IPR proceeding, the Board's decision
whether to institute an IPR proceeding is judicially unreviewable"), cert. granted, 136
S. Ct. 890 (2016).
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For now, though, the Federal Circuit's current jurisprudence still
leaves it a potential safety valve to review egregious decisions related
to institution. Cuozzo suggested that the court "may" be able to review
a decision to institute on petition for mandamus, instead of direct
appeal.491 Writs of mandamus are difficult to get-they require proof
of (1) the absence of alternative remedies, (2) a "clear and
indisputable right" to relief, and (3) that the writ is "appropriate
under the circumstances" as judged by the court's discretion.92 The
first condition will always be satisfied by institution-related challenges,
given the court's broad application of § 314(d), but the latter two
leave broad discretion to deny mandamus, even if the requestor
would win in a regular appeal. No Federal Circuit decision has
granted mandamus in an IPR or CBM proceeding, while plenty have
denied it.493 If the Federal Circuit uses mandamus at all, it will only
be in extraordinary circumstances. Only time will tell what those are.
B. Claim Construction in IPR and CBM Proceedings
Claim construction is generally an attractive issue to appeal
because it is ultimately a question of law that is reviewed de novo
where the tribunal below resolves it based only on the intrinsic
evidence.9 But patentees challenging a Patent Office decision face
an additional hurdle because the Board applies the "broadest
reasonable interpretation" (BRI) standard, putting a thumb on the
scales in favor of a defendant, who wants a broad construction to
sweep in prior art.4 9' Two aspects of the Federal Circuit's
jurisprudence on claim construction in post-grant appeals are
notable-the first relates to whether the BRI standard should apply in
inter partes review, and the second is about what is required to obtain
reversal of the Patent Office's claim construction.
491. Id. at 1274 ("Cuozzo argues that Congress would not have intended to allow
the PTO to institute IPR in direct contravention of the statute .... The answer is
that mandamus may be available to challenge the PTO's decision to grant a petition
to institute IPR after the Board's final decision in situations where the PTO has
clearly and indisputably exceeded its authority.").
492. Id. at 1275.
493. See, e.g., id. at 1274; GTNX, Inc. v INTTRA, Inc., 789 F.3d 1309, 1310 (Fed.
Cir. 2015); In re MCM Portfolio, LLC, 554 F. App'x 944, 945 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re
Dominion Dealer Sols., LLC, 749 F.3d 1379, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Procter &
Gamble Co., 749 F.3d 1376, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Bd. of Trs. Univ. Ill., 564 F.
App'x. 1021, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Versata Dev. Grp., 564 F. App'x 1025, 1026
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
494. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
495. See Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1275.
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1. Broadest reasonable interpretation
The applicability of the BRI standard to post-grant proceedings
deeply split the Federal Circuit. A divided panel in Cuozzo held that
the Patent Office can apply the BRI standard in IPRs,496 and the full
court subsequently refused to rehear that decision en banc by a vote
of 6-5.'9 Some historical background will put the judges'
disagreement in context. The BRI standard originally developed as
an expedient in the original examination of patents. The thought
was that a broad interpretation would force applicants to clarify their
claims and include specific language to avoid prior art, thereby
preventing a patentee from later taking a position about the breadth
of its claims during litigation that would have caused the patent
examiner to reject them (had he viewed them so broadly)." The
Patent Office and Federal Circuit gradually expanded it to other
proceedings, like interferences, reissues, and reexaminations, where
the applicant again had free reign to amend its claims.' The
doctrine also had an exception in the latter set of proceedings-it did
not apply to expired patents because patentees could not amend an
expired patent's claims.""0
Inter partes review is arguably different from these other
proceedings. It is an adversarial adjudication, not an examination-
style back and forth between applicant and examiner. Moreover, a
patentee's ability to amend its claims is very limited in an IPR-it is
allowed to move to amend, but the Patent Office has broad authority
to refuse to entertain amendments if the patentee does not
demonstrate the amended claims are patentable over the prior art of
record, to ensure that the IPR proceeding is quickly concluded with
the statutory time limits."0 ' "[T]he patent office had rarely allowed
such amendments in practice: It has granted only two motions to
496. Id. at 1278-79.
497. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam).
498. See, e.g., In Re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (C.C.P.A. 1969); Podlesak v.
McInnerney, 26 App. D.C. 399, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1906); see also In re Am. Acad. of Sci.
Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Giving claims their broadest
reasonable construction 'serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that
claims, finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified."').
499. See, e.g., In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (ex parte
reexamination); In re Reuter, 670 F.2d 1015, 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (reissues); Fontijn
v. Okamoto, 518 F.2d 610, 617-18 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (interferences).
500. InreRambus, Inc., 753 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
501. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(d)(1), 326(d)(1) (2012) (motions to amend); 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.221 (2014) (same).
840 [Vol. 65:769
2015 PATENT DECISIONS
amend in the over [nine hundred] IPR proceedings completed so
far."10 2 Given the difficulty of amending, the traditional rationale for
applying BRI is absent from IPR proceedings.
The Cuozzo panel majority, however, concluded that the Patent
Office was within its discretion to use the BRI standard for post-grant
proceedings.03 Congress had given the Patent Office the authority to
issue regulations governing IPR proceedings, and the Patent Office
had adopted the BRI standard in one of those regulations.504 The
Patent Office's decision was consistent with the long history of
applying BRI in a variety of proceedings, and nothing in the AIA's
text or history suggested that BRI was not to be used. Moreover, this
case did not present any undue restrictions on motions to amend
because the proposed amended claims were broader than others that
had previously been flagged as unpatentable.so' At a minimum,
Congress was silent on the question, and the Board's regulation was
reasonable under Chevron deference.0 ' Judge Newman dissented,
however, pointing to the adjudicatory nature of IPRs, the limited
opportunities to amend, and the fact that claims should be given
their "correct" construction.0o
The opinions at the rehearing stage made similar arguments.
Judge Dyk, who wrote the panel decision, concurred in the denial of
rehearing en banc, joined by Judges Lourie, Chen, and Hughes.508
502. Craig E. Countryman & Michael M. Rosen, How Patent Reform Could Affect
Claim Construction in IPR, LAw360 (May 20, 2015, 11:42 AM), http://www.fr.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/How-Patent-Reform-Could-Affect-Claim-Construction-In-
IPR-Law360.pdf.
503. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1276-78. The Cuozzo panel initially issued their opinions
in February 2015, reported at 778 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2015), but then reissued
significantly amended opinions in July 8, 2015, on the same day as the full court's
denial of rehearing en banc. In particular, the Cuozzo panel majority amended their
opinion to leave open the possibility that BRI might be subject to challenge in a case
where the Patent Office had acted arbitrarily in denying a motion to amend. Id. at
1278 ("If there are challenges to be brought against other restrictions on
amendment opportunities as incompatible with using the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard, they must await another case.").
504. Id. at 1275-76 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(a) (2)-(4) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)).
505. Id. at 1272.
506. Id. at 1279 (finding that the statute was ambiguous regarding what standard
the Patent Office should use to construe the claim, step one of the Chevron test, and
then, under step two, that the Patent Office's use of the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard was a reasonable interpretation of the statute, therefore
warranting Chevron deference).
507. Id. at 1285, 1287-88 (Newman,J., dissenting).
508. Id. at 1298 (Dyk,J., concurring).
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He reiterated that nothing in the legislative history suggested that
Congress wanted a different claim construction standard to apply to
IPRs than to all other Patent Office proceedings."o9 Congress had
legislated against the backdrop of BRI, and it had given the Patent
Office discretion to make procedural regulations for IPR, which
included the ability to set the claim construction standard.o10 "In the
absence of evidence of congressional intent to abrogate the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard, we should not act to adopt a
different standard based on our own notions of appropriate public
policy. If the standard is to be changed, that is a matter for Congress."51 1
Chief Judge Sharon Prost and Judges Newman, Moore, O'Malley,
and Reyna issued a joint dissent from denial of rehearing en banc.'"
The dissenters stressed that Congressional silence was just that-
silence-and did not shed any light on whether BRI was the right
standard."' The court thus had to decide the issue from first
principles, and the traditional rationale for applying BRI did not
apply where, as here, there was no "give-and-take between applicant
and examiner. "514 Instead, it is an adjudicatory proceeding, like a
district court litigation, which is streamlined to be efficient, has
limited rights to amend claims, and is more like a trial.115  The
dissenters also questioned the panel's assertion that BRI might not
apply in a particular case where the patentee was improperly denied
the right to amend:
If the opinion means to imply that the correctness of the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard depends on the specific type of
amendments available in a given IPR, we find the suggestion
problematic, as we do not see how the Board can be expected to
determine whether a certain amendment restriction calls for one
claim construction standard or another. 516
The joint dissent also questioned whether Chevron deference to the
Patent Office's regulation was appropriate, although it would not
have upheld the regulation even with such deference.' Judge
509. Id. at 1299.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id. (Prost, C.J., Newman,J., Moore,J., O'Malley,J., Reyna,J., dissenting).
513. Id. at 1299-1300.
514. Id. at 1300-01.
515. Id. at 1301.
516. Id. at 1302.
517. Id. at 1302-03.
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Newman also separately dissented to stress the views of amici who
described the problems with the panel's holding."'
The ongoing debate over BRI continues on two fronts. First, the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Cuozzo and decide by June
2016 whether BRI applies in IPR proceedings."' Second, multiple
bills have been proposed in Congress to eliminate the BRI standard
for inter partes review.2 o The bills have gotten hung up due to
disputes on other, unrelated issues, but the BRI section seems likely
to be included if Congress is able to pass a bill. Either way, the
fractured en banc decisions will not be the last word on this issue.
2. The Federal Circuit's analysis of the Board's constructions
Given that "broadest reasonable interpretation" remains the
governing standard, the Federal Circuit has affirmed most Patent
Office claim constructions as reasonable.521 There is little to say
about those decisions other than that parties who try to use the
specification to import limitations are unlikely to succeed, especially
given the BRI standard. The Federal Circuit's two claim construction
reversals, however, provide a roadmap for patentees who want to
salvage their claims from invalidation.
Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc. 22 reversed two overbroad
constructions as inconsistent with the claim language.23 The patent
was directed to a system for expediting network data access by having
a "sender/computer" transmit a short data digest that, if recognized
by the "receiver/computer," eliminates the need to send the entire
underlying document.5 24 The system could also include "gateway"
518. Id. at 1303 (Newman,J., dissenting).
519. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted,
136 S. Ct. 890 (2016).
520. See Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 9(b) (2015); Support Technology
and Research for Our Nation's Growth (STRONG) Patents Act of 2015, S. 632, 114th
Cong. §§ 102(a), 103(a) (2015).
521. See, e.g., Prolitec, Inc. v. ScentAir Techs., Inc., 807 F.3d 1353, 1363-64 (Fed.
Cir. 2015); Sightsound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In
addition, Cuozzo also dealt with claim construction, but, oddly, the patentee argued
on appeal for a broader construction, which made little sense because it would sweep
in more prior art, rendering the claims even more invalid. See 793 F.3d at 1280
(explaining the patentee's argument that the phrase "integrally attached" should be
construed to mean 'joined or combined to work as a complete unit," not, as the
Board construed it, "discrete parts physically joined together as a unit without each
part losing its own separate identity").
522. 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
523. Id. at 1308-09.
524. Id. at 1296.
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and "caching" computers to further facilitate matters.52" The court
held that the term "gateway ... connected to said packet-switched
network in such a way that network packets sent between at least two
other computers" should have been limited so the "two other
computers" were the sending and receiving computers and could not
include the caching computer.5 " The claim recited the "two other
computers" independently of the caching and gateway computers,
and the word "other" further distinguished them.17 Moreover, the
specification consistently used "two other computers" to refer to the
sending and receiving computers.2
The court also held that the terms "sender/computer" and
"receiver/computer" were not broad enough to include
intermediaries.' The claim language itself seemed to exclude the
presence of additional machines-it referred to a sender "computer"
and receiver "computer," and the specification referred to them as
separate components from the rest of the network.so
The other notable decision was Straight Path IP Group, Inc. v. Sipnet
EU S.R. O.,"l which held that the term "transmitting . .. a query as to
whether the second process is connected to computer network"
required that the computer was connected at the time the query was
transmitted.5 32 The claim language had "a meaning that can only be
called plain," because of the present tense word "is." 5 33 "The question
asked by the query is whether the device 'is' connected, not whether it
was connected or whether it is still registered as being connected even if
that registration information is no longer accurate."3 Such clear claim
language could not be overcome by anything in the specification:
When claim language has as plain a meaning on an issue as the
language does here, leaving no genuine uncertainties on
interpretive questions relevant to the case, it is particularly difficult
to conclude that the specification reasonably supports a different
meaning. The specification plays a more limited role than in the
525. Id.
526. Id. at 1298-99.
527. Id. at 1299.
528. Id.
529. Id. at 1300.
530. Id.
531. 806 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
532. Id. at 1359-60.




common situation where claim terms are uncertain in meaning in
relevant respects.5 3 5
The panel then stressed the primacy of the claim language, with the
specification mainly coming into play (absent disclaimer or lexicography)
only when the claims have a range of possible ordinary meanings:
Reflecting the distinct but related roles of the claims and
specification, the governing approach to claim construction thus
maintains claim language's key (not always decisive) role in claim
construction: it stresses the importance of the specification in
identifying and resolving genuine uncertainties about claim
language, and in stating redefinitions or disavowals, while it rejects
a sequenced, dictionary-driven, burden-shifting approach to claim
construction. Under our Phillips approach, the plainness of the
claim language necessarily affects what ultimate conclusions about
claim construction can properly be drawn based on the specification.
For that reason, the court has repeatedly stated since Phillips that
redefinition or disavowal is required where claim language is plain,
lacking a range of possible ordinary meanings in context.5 3 "
The specification there fell far short of the required "redefinition
or disavowal." 37
The bottom line is that a patentee seeking a narrow construction
needs a clear hook in the claim language. The patentee needs to
show that any broader construction is "unreasonable," and the only
way to do that is to demonstrate the claim language forecloses the
broader construction. Proxyconn and Straight IP reversed the Board
because the claim language left them no other choice.
C. Obviousness
Obviousness might at first seem an issue where an appellant could
get traction, for it is a legal determination subject to de novo review.
But obviousness turns on underlying facts-such as what a prior art
reference would disclose to the skilled artisan, the presence of a
motivation to combine, and whether the objective indicia have the
required connection or "nexus" to the claimed invention-and the
Federal Circuit reviews the Board's decisions on these matters for
substantial evidence." The court has thus affirmed in most
obviousness appeals because they rise or fall with the Board's findings
535. Id. at 1361.
536. Id. (citations omitted).
537. Id. at 1361-63.
538. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1280-81 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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on underlying facts.' Two reversals, however, are worth examining
in more detail.
The first is Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC,5 40 which involved a situation
in which the Board invalidated the broader claims but confirmed the
patentability of the narrower, dependent claims."' The Board has
done this with increasing frequency in recent months, often taking
an overly formalistic approach and allowing narrower claims that add
little to the invalidated claims. Belden shows that the court will
intervene if the Board's split decision does not make sense. The
Federal Circuit reversed on the dependent claims, holding them
invalid because there was no dispute that the prior art taught all the
claim elements, and the Board's reasons for finding no motivation to
combine were all legally irrelevant.54 2 It was encouraging to see the
panel dig into the Board's technical reasoning on the narrower
claims, and hopefully future panels will do the same when the Board
departs from the flexible obviousness inquiry required by KSR
International, Co. v. Teleflex Inc.543
The other is Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc.," which
vacated a non-obviousness finding where it was unclear whether the
Board properly considered all the relevant evidence." The panel's
holding was potentially quite narrow-it reiterated the long-standing
rule that prior art can be relevant to the obviousness inquiry even if it
539. See, e.g., Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 452
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding of
no motivation to combine); Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 838-39 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (finding substantial evidence of motivation to combine and no objective
indicia); S. Ala. Med. Sci. Found. v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 823, 824-25 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (same); SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (finding substantial evidence of motivation to combine and no teaching away,
and dismissing evidence of commercial success where there was no direct proof the
success was the "direct result of a unique characteristic" of the claimed invention);
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 625 F. App'x 552, 557 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (finding substantial evidence of motivation to combine); Trs. of Columbia
Univ. v. Illumina, Inc., 620 F. App'x 916, 928-29 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding substantial
evidence regarding reasonable xpectation of success and lack of secondary indicia);
Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1280-82 (finding that substantial evidence supported Board's
findings of motivation to combine and disclosures in various prior art references).
540. 805 F.3d 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
541. Id. at 1068, 1072.
542. Id. at 1075-77.
543. 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
544. 805 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
545. Id. at 1365.
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is not part of the formal obviousness "combination.""5 6 The Board
has a tendency toward formalism over substance, so this will be a
useful point for petitioners in future cases. Nevertheless, it was
hardly clear that the Board had engaged in such formalism here:
"The Board might have been saying only that the development of the
argument invoking [the Board's incorrectly limited consideration of]
Exhibit 1010 in the Petitions was not adequate.""' So this case was
hardly a win for the petitioner-on remand, the Board could adopt
that rationale and again confirm the claims as patentable.
D. Claim Amendments
With all the controversy over the "broadest reasonable
interpretation" standard, one might think that the Board's denials
of patentee motions to amend the claims might be a fruitful
avenue to pursue on appeal. But, so far, the Federal Circuit has
affirmed those denials, while hinting that some aspects of the
Board's rules might be too strict.
The main example is Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc."' The Patent
Office had issued very general regulations governing amendments,4 9
and then a Board panel added several more specific requirements.5 50
Proxyconn dealt with the Board's requirement that a patent owner
demonstrate that any proposed amended claims have "patentable
distinction over the prior art of record."' The Federal Circuit first
held that the Board was free to impose requires beyond those in the
regulation, crediting the Director's argument that the rule was
appropriately developed through adjudication, once the Board had
more practical experience with the issue.5' The court then
concluded that the Board's rule was reasonable, given that any
amended claim would immediately become part of the patent,
without further examination:
546. Id. ("Art can legitimately serve to document the knowledge that skilled
artisans would bring to bear in reading the prior art identified as producing
obviousness.").
547. Id. at 1366.
548. 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
549. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20, 42.121 (2013)).
550. See id. at 1304-05 (citing Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., No. IPR2012-
00027, 2013 WL 5947697 (P.T.A.B.June 11, 2013)).
551. See id. at 1304, 1307 (quoting Idle Free, 2013 WL 5947697, at *4).
552. Id. at 1307.
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During IPRs, once the PTO grants a patentee's motion to amend,
the substituted claims are not subject to further examination.
Moreover, the petitioner may choose not to challenge the
patentability of substitute claims if, for example, the amendments
narrowed the claims such that the petitioner no longer faces a risk
of infringement. If the patentee were not required to establish
patentability of substitute claims over the prior art of record, an
amended patent could issue despite the PTO having before it prior
art that undermines patentability. Such a result would defeat
Congress's purpose in creating IPR as part of "a more efficient and
streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit
unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs."
5 53
The panel was quick to note, however, that it was not addressing
some of the Board's other more potentially suspect limitations on
amendments, such as the requirement of demonstrating patentability
over all "prior art known to the patent owner," even if not of record:
Importantly, this case does not call on us to decide whether every
requirement announced by the Board in Idle Free constitutes a
permissible interpretation of the PTO's regulations. The Idle Free
decision is not itself before us, and we resolve this case only with
respect to the Board's having faulted Proxyconn for "attempt[ing]
to distinguish claims [35 and 36] only from the prior art for which
we instituted review of corresponding claims [1 and 3]" and,
ultimately, for "fail[ing] to establish by a preponderance of
evidence that [claims 35 and 36] are patentable over DRP." We do
not address the other requirements of Idle Free that the Board
relied upon. Nor do we address, for example, Idle Free's
requirement that the patentee to [sic] show patentable distinction
over all "prior art known to the patent owner."554
This reasoning in Proxyconn is a strong signal that the Federal Circuit
might strike down that requirement in a future case, if it is the sole
basis for denying a motion to amend.
Another recent Federal Circuit decision dealing with a motion to
amend was Prolitec, Inc. v. Scentair Technologies, Inc.,"' which held that
the patentee's burden to demonstrate patentability "over the prior art
of record" includes cited prior art in the original prosecution history:
The prior art references cited in the original patent's prosecution
history often will be the closest prior art and will already have been
reviewed by the patentee. Evaluating the substitute claims in light
of this prior art helps to effectuate the purpose of IPRs to "improve
553. Id. at 1307-08 (citing H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011)).
554. Id. at 1307 n.4 (citations omitted).
555. 807 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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patent quality and limit, unnecessary and counterproductive
litigation costs.""'
Moreover, the patentee should have known that prior art from the
original prosecution invalidated the proposed amended claims, given
the Board's rejection of other claims based on that prior art and the
patentee's own concessions about what the art taught.55 7  In both
Prolitec and Proxyconn, the court stressed that " [t] his is not a case in
which the patentee was taken by surprise by the Board's reliance on
an entirely new reference or was not given adequate notice and
opportunity to present arguments distinguishing that reference." 558
The upshot is that a future case presenting such a problem might
well be a candidate for reversal.
E. What Constitutes a "Covered Business Method" Patent
"Covered business method" proceedings, alluded to above in the
discussion of Versata, are a special type of post-grant proceeding that
Congress established for a limited, eight-year period." These
proceedings are similar in some respects to IPR but are more
favorable to the petitioner in other respects. In particular,
petitioners can raise more invalidity grounds in a CBM that are not
available in IPR;5" petitioners can obtain immediate appellate review
if a district court denies a stay pending CBM;56 ' and the estoppel
provisions for CBM are narrower, as the provisions apply in district
court only to grounds actually raised and resolved, not to grounds
that "reasonably could have [been] raised.""' So, both parties have
much at stake over whether a patent is a "covered business method."
The statute itself offers little guidance on what constitutes a CBM,
and delegates authority to the Patent Office to further define the
term; however, the Patent Office has not added much to help the
analysis.5 " The statute defines a "covered business method patent" as
556. Id. at 1363-64 (quoting Proxyconn, 789 F.3d at 1308).
557. Id. at 1364-65.
558. Id. at 1365 (quoting Proxyconn, 789 F.3d at 1308).
559. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a) (3), 125 Stat. 284, 330 (2011); see supra notes
468-77 and accompanying text.
560. Petitioners in the CBM process can raise 35 U.S.C. § 101 and § 112 invalidity claims.
561. AIA§18(b).
562. Compare AIA, § 18(a) (1) (D) ("any ground that the petitioner raised"), with 35
U.S.C. § 315(e) (2) (2012) ("any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably
could have raised").
563. SeeAIA, § 18(d); 37 C.F.R. § 42.301 (a) (2013).
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one dealing with "a financial product or service," with an exception
for technological inventions.
The Patent Office regulations provide no further insight into what
constitutes a "financial product or service" but impose some
additional requirements on the "technological invention" exception:
(a) Covered business method patent means a patent that claims a
method or corresponding apparatus for performing data
processing or other operations used in the practice, administration,
or management of a financial product or service, except that the
term does not include patents for technological inventions.
(b) Technological invention. In determining whether a patent is for a
technological invention solely for purposes of the Transitional
Program for Covered Business Methods (section 42.301 (a)), the
following will be considered on a case-by-case basis: whether the
claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological feature
that is novel and unobvious over the prior art; and solves a
technical problem using a technical solution.565
Two Federal Circuit decisions have addressed these definitions,
with both decided against the patentee.
In Versata, the Federal Circuit, after going to great lengths to hold
that it had jurisdiction to decide the issue, determined that a patent
covering a method of determining a product price offered to a
purchaser was a CBM." The panel rejected the argument that a
CBM was limited to "products and services of only the financial
industry, or to patents owned by or directly affecting the activities of
financial institutions such as banks and brokerage houses.""' The
statutory text "on its face covers a wide range of finance-related
activities" and "makes no reference to financial institutions as such,
and does not limit itself only to those institutions."" Moreover,
although the Federal Circuit rejected the Patent Office's attempt to
explain the definition of "technological invention," remarking that
"neither the statute's punt to the USPTO nor the agency's lateral of the
564. AIA, § 18(d)(1) ("[T]he term 'covered business method patent' means a
patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data
processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management
of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for
technological inventions.").
565. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301.
566. See Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1323-27 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (assessing the CBM definition and applying it to the patent in question),
petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. Mar. 11, 2016) (No. 15-1145).
567. Id. at 1325.
568. See id. (discussing the text of AIA, § 18(d) (1)).
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ball offer anything very useful,""' the patent here was not technological
because it required no special software or hardware and was "more akin
to creating organizational management charts."7 o
In SightSound Technologies, LLC v. Apple Inc.,"' the Federal Circuit
expanded the CBM definition even further, holding that a patent for
electronically selling digital audio was covered.57" The panel
accepted the Board's reasoning that the patent was "directed to
activities that are financial in nature," and that "the electronic sale of
something, including charging a fee to a party's account, is a
financial activity, and allowing such a sale amounts to providing a
financial service."" This holding seems to expand the term CBM
because almost any patent involves something that can be sold; the
distinction here, it appears, is that the patent claims themselves
expressly recited obtaining the fee. The panel also held,
unremarkably, that the patent was not a technological invention
because it used an obvious combination of "known technologies. 5
Whatever the merits of their arguments, however, the patentees in
these cases were taking an impractical stance. They wanted the
Federal Circuit to vacate the invalidity judgment, regardless of
whether the patent actually was invalid, based on a procedural
technicality, which is terrible policy.575 The defendants would then
be forced to reargue the same invalidity issues in district court,
making the Patent Office's expenditure of resources for naught and
imposing significant costs on litigation and the judiciary.7 6 It is
difficult to imagine the Federal Circuit permitting this outcome when
the statute is vague enough to avoid it. It does suggest, however, that
a patentee who wants to challenge whether a CBM proceeding is
proper should try to seek mandamus before the proceeding
569. Id. at 1326.
570. Id. at 1327.
571. 809 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
572. Id. at 1311, 1315.
573. Id. at 1315-16 (internal citation omitted).
574. Id. at 1315.
575. See id. at 1313 ("SightSound contends that we should set aside the final
decision because the proceedings were improperly initiated since Apple did not
explicitly raise the issue of obviousness in its petitions.").
576. In these circumstances, the defendant would unlikely be able to file an IPR
because the grounds are either unreviewable, see, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP
Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3530
(U.S. Mar. 11, 2016) (No. 15-1145), or, even if the grounds were reviewable, see, e.g.,
SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2015), the one-
year bar for filing an IPR would have passed. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012).
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concludes; otherwise, these pragmatic considerations will block the
argument if the Patent Office invalidates the patent.
F. Procedural Issues in Post-Grant Proceedings
Procedural challenges are another tempting path for parties that
lose an IPR because they seem to raise broader "legal" issues about
fairness rather than requiring the Federal Circuit to second-guess the
Board's factual findings on complicated technical issues. But the
Board still gets significant deference, and no procedural challenges
have succeeded so far.
For example, in Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC," the court rejected the
patentee's complaint that a petitioner improperly included new
evidence in a reply expert declaration."' The Board acted within its
discretion because it considered only material that was responsive to
the patentee's expert, it gave the patentee an additional chance to
cross-examine the expert and file observations about the testimony,
and it allowed the patentee to file a reply.57 9 Parties are thus unlikely
to succeed with a procedural quibble unless they can identify
something that the Board prevented them from doing that could
have changed the result.
Likewise, the Board has broad discretion to control the timing of
the parties' submissions. In Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech,
Inc.,580 a petitioner moved under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123 to submit
"supplemental information," including a sixty-page expert
declaration and additional prior art, after the Board instituted
review .5 ' The Board denied the motion, noting that the petitioner
had not shown any reason why it could not have submitted the
information earlier but had only done so because it was supposedly
more "cost effective. "58' The Federal Circuit affirmed because
nothing in § 42.123(a) required the Patent Office to accept the
evidence, while the Patent Office reasonably determined that
allowing parties to submit such evidence would undermine the speed
and efficiency of proceedings." The court's decisions in prior IPRs
and treatment of the Patent Office's regulations, in addition to the
history of the regulations, showed significant deference to the agency.
577. 805 F.3d 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
578. Id. at 1082.
579. Id.
580. 811 F.3d 435 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
581. Id. at 440, 442.
582. Id. at 442.
583. Id. at 443-44.
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Another decision, Dynamic Dinkware, LLC v. National Graphics,
Inc.,584 addressed who has the burden of proof on whether a prior art
patent is entitled to the priority date of its provisional application.15
The court held that the petitioner bears the burden of proof to show
that the prior art is entitled to the earlier priority date, as part of its
overall burden to prove invalidity.58 ' The petitioner also bears a
burden of production on that issue, which, if met, shifts to the
patentee.8 In this case, the petitioner originally relied on the prior
art's later filing date, but then the patentee put in evidence of an
earlier reduction to practice.8 The burden then shifted back to the
petitioner to show that the prior art was entitled to the earlier
provisional filing date, which was before the reduction to practice.
The petitioner failed to meet that burden by relying only on the
erroneous argument that there was a "presumption" in favor of giving
the prior art patent its earlier provisional filing date.58" There is no
such presumption.
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to
the IPR process in MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,590 holding
that the process is consistent with both Article III of the U.S.
Constitution and the Seventh Amendment."' The court reviewed
extensive precedent upholding the constitutionality of reissue and
reexamination proceedings and concluded that IPR is no different.592
Both aspects of the decision turned on the fact that patents are public
rights that are initially granted by the Patent Office: "There is
notably no suggestion that Congress lacked authority to delegate to
the PTO the power to issue patents in the first instance. It would be
odd indeed if Congress could not authorize the PTO to reconsider its
own decisions.""' Likewise, "[b]ecause patent rights are public
rights, and their validity [is] susceptible to review by an administrative
agency, the Seventh Amendment poses no barrier to agency
584. 800 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
585. Id. at 1378, 1381.
586. Id. at 1378-79.
587. Id. at 1379-80.
588. Id.
589. Id. at 1380.
590. 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
591. Id. at 1285.
592. Id. at 1287-93.
593. Id. at 1291.
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adjudication without ajury.""' Constitutional challenges are unlikely
to succeed in patent litigation. MCMis just the latest example.
G. jurisdiction to Appealfrom a Denial of Stay Pending CBM
As noted earlier, one benefit of filing a petition for CBM review
rather than an IPR is that, for CBM, the America Invents Act entitles
the defendant to take an immediate interlocutory appeal if the
district court refuses to stay the case."' But, in Intellectual Ventures II
LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,"' a split panel differed over precisely
how soon such an appeal can occur. The relevant statutory provisions
refer to the ability to seek a stay pending "a transitional [CBM]
proceeding" and to obtain interlocutory review of such a ruling:
(b) REQUEST FOR STAY.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-If a party seeks a stay of a civil action alleging
infringement of a patent under section 281 of title 35, United
States Code, relating to a [transitional CBM) proceeding for that patent,
the court shall decide whether to enter a stay ....
(2) REVIEW.-A party may take an immediate interlocutory appeal
from a district court's decision under paragraph (1). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall review the district
court's decision to ensure consistent application of established
precedent, and such review may be de novo.597
The majority concluded that the statute's reference to a
"proceeding" requires that the district court have decided a stay
motion filed after the Patent Office actually initiated review before
the Federal Circuit can review the decision."' The majority noted
that the statute distinguishes between a CBM "proceeding" and CBM
"petition," explaining that a "proceeding" begins only after the Patent
Office institutes review."' Delaying review until after institution was also
consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, which was to provide for
review in the rare circumstance in which a court denied a stay, despite
the Patent Office having instituted proceedings."o
Judge Hughes dissented, arguing that the panel's textual analysis
was overly narrow and conflicted with the statutory purpose.601 The
594. Id. at 1293.
595. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b), 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011).
596. 781 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
597. Id. at 1375 (quoting AIA, § 18(b)) (emphasis added).
598. Id. at 1377-79.
599. Id. at 1377-78.
600. Id. at 1377.
601. Id. at 1379-80 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
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CBM program was designed, Judges Hughes explained, as an
alternative to civil litigation, and stays were to be granted "in all but
the rarest of circumstances."o6 2  Although the majority's textual
analysis was "reasonable," it could not be squared with Congress's
goal of ensuring that parties did not have to waste money litigating in
district court when validity could be resolved more cheaply at the
Patent Office. Parties should not be forced to litigate in district court
while waiting for the Patent Office to decide whether to institute
CBM review because, if review is eventually granted and the patent
invalidated, the district court fees would all be wasted. In addition,
Judge Hughes thought that delaying review undermined the
legislative goal of uniformity in stay decisions, as all such pre-
institution decisions are now unreviewable."
H. Decisions in Examination and Reexamination Proceedings
The Federal Circuit also decided three other cases dealing with
procedural issues in older reexamination proceedings and in an
original examination proceeding.
The first, Power Integrations, Inc. v. Lee,"o held that when the Patent
Office construes claims under the broadest reasonable interpretation,
it still must address a prior district court construction that is argued
to it by the patentee." Although the Board is not bound by the
prior district court construction, this "does not mean, however, that it
has no obligation to acknowledge that interpretation or to assess
whether it is consistent with the broadest reasonable construction of
the term.""ce This logic would seem to apply equally to IPR
proceedings where a district court has previously construed the
claims at issue, although the situation may be less likely to arise there
if the district court stays the co-pending litigation.
Next, Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp." dealt with a procedural issue
within inter partes reexamination." When the patentee added new
claims, the examiner refused to enter the requestor's proposed
obviousness rejection, finding no "substantial new question of
patentability," but rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112." The
602. Id. at 1380.
603. Id. at 1381.
604. 797 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
605. Id. at 1326-27.
606. Id. at 1326.
607. 793 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
608. Id. at 1376-77.
609. Id. at 1377.
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Board reversed the § 112 rejection and refused to entertain the
requestor's cross-appeal on obviousness."'o The Federal Circuit
reversed the refusal to entertain the cross-appeal."' Precedent
barring Board review of an examiner's determination of whether there
is a substantial question of patentability with respect to original claims was
inapplicable here because reexamination was already ongoing, so a
different regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 1.948 (a) (2),"' applied.6 13
Finally, Hyatt v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office"' dealt with a
peculiar issue involving Gilbert Hyatt, a recalcitrant patent applicant
who had dragged out the pendency of hundreds of his applications to
allow himself to write over 115,000 claims, filed decades after his
original priority dates, which date back to the 1970s."' The operative
provision of 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) required the Patent Office to keep
these applications secret, except "in such special circumstances as
may be determined by the Director."' The court rejected the Patent
Office's position that its "special circumstances" were not reviewable
under the APA, and concluded that any disclosed information "must
be linked to the 'special circumstances' justifying the disclosure.""
The Patent Office acted within its discretion in enforcing 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.75(b)," which forbids applicants from unduly multiplying their
claims, by disclosing information about the pending claims and the
specifications, given the unique volume of claims, all of which stood
to have a term of seventeen years from issuance if allowed.1 '
L Burden ofProof in Action Under § 145
A patentee in an ex parte reexamination filed before November 29,
1999 has the right to seek review of an adverse decision by filing suit
in district court under 35 U.S.C. § 145."' One hopes that there are
few such proceedings still pending, but the Federal Circuit dealt with
an appeal from one in Dome Patent L.P. v. Lee."'
610. Id.
611. Id. at 1381.
612. 37 C.F.R. § 1.948(a) (2) (2016).
613. Airbus S.A.S., 793 F.3d at 1379-81.
614. 797 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
615. Id. at 1377.
616. Id. at 1378 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2012)).
617. Id. at 1383.
618. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(b) (2016).
619. Id. at 1384-85.
620. 37 C.F.R. § 1.303(a) (2012).
621. 799 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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The issue was whether the Patent Office bears the burden of
proving invalidity in district court by clear and convincing evidence
or by only a preponderance of the evidence.622 The court held that
preponderance was the right standard because, in reexamination, the
examiner is conducting another substantive examination, and the
patentee only has the right to its patent if the examiner concludes it is
patentable.623  "When the Patent Office institutes ex parte
reexamination, it reopens prosecution to determine whether the
claimed subject matter should have been allowed in the first place."24
Section 282 is therefore inapplicable because there is no issued patent.
In addition, the rationale underlying the clear and convincing
burden is absent in a court action challenging the Patent Office's
invalidation decision. The purpose of reexamination is to give the
Patent Office a second chance to scrutinize the patent. "We would
hinder this intent if we required the district court here to presume
that the reexamined claim is valid because of the Patent Office's
previous determination and, consequently, to impose a burden to




The en banc Federal Circuit reassessed the applicability and scope
of laches in patent cases in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag SCA
Personal Care, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC 626 The court split
6-5 on the issue of whether laches bars past damages, with the
majority holding that it does.62' The court unanimously agreed
laches can bar prospective injunctive relief, overruling A. C. Aukerman
Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., 2' but noted that it will not bar
imposition of an ongoing royalty "absent egregious circumstances. "629
The Federal Circuit's decision won't be the last word, though,
because the Supreme Court recently announced it will review these
holdings during the October 2016 term.
622. Id. at 1377-78.
623. Id. at 1378-79.
624. Id. at 1379.
625. Id.
626. 807 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
627. Id. at 1315.
628. 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
629. SCA, 807 F.3d at 1332-33.
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The Federal Circuit convened en banc to address the impact of the
Supreme Court's holding in Petrella v. Metro-Golduyn-Mayer, Inc.,630
which held that laches was unavailable to bar past damages in
copyright cases.31 Petrella based its conclusion on copyright's statute
of limitations,' which provides that "[n]o civil action shall be
maintained ... unless it is commenced within three years after the
claim accrued."' Applying laches to bar all pre-suit damages would
conflict with this statute, which barred only damages from
infringement more than three years before filing suit. Moreover, the
copyright statute permits the defendant to deduct its own
contributions from any damages under the statute, already
minimizing economic prejudice from delay that might otherwise be
triggered by its investments in a product that was later accused of
infringement.' Finally, laches is an equitable doctrine designed to
deal only with claims without a statute of limitations, and thus has no
applicability to bar past damages, a legal remedy. Petrella noted,
however, that a plaintiffs delay in bringing suit was a factor to
consider in deciding whether to issue injunctive relief.6'
The SCA en banc majority held that laches can still bar past
damages in patent cases, despite Petrella."' The majority noted that
patent law has a similar statute of limitations, which provides that
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be had for
any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of
the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action."'
But the patent statute also included a different provision that
codified the laches defense-35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (1) makes
"unenforceability" a defense to patent infringement, and, according
to P.J. Federico, a co-author of the 1952 Act, this provision would
include "equitable defenses such as laches."' The copyright statute
contained no such codification. Moreover, the regional circuits
uniformly applied laches before the 1952 Act; the two decisions to
explicitly consider the question held that the laches defense
630. 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014).
631. Id. at 1967.
632. Id. at 1973-74.
633. Id. at 1973 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012)).
634. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
635. 134 S. Ct. at 1978-79.
636. SCA, 807 F.3d at 1315.
637. 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012).
638. SCA, 807 F.3d at 1318 (quoting P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent
Act, 75J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 161, 215 (1993)).
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extended to barring legal relief;," and all the others implicitly
assumed that laches barred legal relief."o The majority also noted a
practical difference between copyright and patent law-the former
requires proof of copying, which suggests that infringers are on
notice of potential infringement claims and are thus at less risk of
prejudice from a plaintiffs delay."' By contrast, patent infringers may
face strict liability and be accused of infringing patents of which they have
no notice based on products they independently developed, making it
more difficult for them to plan their investment."
Judge Hughes, joined by Judges Moore, Wallach, Taranto, and
Chen, dissented on this issue." They thought that § 286's statute of
limitations expressly ruled out a laches defense (as in Petrella), while
§ 282(b)'s reference to "unenforceability" was too vague to justify
engrafting a laches defense." The dissenters questioned the
majority's reliance on a single statement made in Federico's
Commentary to infer that Congress intended to permit laches as a
defense because the statement was made two years after § 282 was
passed and by someone-namely, Federico-who was not a member
of Congress.6  Instead, the dissenters believed the statement
referred to the traditional form of laches that barred equitable
remedies, not one that barred legal damages." As for the pre-1952
case law, the dissenters thought the appropriate reference point was
Supreme Court precedent outside patent law that held laches was not
639. See Banker v. Ford Motor Co., 69 F.2d 665, 666 (3d Cir. 1934) (authorizing
"equitable defenses in actions at law theretofore applicable only in equity"); Ford v.
Huff, 296 F. 652, 658 (5th Cir. 1924) (noting that under section 27b of the Judicial
Code, "a defendant in an action at law who files a plea setting up an equitable
defense is given the same rights as if he had set them up in a bill in equity").
640. See generally Middleton v. Wiley, 195 F.2d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 1952) (discussing
the availability of laches as a grounds to deny relief); Brennan v. Hawley Prods. Co.,
182 F.2d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 1950) (same); Fr. Mfg. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 106 F.2d
605, 609 (6th Cir. 1939) (same); Universal Coin Lock Co. v. Am. Sanitary Lock Co.,
104 F.2d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 1939) (same); Hartford-Empire Co. v. Swindell Bros.,
Inc., 96 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1938) (same); GeorgeJ. Meyer Mfg. Co. v. Miller Mfg.
Co., 24 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1928) (same); Wolf, Sayer & Heller, Inc. v. U.S.
Slicing Mach. Co., 261 F. 195, 197-98 (7th Cir. 1919) (same).
641. SCA, 807 F.3d at 1330.
642. Id.
643. Id. at 1333 (Hughes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (dissenting
specifically to the majority's holding that laches is an available defense to claims for
damages brought within a statutory limitations period).
644. Id. at 1335.
645. Id. at 1337.
646. Id.
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a defense to legal remedies.17  And the dissenters dismissed the
various regional circuit cases as either silent on laches' applicability to
legal remedies, ambiguous, or incorrectly decided." Finally, policy
was irrelevant because Petrella controlled the issue.69
Both the majority and dissent agreed, though, that laches is a
factor to consider when assessing the propriety of injunctive relief.6 50
As such, laches is not a per se bar to an injunction." Aukerman's view
that laches cannot bar an injunction was based on a misreading of
precedent, and it was reached at a time, before eBay, when the court
erroneously treated injunctions as automatic.52
But ongoing royalties were a different matter. SCA cited precedent
suggesting that the patentee remained entitled to ongoing royalties,
despite delay in bringing suit." It also stressed the importance of
maintaining a difference between equitable estoppel (which bars all
relief, including ongoing royalties, based on reliance on the
patentee's misleading conduct) and laches (which can apply without
misleading conduct).654
The Federal Circuit's only other laches case in 2015 was Carnegie
Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd.,55 in which the
district court refused to bar pre-suit damages.56  The district court
thought that both elements of laches were met-including an
"inexcusable" delay of over six years and "some" evidentiary
prejudice-yet exercised its discretion not to bar pre-suit damages
based on the defendant's own "particularly egregious conduct," e.g.,
"blatant and prolonged copying."1" The Federal Circuit affirmed,
rejecting the defendant's argument that its copying could be relevant
only if it caused the plaintiffs delay.5 1
647. Id. at 1338.
648. Id. at 1339.
649. Id. at 1342.
650. Id. at 1331-32 ("Many of the facts relevant to laches, such as the accused
infringer's reliance on the patentee's delay, fall under the balance of the hardships
factor. Unreasonable delay in bringing suit may also be relevant to a patentee's
claim that continued infringement will cause it irreparable injury.").
651. Id. ("More than anything, district courts should consider all material facts,
including those giving rise to laches, in exercising its discretion ... under eBay to
grant or deny an injunction.").
652. Id. at 1331-32.
653. Id. at 1332.
654. Id. at 1333.
655. 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
656. Id. at 1288.
657. Id. at 1298-99.




The Federal Circuit decided one important exhaustion case in
2015, Helfeich Patent Licensing, LLC v. New York Times Co.,'" which
reversed a summary judgment of exhaustion and held that the
doctrine protected only "authorized acquirers" of a licensed product,
not just anyone who might happen to use the product in an
infringing method.6" The asserted claims covered systems and methods
for transmitting data to wireless communications devices (e.g., phones
and other handsets)."' The patentee previously licensed its portfolio to
handset manufacturers, but then sued content providers who sent data to
the handsets.' Lacking allegations that authorized acquirers infringed the
asserted claims, exhaustion did not bar the suit, even though the patents
covered use of the already licensed handsets.6 This case involved no such
allegation-the plaintifs allegations were only against third parties
transmitting data to the handsets, not the handset users themselves.6"
Moreover, unlike in prior cases involving complementary products,
the patentee had separate patents on the handset itself and on
content transmission, and the defendants had not argued that the
asserted claims could be infringed only with a handset that had the
inventive features covered in the patentee's other patents.6 6 5
The court then declined to extend precedent to cover this case,
emphasizing that (1) cases grounding exhaustion in the common law
of property suggested that the doctrine only protected the activities
of the handset owners; (2) Congressional silence on exhaustion
supported hewing closely to precedent; (3) expanding exhaustion to
cover related products or third-party use could have dramatic
implications for patent policy in the areas of software,
communications, and social networking; and (4) restriction
requirements imposed by the Patent Office reinforced that the
content claims and handset claims were directed to distinct
659. 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
660. Id. at 1295-97.
661. Id. at 1295-96.
662. Id. at 1296-97.
663. Id. at 1302 ("The doctrine has never applied unless, at a minimum, the
patentee's allegations of infringement, whether direct or indirect, entail
infringement of the asserted claims by authorized acquirers-either because they are
parties accused of infringement or because they are the ones allegedly committing
the direct infringement required by the indirect infringement charged against other
parties.").
664. Id. at 1299.
665. Id. at 1309.
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inventions."' It thus vacated the grant of summary judgment and
remanded, noting that its opinion might not foreclose other, more
narrowly framed, exhaustion defenses on particular claims because
they have not been presented on appeal.6
Helferich has been the source of academic controversy." Professor
Ernst argued that Helferich "imposes a wholly novel restriction on the
exhaustion doctrine by holding that the doctrine only protects
'authorized acquirers' of a device.""' In his view, the "exhaustion
doctrine promotes the policy against servitudes attaching to goods in
commerce in restraint of the free trade and use of those goods," and
should thus bar suit against anyone accused of infringement based on
use of the licensed goods.670 The focus of patent exhaustion is the
patented device, not "certain persons" authorized to use the device.67
By contrast, Professor Rinehart believes that the Federal Circuit's
"authorized acquirers" concept is not novel-"the difficulty with
Helferch is not that the Federal Circuit stretches the exhaustion
doctrine in a new way, but that the doctrine . . . fails to provide an
easy way to remove infringement liability in an increasingly complex
world of patent assertion."67 ' The debate turns on an analysis of
Supreme Court precedent, some of which is either old, unclear, or
both, suggesting that the Court needs to resolve the debate about the
meaning of its prior decisions. But it will not happen in Helferich
because the defendants did not seek certiorari.
666. Id. at 1295-96, 1305-08.
667. Id. at 1311.
668. Compare Samuel F. Ernst, The Federal Circuit's New "Authorized Acquirer"
Restriction on Patent Exhaustion, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Ernst,
Authorized Acquirer Restriction], http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/02/authorized-
restriction-exhaustion.html (concluding that Helferich's interpretation of the
exhaustion doctrine "directly [contradicts] Supreme Court precedent"), and Samuel
F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted Defendant: Should Parties Be Able to Contract
Around Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation?, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 445,
445-46 (arguing that provisions in agreements that effectively "preclude []
application of the exhaustion doctrine" are not enforceable), with Amelia Smith
Rinehart, Guest Counterpoint: Patent Exhaustion and Helferich's Assertion Problem,
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 5, 2015) http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/counterpoint-
exhaustion-helferichs.html (disagreeing with Professor Ernst and arguing that the
Federal Circuit's ruling was not novel or broad).
669. Ernst, Authorized Acquirer Restriction, supra note 668.
670. Id.
671. Id.





The Federal Circuit took a relatively deferential approach to its
review of reasonable royalty awards this year, affirming most of the
methodologies it considered and rejecting arguments that the
patentee had failed to properly apportion damages. The court also
reiterated that exclusion of the patentee's expert does not
necessarily justify summary judgment of no damages. It did,
however, set aside awards that failed to adequately account for the
value of standard-essential patents or that covered post-expiration
or extraterritorial activities.
AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp.' provides a typical example of the
Federal Circuit's deference. It affirmed a fifty percent royalty on the
gross profit margin for sales of a generic drug product and rejected
the defendant's challenges to the rate and an alleged failure to
apportion.' As an initial matter, the defendant was wrong to try to
limit royalties to the "harm actually suffered," because the reasonable
royalty theory of damages "seeks to compensate the patentee not for
lost sales caused by the infringement, but for its lost opportunity to
obtain a reasonable royalty that the infringer would have been willing
to pay if it had been barred from infringing. "6" Here, the patentee
would have demanded a high rate because the generic drug's entry
would destroy its market and erode prices.7 In addition, the generic
had no non-infringing alternative, and "if avoiding the patent would
be difficult, expensive, and time-consuming, the amount the
infringer would be willing to pay for a license is likely to be
greater."' Another company's formulation was not a non-infringing
alternative because that company's patents covered its formulation,
meaning it was unavailable to the defendant here.
The plaintiffs settlements with other generics for between fifty and
seventy percent rates were also instructive because they were
negotiated after the district court found infringement and validity,
making them comparable to the hypothetical negotiation.' And,
673. 782 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
674. Id. at 1332-38.
675. Id. at 1333-34.
676. Id.
677. Id. at 1335.
678. Id. at 1340.
679. Id. at 1336.
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finally, the royalty still left the defendant with a healthy profit margin
that was typical for the industry.s0
AstraZeneca lso found no error in applying the royalty rate to the
defendant's entire drug product." Although the entire market value
rule is not per se inapplicable to pharmaceuticals, it did not apply
here. The patent was for a product with three key elements-the
drug core, coating, and subcoating-and the invention was the
unique combination of those elements." Because AstraZeneca's
patents "cover the infringing product as a whole, not a single
component of a multi-component product," the product lacked any
unpatented or non-infringing features."s It was thus appropriate to
address damages under a Georgia-Pacific analysis, in which factors 9,
10, and 13684 already require assessing the importance of the
inventive contribution, while bearing in mind that "it is improper to
assume that a conventional element cannot be rendered more
valuable by its use in combination with an invention."" The court
noted that when assessing damages, rather than subtracting the value
of all conventional elements from the value of the patented invention
as a whole, "the question is how much new value is created by the
novel combination, beyond the value conferred by the conventional
elements alone.""' Here, the inventive subcoating permitted
AstraZeneca to create a commercially viable product where it
otherwise could not have, so it was appropriate to also include the
value of the active ingredient when calculating damages."
AstraZeneca did, however, vacate the district court's award of royalty
damages for the sale of defendant's product made after the patent
expired.6 8 The patentee had sought those damages because, in the
real world, the defendant would have been unable to sell its product
680. Id. at 1334.
681. Id. at 1337-38.
682. Id. at 1338.
683. Id.
684. Id. (describing that factors nine and ten in Georgia-Pacific "refer to 'the utility
and advantages of the patent property over any old modes or devices that had been
used' and 'the nature of the patented invention, its character in the commercial
embodiment owned and produced by the licensor, and the benefits to those who
used it,' respectively[,]" and that factor thirteen "refers to the 'portion of the
realizable profit that should be credited to the invention"').
685. Id.
686. Id. at 1339.
687. Id.
688. Id. at 1344.
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during that period due to the FDA's pediatric exclusivity period."
But the court rejected this argument because the patent statute does
not permit damages for post-expiration sales.690
Another case, Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co.," similarly
took a deferential approach, affirming a $15 million lump sum
verdict as supported by substantial evidence.6 ' The court criticized
the defendant for "conflat[ing]" the issue of whether a license should
have been excluded with whether, once it was admitted, it could
support the verdict.' The defendant had challenged only the latter,
and the license was probative because it involved the patent-in-suit
and was to another party that also sold camera phones with the
accused functionality." So the license, coupled with the patentee's
expert testimony, supported the verdict. But the court rejected the
patentee's cross-appeal seeking future royalties; the jury had
specifically indicated that it was awarding a "lump sum," and the
patentee's expert had admitted that a lump sum would compensate
through the entire patent term.95
Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd. dealt with
two substantive challenges to a $1.17 billion reasonable royalty
verdict-one to the rate and form of the royalty, and the other to its
inclusion of extraterritorial activity."' The Federal Circuit once
again gave the patentee significant leeway. With respect to the first
issue, substantial evidence supported use of a per unit royalty (as
opposed to lump sum) because it "ties compensation paid to revealed
marketplace success, minimizing under- and over-payment risks from
lump-sum payments agreed to in advance."6 7 Although the plaintiff
had entered other lump sum licenses, they were distinguishable
because they were extensive, long-standing collaboration agreements
689. Id. at 1341.
690. Id. at 1342.
691. 802 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
692. Id. at 1299-1301.
693. Id. at 1299.
694. Id. at 1299-1300.
695. Id. at 1300-01.
696. 807 F.3d 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The panel also rejected a Rule 702
challenge to the expert's qualifications and methodology, noting that the expert had
ample experience calculating patent damages and was relying on technical experts
for other non-economic parts of her opinion. Id. at 1303. The panel also found her
expert reports thorough, complete, and admissible. Id. The district court held an
extensive Daubert hearing, which reinforced the panel's conclusion that there was no
abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony. Id. at 1302-03.
697. Id. at 1304.
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entered when the technology had not yet been commercialized, and
the payments were structured so the parties shared the risks and costs
of that research." Moreover, the royalty rate of $0.50 per unit was
well-supported because (1) the defendant identified no alternative to
the patented technology, (2) the patented technology was so
significant that it was used industry-wide, (3) the defendant faced
strong market pressures to improve chip performance at the time of
the hypothetical negotiation, (4) the defendant's attempts to develop
other solutions were failing, and (5) the royalty still left the
defendant with "upwards of three quarters of the per-chip profit."
699
The court vacated part of the royalty due to extraterritoriality
issues, however. The court approved some aspects of the patentee's
calculations. For example, the patentee was entitled to damages if
one of the activities listed in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a)-making, using,
selling, offering to sell, or importing-occurs in the United States,
even if the others do not.70 0 Moreover, although the patents involved
only method claims, the parties were using a physical product to
measure damages; it was enough if that product was made, used, sold,
offered for sale, or imported in the United States, especially because
the "product practices the method in its normal intended use" and
"the hypothetical negotiation would have employed the number of
units sold to measure the value of the method's domestic use (before
production and after)."7or
The problem was that the jury was not instructed that it could only
award damages for chips made and delivered abroad if they were
"sold" in the United States.702 The Federal Circuit did not attempt to
elaborate on the legal standard for determining what constitutes a
"sale within the United States" under § 271(a), instead leaving this for
remand, where additional facts could be developed.
70' However, the
court did conclude that the patentee's evidence was enough to avoid
JMOL against it at this stage of the proceedings.
704  Much of the
activity related to the defendant's "design win [s]," which determined
698. Id. at 1304-05.
699. Id. at 1305. On the last point, this is (coincidentally?) the same profit
amount that the now-rejected twenty-five percent rule of thumb would have left for
the defendant, but, here, the other evidence tied the facts of the case to the royalty
awarded by the jury.
700. Id. at 1306-08.
701. Id. at 1306-07.
702. Id. at 1310.
703. Id. at 1311.
704. Id. at 1308.
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which chips went into mass production in the United States,
including "designing, simulating, testing, evaluating, [and] qualifying
the chips by Marvell as well as by its customers."70" Further, the
defendant provided samples from California to customers and
"specific contractual commitments for specific volumes of chips were
made in the United States."7 0 6 A remand was thus appropriate to
further develop this evidence and determine which chips, if any, were
sold in the United States.
The only decision setting aside a royalty based on improper
methodology was Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organisation v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,"0 which vacated a $16.2 million
judgment entered after a bench trial.' The court upheld the first
part of the district judge's methodology, where the judge assessed a
per unit royalty based on the defendant's end-products rather than a
smaller salable unit within the products.70" The judge adopted his
preferred base by relying on the parties' actual prior negotiations,
which had used end-products as the basis, but were still a negotiation
over the value of the asserted patent "and no more."1 o This was
permissible because the fact-finder can calculate royalties based on
sufficiently comparable licenses, even if those licenses do not use the
smallest salable unit as the base:
The rule Cisco advances-which would require all damages models
to begin with the smallest salable patent-practicing unit-is
untenable. It conflicts with our prior approvals of a methodology
that values the asserted patent based on comparable licenses....
Where the licenses employed are sufficiently comparable, this
method is typically reliable because the parties are constrained by
the market's actual valuation of the patent."
To hold otherwise might sometimes result in excluding
comparable license valuations that "may be the most effective method
of estimating the asserted patent's value."'
Nevertheless, the district court committed legal error by failing to
sufficiently adjust its per unit rate to account for any extra value of
the patent that was attributable to the fact that it was essential to the
705. Id. at 1309.
706. Id.
707. 809 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
708. Id. at 1306-07.
709. Id. at 1302-04.
710. Id. at 1303.
711. Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
712. Id. at 1303-04.
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wireless standard.71' Damage awards for standard-essential patents
cannot be determined by the added value resulting from the
standard's widespread adoption, but, instead, must only consider the
value added from the patent's superior technology.714 This rule
applies to all standard essential patents, not just those encumbered by
obligations to license at a reasonable and non-discriminatory rate.1
The rule ensures that patentees are not the only recipients of all of
the advantages afforded by the standardization-benefit by allowing
such benefits to "flow to consumers and businesses practicing the
standard."' The district court, however, had legally erred by
adjusting the royalty rate upward based on the fact the patent is the
subject of the standard." Moreover, it failed to account for the fact
that the starting royalty rates in the parties' negotiations may include
value due to the standard and thus need to be adjusted downward.1
The district court also erred by discounting a prior license on
related technology between the plaintiff and the defendant's
predecessor-in-interest.719 Although the original license was earlier
and based on a close relationship between the parties, it was
subsequently amended after the defendant acquired the licensee and
near the time of the hypothetical negotiation.720 Moreover, the
district court was wrong to exclude it simply because it used the
accused the chip rather than the entire end-product as the base,
because "a license may not be excluded solely because of its chosen
royalty base."7 2' The district court thus had to give further
consideration to the license on remand.
Finally, Info-Hold, Inc. v. Muzak LLC held that striking the plaintiffs
expert report does not automatically require a summary judgment of
zero damages.722 The district court had correctly excluded the expert
based on his reliance on the twenty-five percent rule and invocation
of the entire market value rule without showing the patented feature
713. Id. at 1305-06.
714. Id. at 1304 ("[D]amages awards for SEPs [standard-essential patents] must be
premised on methodologies that attempt to capture the asserted patent's value
resulting not from the value added by the standard's widespread adoption, but only
from the technology's superiority.").
715. Id. at 1304-05.
716. Id. at 1305.
717. Id. at 1305-06.
718. Id.
719. Id. at 1306-07.
720. Id.
721. Id. at 1307.
722. 783 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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was the basis of demand.2' But other damages evidence precluded a
grant of summary judgment for lack of damages evidence, including
deposition testimony by the defendant's expert that appropriate
royalties would be one or two percent, a license to the patent-in-suit,
and the profitability of the accused systems.7 24 The decision is thus a
reminder to defendants that any damages estimate they submit
becomes the new floor for damages.25 A defendant should consider
whether it is safer to have its expert critique the plaintiffs theory but
not offer his own counter-estimate.
Taken together, these cases are part of a larger, more moderate
strain of damages law that has emerged from the Federal Circuit after
the more aggressive decisions2 1 in in prior years. The court's shift
may be the result of better prepared patentees, who are putting more
thought and rigor into their damages models. The Federal Circuit
also seems to recognize the practical difficulties that can be involved
with proving damages and, therefore, will approve the use of many
types of evidence, so long as it is actually tied to the patent's value.
The court still insists, however, that the patentee not inflate its
damages number by relying on improper considerations (e.g., the
value from practicing a standard, or from non-infringing sales). It is
thus striking a proper balance in its case-by-case assessment of
reasonable royalty awards.
B. Lost Profits
In contrast to its relatively deferential review of royalty awards, the
Federal Circuit set aside large jury verdicts in two lost profits cases.
The first, Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc.,'12 presented two
issues-(1) a patentee's attempt to recover money transferred to it by
related entities, who supposedly lost sales, and (2) a patentee's
attempt to recover convoyed sales on unpatented products that it said
were "functionally related" to the patented products.2 ' Each point is
addressed separately below.
723. Id. at 1371.
724. Id. at 1372.
725. Id.
726. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks Sols., Inc., 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
ResQNet.com v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Lucent
Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
727. 778 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. on another issue, Medtronic
Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., v. NuVasive, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 893 (2016) (mem.).
728. Id. at 1373-75.
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Prior Federal Circuit precedent prevented patentees from
collecting the lost profits of their related companies.7" Here, Warsaw
and its corporate parent, Medtronic, Inc., tried to circumvent this by
setting up a web of contracts, whereby Warsaw received transfer
payments and royalties from other Medtronic entities that sold
products to hospitals and customers.3 o Warsaw argued that the
infringement caused those other entities to sell fewer products,
which, in turn, diminished Warsaw's transfer payments.731 The
Federal Circuit rejected this argument, noting that Warsaw was not
entitled to "lost profit[s]" in circumstances where it was not selling
any products, especially where some payments were not specific to
the products at issue or the patented technology, but were instead on
a company-by-company basis.3
As for convoyed sales, the Federal Circuit held that Warsaw could
not recover lost profits for sales of unpatented rods and screws that
were sometimes used in spinal "fixation" systems along with the
patented spinal implants because the products were not "functionally
related" to each other.33 Warsaw's sales brochures showed that they
were sold together mostly for convenience, which was insufficient
under relevant precedent.73 1 In addition, "Warsaw never presented
testimony that the fixations it sold to [related entity Medtronic Sofamor]
had no independent function-that is, that they would not work as well
in other surgeries not involving the patented technologies."73
The other case, WesternGeco L.L. C. v. ION Geophysical Corp.,"6 held
that a plaintiff who proved infringement under § 271 (f) was not
entitled to lost profits on components that were made in the United
States but exported and used abroad.3 The majority determined
729. See, e.g., Spine Sols., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d
1305, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that a patentee, not its subsidiary, must have
sold the products in question to have standing to recover profits lost due to
infringing sales); Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (holding that Mars was barred from recovering lost profits as a result of lost
sales of its subsidiary); Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Tech., Inc., 383 F.3d 1303,
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a corporation was barred from incorporating the
claim of a related entity into its damages calculation for lost profits).
730. Warsaw, 778 F.3d at 1376-77.
731. Id. at 1375-76.
732. Id. at 1376.
733. Id. at 1375-76.
734. Id.
735. Id.
736. 791 F.3d 1340, reh'g en banc denied, 621 F. App'x 663 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3502 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2016) (No. 15-1085).
737. Id. at 1349-51.
870 [Vol. 65:769
2015 PATENT DECISIONS
that Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor International,
Inc.," which had rejected a similar lost profits theory for § 271 (a)
infringement, 9 barred recovery here.7 40 The majority found no
distinction between § 271 (a) and § 271 (f) for purposes of lost profits:
WesternGeco's argument misunderstands the role of § 271 (f) in
our patent law. Section 271 (f) does not eliminate the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Instead, it creates a limited exception.
As we have discussed, by its terms, § 271 (f) operates to attach
liability to domestic entities who export components they know and
intend to be combined in a would-be infringing manner abroad.
But the liability attaches in the United States. It is the act of
exporting the components from the United States which creates
the liability. A construction that would allow recovery of foreign
profits would make § 271 (f), relating to components, broader than
§ 271(a), which covers finished products. In fact, § 271(f) was
designed to put domestic entities who export components to be
assembled into a final product in a similar position to domestic
manufacturers who sell the final product domestically or export the
final product. Just as the United States seller or exporter of a final
product cannot be liable for use abroad, so too the United States
exporter of the component parts cannot be liable for use of the
infringing article abroad.'
Neither Supreme Court authority nor other damages principles
required a different result. Prior Supreme Court cases simply
permitted damages on profits for foreign sales of a U.S.-manufactured
item, not damages on subsequent foreign use.v Moreover, no
precedent suggested that foreign sales could be recovered as "convoyed
sales," and the patentee had not argued that point. 73
Judge Evan Wallach dissented, arguing that some extraterritorial
conduct may be relevant to damages, even if it does not constitute
infringement. 7" He pointed to the Supreme Court's decisions in
Manufacturing Co. v. Cowing45 and Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v.
738. 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
739. Id. at 1371-72.
740. WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1350-51 ("Under Power Integrations, WesternGeco
cannot recover lost profits resulting from its failure to win foreign service contracts,
the failure of which allegedly resulted from ION's supplying infringing products to
WestemGeco's competitors.").
741. Id. at 1351 (citation omitted).
742. Id. at 1351-52.
743. Id. at 1352.
744. Id. at 1354 (Wallach,J., dissenting in part).
745. 105 U.S. 253 (1881).
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Minnesota Moline Plow Co.7 11 to argue that lost profits on foreign sales
are recoverable where the product is made in the United States.
He also noted precedent where domestic sales of a product were used
as a proxy for damages from U.S. infringement for a method claim."
He saw no relevant difference because the doctrine of "convoyed
sales" would allow for recovery of non-patented items that were
integral to the patented method.7 9 Nor did it matter that the end
sales here were made by a downstream customer (rather than the
defendant) because competition still inflicted the same harm on the
plaintiff.70 He would distinguish Power Integrations because there was a
supposedly "tenuous connection between infringement and harm"
there, which Judge Wallach did not think existed in WestemGeco, and
because the infringement here occurred on the high seas, meaning the
plaintiff could not have obtained patent protection from another
jurisdiction to cover it.751  He dismissed the majority's discussion of
§ 271 (f) as irrelevant because the defendant had been found liable for
infringement and the question here simply regarded damages; it thus
did not matter whether the use of the components was infringing. 72
The full court subsequently denied a petition for rehearing en
banc, with Judge Wallach again dissenting, this time joined by Judges
Newman and Reyna." He wrote to make one additional point-
namely, that the panel's decision conflicted with copyright's "predicate
act" doctrine, which holds that a plaintiff may collect damages flowing
from the extraterritorial exploitation of domestic infringement.7 54
As a matter of first principles, Judge Wallach's view seems correct.
If the defendant's U.S. infringement actually and foreseeably
damaged the plaintiff abroad, then § 284's requirement that the
746. 235 U.S. 641 (1915).
747. WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1356 (Wallach, J., dissenting).
748. Id. at 1357 (noting that in State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc.,
883 F.2d 1573,1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the Federal Circuit considered the profit loss
resulting from the non-infringing domestic sales in its damages calculations).
749. Id. at 1357-58.
750. Id. at 1358-59.
751. Id. at 1360-61.
752. Id. at 1361-63.
753. WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 621 F. App'x 663 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (per curiam).
754. Id. at 664 (Wallach, J., dissenting) (citing Tire Eng'g & Distrib., LLC v.
Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 306-07 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam);
L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 991-92 (9th Cir. 1998);
Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988); Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 48, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1939)).
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patentee be awarded "damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement,"7 5 should cover those damages. To permit anything
less denies the patentee full compensation under the statute. It should
not matter whether the foreign conduct infringes-patentees can recover
lost profits on non-infringing "convoyed sales" that would not have been
made without the infringement 756 There is no reason to treat sales that
do not infringe because they were made abroad any differently.
Nevertheless, Power Integrations resolved all these issues against the
patentee, meaning that absent en banc or Supreme Court review,
WesternGeco could not have come out any other way. Judge Wallach's
attempt to distinguish Power Integrations was unconvincing because it
was undisputed in Power Integrations that the defendant's U.S.
infringement had caused the plaintiff to lose sales all over the
world.5 Although not mentioned in the Power Integrations opinion, it
was undisputed that customers there would not have bought a single
power chip from the defendant if they were not able to import them
into the United States, because they did not want to be hassled in
trying to segregate which end-products containing the infringing
chips could enter the United States.75" The causal connection
between the U.S. infringement and the foreign lost sales was as strong
in Power Integrations as it was in Western Geco.
The Federal Circuit also considered two other lost profits cases in
which it affirmed more garden-variety calculations. In the first, Apple
Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,759 one issue on appeal was whether
substantial evidence supported the jury's finding of a lack of non-
infringing substitutes." The defendant's arguments were
insufficient because it relied only on the "mere existence" of its other
755. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement.").
756. WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1358 (Wallach,J., dissenting).
757. Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
758. Joint Appendix Vol. 2 at 5010-11, 5303-04, Power Integrations, Inc. v.
Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l., Inc., 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 04-CV-
1371); Joint Appendix Vol. 3 at 5429-30, 5442-44, 5500-01, Power Integrations, Inc.
v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l., Inc., 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 04-CV-
1371).
759. 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3350 (U.S. Mar. 21,
2016) (No. 15-777). -
760. Id. at 1004. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the jury's reasonable royalty
calculation because the plaintiffs expert testimony on the "demand" element of lost
profits was equally applicable to the reasonable royalty analysis under Georgia-Pacific,
and the expert was not required to repeat her testimony when explaining the royalty
rate. Id. at 1004-05.
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non-infringing phones without showing that they had a feature
similar to the patented feature or would have otherwise been
acceptable to customers.7 By contrast, the plaintiff showed that one
phone had markedly different features (e.g., a slide-out keyboard and
lower resolution screen), while the other phone had never been sold
to a U.S. carrier.6
In the second case, Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks,
Inc., the court rejected a challenge to the proof of causation between
the plaintiffs lost sales and the infringement.7 " The defendant
argued that the large price disparity between its products (and its
customers' preference for lower priced goods) precluded any finding
that the plaintiff would have captured those sales without the
infringement.7' But the plaintiffs expert presented sufficient evidence
that demand for the products was relatively "inelastic," i.e., price
insensitive, and he accounted for any elasticity by assuming that the
plaintiff would capture only seventy-five percent of the defendant's
sales.76 5 Substantial evidence thus supported the jury's verdict.
The takeaway common to all four cases, then, is that a factual
attack on a jury verdict, as in Apple and Akamai, is far less likely to
succeed than legal challenges to an entire category of damages, as in
Warsaw and WesternGeco.
C. Attorney Fees
The main question regarding attorney fee awards in 2015 was what
impact, if any, the Supreme Court's decisions in Octane Fitness, LLC v.
Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.7" and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health
Management System, Inc. 77 would have on the imposition and review of
fees. Octane held that an "exceptional" case, which may justify an
award of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, "is simply one that
stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a
party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and
the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case
was litigated."7' Highmark held that the district court's decision must
761. Id. at 1004.
762. Id.
763. 805 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3437
(U.S.Jan. 26, 2016) (No. 15-993).
764. Id. at 1379-81.
765. Id. at 1380.
766. 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
767. 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
768. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756.
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be reviewed for abuse of discretion (not de novo), although it added
that a court "necessarily abuse [s] its discretion if it base [s] its ruling
on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment
of the evidence."6' The Federal Circuit issued three precedential
decisions applying these new standards. Two reversed denials of fees
where the district court decision was inadequately explained or
unsupported, while the third affirmed a denial of fees and treated the
district court's opinion much more deferentially.
The first, Oplus Technologies, Ltd. v. Vizio, Inc.,`o vacated and
remanded a pre-Octane fee denial to allow the district court to
reconsider in light of the new law."' The district court's opinion was
odd because it found the case exceptional and detailed "an egregious
pattern of misconduct," yet declined to impose any fees.7 ' The panel
first noted that Octane "lowers considerably the standard for awarding
fees," and then vacated because "nothing in the opinion or in the
record substantiates the court's decision not to award fees."7 7 ' The
plaintiffs conduct likely significantly drove up costs-it was
constantly shifting positions and filed numerous unsupported
motions to compel-and the district court found its behavior
"inappropriate," "unprofessional," "vexatious," and "harassing."774
The district court suggested that the defendant caused delay too, but
it identified nothing specific, and the Federal Circuit could not
determine what delaying tactics the defendant may have taken."
"Although the award of fees is clearly within the discretion of the
district court, when, as here, a court finds litigation misconduct and
that a case is exceptional, the court must articulate the reasons for
its fee decision. "776
Another decision, Gaymar Industries, Inc. v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero
Products, Inc.,"' also reversed a denial of fees where the district court
had relied in part on alleged misconduct by the party seeking fees. 778
Here, the district court had given four examples of statements that
supposedly showed that the defendant (who was seeking fees) "[did]
769. Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1748 & n.2.
770. 782 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
771. Id. at 1374-75.
772. Id. at 1373-74.
773. Id. at 1374.
774. Id.
775. Id. at 1375.
776. Id. at 1375-76.
777. 790 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
778. Id. at 1377.
8752016]
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
not have 'clean hands."'77  The Federal Circuit acknowledged that
the movant's conduct could be relevant to fees, but found clear error
in each of the district court's four findings of alleged misconduct by
the movant.780  Although those four examples involved
"overstatements," none "amount[ed] to misrepresentation or
litigation misconduct."'7 1 Indeed, "other circuits have concluded that
isolated overstatements do not rise to the level of sanctionable
litigation misconduct under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11." "
Because the district court's fee denial had been based on these
alleged misstatements, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded,
while leaving open the possibility that the fee motion could be
denied on other grounds, such as the strength of the plaintiffs
litigation positions. 8
The third decision, SFA Systems, LLC v. Newegg, Inc.,'8 affirmed a
denial of fees.7" The plaintiff had filed two suits against multiple
defendants and settled with everyone but defendant Newegg.786 The
plaintiff prevailed on claim construction and indefiniteness, yet it
voluntarily dropped the suit before trial.8 The defendant then
moved for fees, arguing that the plaintiffs litigation positions were
unreasonable and that it had filed suit for the improper purpose of
extracting a nuisance settlement.788 The district court rejected both
arguments, and the Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion. 789
On the first point, the Federal Circuit refused to review the legal
issues of claim construction and indefiniteness de novo, and
concluded that Highmark's footnote two did not require them to.790
The court explained that the task on appeal was to assess the
"strength" 7 1 of the plaintiffs positions, not their "correctness":
779. Id. at 1373-76.
780. Id. at 1373-77.
781. Id. at 1376.
782. Id.
783. Id. at 1377.
784. 793 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
785. See id. at 1352.
786. Id. at 1345-46.
787. Id. at 1346 (stating that the plaintiff had filed a motion to dismiss, which the
district court granted).
788. Id. at 1346-47.
789. Id. at 1346-49, 1352.
790. Id. at 1347-48.
791. Id. at 1348 (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014)).
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Importantly, this means that we need not rule on the correctness of
the district court's decision on all underlying issues of law in
reviewing a district court's exceptional case determination. We need
only determine whether the district court abused its discretion when
it found that the party's litigating position was not so merit-less as to
"stand out" from the norm and, thus, be exceptional.9
The court is certainly correct to distinguish between "strength" and
"correctness," but it is difficult to understand why that has any
bearing on the standard of review. The strength of a party's position
on an issue of law is every bit as much of a legal judgment as the
correctness of that position. Regardless, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion because
it reasonably considered both issues, and "there is nothing in the district
court's summary judgment ruling to indicate the court gave Newegg's
arguments scant attention or that its denial of summary judgment was
predicated on an institutional bias against granting such requests.""
The court also found no abuse of discretion regarding the second
point. The panel agreed that "a pattern of litigation abuses
characterized by the repeated filing of patent infringement actions
for the sole purpose of forcing settlements, with no intention of
testing the merits of one's claims, is relevant," and that it would be
wrong to "discount the motivations behind a patentee's litigation
history."9 4 But the record did not show evidence of such conduct.
Evidence that the plaintiff filed many suits and settled many of them
for less than the costs of litigation did not necessarily suggest that the
plaintiff filed this suit to extract a nuisance settlement.9 5  The
plaintiff had continued to pursue another case against a larger
defendant with no guarantee of settlement, and it had settled cases
on other patents for larger sums.79 6 The district court, which was best
positioned to assess the facts, thus did not abuse its discretion in
finding the evidence here insufficient.
D. Enhanced Damages
This year's enhanced damages jurisprudence culminated with the
Supreme Court granting certiorari in two cases-Halo Electronics, Inc.
v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.797 and Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer Inc. "-to reassess the
792. Id.
793. Id. at 1349.
794. Id. at 1350.
795. Id. at 1347, 1349, 1351.
796. Id. at 1351.
797. 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015).
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Federal Circuit's current standard. The panel decisions in Halo and Stryker
were in 2014, but the full court denied rehearing en banc in 2015, so it is
worth discussing those denials, along with the court's other 2015
enhanced damages decisions."' But, first, some general background on
the enhanced amages inquiry will help put things into context.
The Federal Circuit's current § 284 jurisprudence stems from In re
Seagate Technology, LLC,soo which held that a finding of willful
infringement is a necessary prerequisite to enhancement, and then
equated willful infringement with "objective recklessness," and set
forth a two-prong test: (1) "the infringer acted despite an objectively
high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid
patent," and (2) "this objectively-defined risk (determined by the
record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known
or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused
infringer."' Seagate added that "[t]he state of mind of the accused
infringer is not relevant" to the first prong.o2 Subsequent cases held
that the objective prong was not met when the infringer presented a
reasonable trial defense.80 ' Halo presented a further twist because it
set aside a jury's willfulness finding where the infringer had no good
faith defense pre-suit, but developed a non-sham trial defense after
being sued."' Other precedent also held that the objective prong
was a pure legal issue for the judge, reviewable de novo on appeal."80
Intervening Supreme Court authority called this approach into
doubt. Octane and Highmark, which interpreted the attorney fee
provision of § 285, jettisoned a similar two-prong test and determined de
798. Id.
799. Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 774 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014), withdrawn and
revised by 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh'g denied, 596 F. App'x 924 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
granted, 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2014), reh'g denied, 780 F.3d 1357, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S.
Ct. 356 (2015).
800. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
801. Id. at 1371.
802. Id.
803. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1310-11 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Spine Sols., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
804. Halo, 769 F.3d at 1376-77, 1382-83.
805. Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649, 654 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 136
S. Ct. 356 (2015); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. (Bard I),
682 F.3d 1003, 1005-07 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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novo review as inconsistent with the statutory test.s06 The text of § 284's
enhanced damages provision mirrors that of § 285, as shown below:
"[T]he court may increase the "The court in exceptional cases may
damages up to three times the award reasonable attorney fees to
amount found or assessed."0 7  the prevailing party."80 8
The question is whether Octane and Highmark require setting aside
the rigid Seagate standard and adopting a more flexible standard for
enhanced damages.
Halo's petition for rehearing en banc argued that they do,"80 but
the Federal Circuit denied review.10 Judge Richard G. Taranto,
joined by Judge Reyna, thought that the court's enhanced damages
jurisprudence may well require revision in the future, but did not
believe that Halo was the proper vehicle to do it.8"' Judge O'Malley,
joined by Judge Hughes, dissented, arguing that Octane and Highmark
required eliminating the two-prong Seagate test.' They began by
noting the parallel between § 284 and § 285:
Our current two-prong, objective/subjective test for willful
infringement, set out in In re Seagate Technology, LLC and further
explained in Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs, Inc., is
analogous to the test this court proscribed for the award of attorney
fees under § 285 in Brooks Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier
International, Inc. The parallel between our tests for these two issues is
not surprising. Both enhanced damages and attorney fees are
authorized under similar provisions in title 35 .... 13
They then urged their colleagues to reconsider the issue en banc
because nothing in § 284's text supports the application of a rigid,
806. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748-49
(2014); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, at 1755-
57 (2014).
807. 35 U.S.C. § 284, para. 2 (2012).
808. Id. § 285.
809. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 780 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(per curiam) (Taranto,J., concurring).
810. Id. at 1358 (majority opinion).
811. Id. at 1359-60 (Taranto,J., concurring).
812. Id. at 1361-62 (O'Malley,J., dissenting).
813. Id. at 1361 (citations omitted).
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two-prong test, just as Octane held that § 285 did not justify use of the
two-prong test for attorney fees:
Because we now know that we were reading PRE [the Federal
Circuit's source for the two-prong attorney fee test] too broadly,
and have been told to focus on the governing statutory
authorization to determine what standards should govern an award
of attorney[] fees, we should reconsider whether those same
interpretative errors have led us astray in our application of the
authority granted to district courts under § 284. Just as "the PRE
standard finds no roots in the text of § 285," there is nothing in the
text of § 284 that justifies the use of the PRE narrow standard. In
rejecting the rigid two-prong, subjective/objective test for § 285
under Brooks Furniture, moreover, the Supreme Court told us to
employ a flexible totality of the circumstances test. ... We should
now assess whether a flexible test similar to what we have been told
to apply in the § 285 context is also appropriate for an award of
enhanced damages.8 1 4
In particular, Judges O'Malley and Hughes were troubled by the
fact that Seagate "require[s] that an evidentiary wall be erected
between the objective and subjective portions of the inquiry," which
"preclude[s] considerations of subjective bad faith-no matter how
egregious-from informing our inquiry," of the "objective" prong.'
Judge O'Malley also urged for an en banc reconsideration of
several other issues related to enhanced damages, including the de
novo standard of review, the clear and convincing evidence burden of
proof, and the submission of part of the inquiry to juries, even
though § 284 simply refers to "the court" deciding whether to
enhance damages."'
The full court also denied en banc review in Stryker the same day,
with the panel simply amending its opinion to add a footnote leaving
open the possibility that it might change its standard of review in a
future case, but that it was unnecessary to do so in Stryker
This court has not yet addressed whether Octane Fitness, LLC v.
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. or Highmark Inc. v. All-care Health
[Management Systems], Inc. altered the standard of review under
which this court analyzes the objective prong of willfulness.
However, as the district court failed to undertake any objective
assessment of Zimmer's specific defenses, the district court erred
under any standard of review and thus this court need not now
814. Id. at 1362-63 (citations omitted).
815. Id. at 1362.
816. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); Halo, 780 F.3d at 1363-64 (O'MalleyJ., dissenting).
[Vol. 65:769880
2015 PATENT DECISIONS
address what standard of review is proper regarding the objective
prong of willfulness.817
This seemed an odd way to resolve the issue, though, because, if
the standard of review were abuse of discretion, one would have
thought that the panel would need to vacate and remand the
willfulness finding with instructions for the district court to address
all the facts in the first instance, rather than simply reversing outright
without giving the district court a chance to exercise any discretion.
The Federal Circuit addressed a few other cases in 2015 raising
similar issues. For example, Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. WL. Gore
& Associates, Inc."' reflected continuing uncertainty about the
appropriate standard of appellate review.' The decision was a
follow-on from a prior 2012 decision, where the Federal Circuit vacated
a decision that enhanced damages and remanded for the district judge
to consider whether Gore's defenses were reasonable under the
objective prong.s2 0 Ultimately, the districtjudge found that the defenses
were not reasonable and reaffirmed the enhancement. 821
On appeal, the panel conducted de novo review of the objective
prong and affirmed the enhancement.8 22  The panel initially held
that the mere fact that one Federal Circuit judge had previously
dissented on the merits did not necessarily mean that Gore's position
was reasonable.2 It then noted that this was an "unusual case"
because Gore had initially sought a patent on the disputed subject
matter, but later turned around and argued Bard's patent on the
same invention was anticipated or obvious, and it made arguments
about joint inventorship that were barred by the result of a prior
interference.8 24  The implication is that, although the panel was
affirming enhancement here, this should not be taken as a sign that
the Federal Circuit was loosening the Seagate standard. Judge Hughes
concurred, adding that although he agreed that Gore should lose
under de novo review, he also thought that Highmark required abuse
of discretion review, which would further tilt the scales against
817. Stryker Corp. v Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649, 661 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citations omitted), reh'g denied, 596 F. App'x. 924 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
356 (2015).
818. Bard II, 776 F.3d 837 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
819. Id. at 848 (Hughes, J., concurring).
820. Bard , 682 F.3d 1003, 1005-09 (Fed. Or. 2012), affd 776 F.3d 837 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
821. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., No. CV 03-0597-
PHX-MHM, 2013 WL 5670909, at *2, *7, *12 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2013).
822. Bard II, 776 F.3d at 844, 847.
823. Id. at 845.
824. Id. at 847.
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Gore."2 Judge Newman dissented, arguing that Gore's joint
inventorship defense was reasonable and that, regardless, of whether
the infringement was willful, a doubling of damages was untenable
given the district court's finding that it was in the public interest for
Gore to continue selling its medical devices.12 1
The other case, Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology
Group, Ltd., solidified the court's position that a reasonable trial
defense, even if developed for the first time post-suit, is a per se bar to
enhancing damages. 8 2  The panel concluded that, although the
defendant had not raised a good faith non-infringement position, its
invalidity defenses were reasonable because there was "enough
uncertainty" about what the prior art disclosed and the scope of the
claims.8 28  The district court had concluded that, despite these
defenses, Marvell was still a willful infringer during the pre-suit
period because it had not relied on them then.8 29 But the panel
rejected this argument, explaining that "we have repeatedly assessed
objective reasonableness of a defense without requiring that the
infringer had the defense in mind before the litigation," citing Halo
and other cases.so
Finally, WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp. affirmed a
decision refusing to enhance damages because the objective prong
was not met.8s The plaintiff barely tried to argue on appeal that the
defenses were unreasonable, and instead focused attention on the
fact that the defenses did not succeed or that the defendant did not
pursue them all on appeal.32 Moreover, evidence that customers
brought the patents to the defendant's attention, yet the defendant
was so concerned about infringement that it avoided entering into
indemnification agreements, was irrelevant to the objective prong. 833
825. Id. at 847-48 (Hughes, J., concurring).
826. Id. at 853-54 (Newman,J., dissenting).
827. 807 F.3d 1283, 1299-1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rehg denied, 805 F.3d 1382 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
828. Id. at 1301.
829. Id.
830. Id.
831. 791 F.3d 1340, 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh'g denied, 621 F. App'x 663
(2015), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3502 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2016) (No. 15-1085).
832. Id. at 1354 (explaining that unreasonableness determines whether to




As noted above, the Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari in Halo and Stryker.13 ' The Court consolidated the cases
and heard the argument on February 23, 2016, meaning a decision
will issue before the end of the term in June. This prompted the
Federal Circuit to subsequently hold Carnegie Mellon's petition for
rehearing on enhancement until after the Supreme Court's
decision.' This decision may, thus, significantly alter the framework
for enhancing damages under § 284.
E. Design Patents
Design patent suits may be increasingly attractive after two Federal
Circuit decisions on damages. The first, Apple Inc. v. Samsung
Electronics, Co., held that a patentee is entitled to recover all the
infringer's profits from infringing products without attempting to
apportion what amount is attributable to use of the patented
design."' The court's holding was based on the plain language of 35
U.S.C. § 289, which entitles a design patent holder to a total
disgorgement of the defendant's profits on the infringing product:
Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license
of the owner, (1) applies the patented design, or any colorable
imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale,
or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such
design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to
the extent of his total pmfit but not less than $250, recoverable in any
United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties.837
The statutory term "article of manufacture" referred to the end-
product as sold, i.e., the entire phone and not its "innards," which are
not sold separately.38  It therefore did not matter whether the
alleged infringement caused any of the accused phone sales or
profits.8" Although this conclusion seems straight-forward, the
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to review it and will
hear argument in the October 2016 term.
834. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015); Stryker Corp. v.
Zimmer, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015).
835. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 805 F.3d 1382, 1382-83
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
836. 786 F.3d 983, 998, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part, Samsung
Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1453 (2016).
837. 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012) (emphasis added).
838. Apple, 786 F.3d at 1001-02.
839. Id.
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The other case, Nordock, Inc. v. Systems, Inc., 4 ' reversed a damages
judgment that did not award the patentee all the infringer's profits.84 1
The defendant had urged the jury to calculate damages based on the
alleged "cost savings" from using the patented design and argued that
there was no evidence it actually made any profits on them.8 42 The
Federal Circuit held that the "cost savings" methodology was
improper because it relied on the same apportionment-type
principles that were barred by the statutory language and Apple."'
Further, both parties' experts had presented evidence showing that the
defendant's profits were somewhere between $600,000 and $912,000,
while nothing supported the jury's award of $0 in disgorgement. 4 The
case was thus remanded for a new trial on damages.4 -
Taken together, these cases demonstrate that design patent
damages can be far different than the typical reasonable royalty
calculation, especially given the statutory bar on apportionment. They
make design patent suits an increasingly attractive option, especially
where the product is complicated and the patentee would need to
apportion to calculate damages from any utility patent infringement.
F Permanent Injunctions
The Federal Circuit issued only one decision on injunctions this
year, but it was an important one that should help patentees protect
their rights against infringing direct competitors. Injunction law has
been in flux since the Supreme Court's decision eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLCO` instructed the lower courts that injunctions in
patent cases are not automatic and that they must use the traditional
four-factor test-namely, that a plaintiff must demonstrate
(1) irreparable harm, (2) the inadequacy of legal remedies, such as
damages, to compensate for that harm, (3) the balance of the
hardships favors the plaintiff, and (4) an injunction would not
disserve the public interest.8 47 Subsequent Federal Circuit precedent
found these factors were met in competitor cases involving simpler
840. 803 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S.
Feb. 1, 2016) (No. 15-978).
841. Id. at 1355.
842. Id. at 1353-54.
843. Id. at 1354-55.
844. Id. at 1355-56.
845. Id. at 1355.
846. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
847. Id. at 391.
[Vol. 65:769884
2015 PATENT DECISIONS
products.84 8  But other precedent, including several prior
Apple/Samsung decisions, stressed that, as part of the first prong, the
plaintiff must prove a "causal nexus" between the alleged harm and
the patented technology, as opposed to other parts of the accused
product. 849 That can get complicated when the patent covers one
feature of a complex product, like a smartphone.
A split panel further clarified the "causal nexus" requirement in yet
another iteration of Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,8 0 vacating a
denial of an injunction .8 ' The patents in question covered three
iPhone features-"slide to unlock," spelling autocorrect, and the
ability to recognize certain items in a text message, such as a phone
number.85 2 Apple sought a "feature-based" injunction, meaning that
Apple wanted Samsung to simply remove these features, not to
discontinue sale of the accused products entirely.5' The panel
rejected Apple's argument that the "causal nexus" requirement does
not apply to feature-based injunctions, but also found that the district
court applied too strict a requirement.8 54 In particular, the patentee
can establish a "causal nexus" if the infringing feature "impacts
customers' purchasing decisions," even if it is not the sole or even
predominant basis for their decision:
[I]n a case involving phones with hundreds of thousands of
available features, it was legal error for the district court to
effectively require Apple to prove that the infringement was the
sole cause of the lost downstream sales .... Instead, the district court
should have considered whether there is "some connection" between
the patented features and the demand for Samsung's products.8 5
The majority then cited to evidence of Samsung's monitoring and
copying of the patented features, its internal documents suggesting
848. See, e.g., Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1344-46
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (applying the four factor test before deciding that the plaintiff was
entitled to a permanent injunction), aff'd, 628 F. App'x 767 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Presidio
Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1362-64 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (same); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. (Apple 1), 678 F.3d 1314, 1332-33
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (same); Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148,
1157 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (same).
849. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1361, 1363-64 (Fed.
Cir. 2013); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Apple I, 678 F.3d at 1324.
850. 801 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir.), modified on reh'g, 809 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
851. Id. at 1366.
852. Id. at 1356.
853. Id. at 1356, 1364.
854. Id. at 1358-60.
855. Id. at 1359-60 (citation omitted).
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their value, and documents showing that users criticized other, non-
infringing keyboards.16  Although copying may not always show a
causal nexus, the evidence here tied Samsung's subjective belief
about the features' importance to customer perceptions.5 Apple
also presented a conjoint study suggesting that customers would not
have purchased an accused product without the accused features and
would pay considerably more for a phone with them.5
After again stressing that the infringing features need only be
"important" to customers and not "the" reason they buy the
infringing products, the majority held the causal nexus requirement
satisfied as a matter of law:
The district court therefore erred as a matter of law when it
required Apple to show that the infringing features were the reason
why consumers purchased the accused products. Apple does not
need to establish that these features are the reason customers
bought Samsung phones instead of Apple phones-it is enough
that Apple has shown that these features were related to
infringement and were important to customers when they were
examining their phone choices. On this record, applying the correct
legal standard for irreparable harm, Apple has established irreparable
harm. The strength of its evidence of irreparable harm goes to this
factor's weight when assessing the propriety of the injunction.859
The majority reversed the district court on the second eBay factor
for similar reasons," finding that Apple's available remedies at law
(money damages) were inadequate because its damages were
difficult to quantify."
On the other eBay factors, the majority affirmed the district court's
decision that the balance of hardships and public interest favored an
injunction.6 With respect to the hardships, the injunction's narrow,
feature-based prohibition strongly favored Apple , especially where
"Samsung will suffer relatively little harm from Apple's injunction,
while Apple is deprived of its exclusivity and forced to compete
against its own innovation usurped by its largest and fiercest
856. Id. at 1361.
857. Id.
858. Id. at 1362.
859. Id.
860. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (stating that the
second factor of the four-factor test requires the plaintiff to prove "that remedies available
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury").
861. Apple Inc., 801 F.3d at 1363.
862. Id. at 1363-65.
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competitor."86 3 As for the public interest, "the public generally does
not benefit when that competition comes at the expense of a
patentee's investment-backed property right.""* Instead, "the public
interest nearly always weighs in favor of protecting property rights in the
absence of countervailing factors, especially when the patentee practices
his inventions." 86  Here, the injunction was narrowly tailored, and there
was no life-saving drug at risk, so the public interest favored relief.16 1
The court thus remanded for entry of an injunction. 86
Judge Reyna filed a concurring opinion, adding that he also
thought an injunction was justified based on (1) the injury to Apple's
right to exclude, and (2) reputational harm to Apple absent an
injunction.68 On the first point, Judge Reyna seemed to suggest that
an injunction will always be appropriate in cases involving direct
competitors because it is difficult to quantify the true value of
excluding a competitor or the harm in allowing them to remain on
the market.8 9 On the latter point, he noted that Apple's reputation as
an innovator was particularly important in the smartphone market.8 0
Although Apple had other licensing agreements, they included carve-
outs to prevent others from creating "clones" of Apple's phones and
involved lesser competitors than Samsung; it was also unclear if those
other licensees used the patented features at issue here.8 1'
Chief Judge Prost dissented, arguing that the district court did not
commit legal error because it did not actually require a showing that
the accused features were the "sole" or "predominant" reasons."7
Instead, she believed the district court simply weighed the evidence and
found the facts against Apple, which was not clear error.7 1 ChiefJudge
Prost also stressed that eBay cautioned against using a patentee's
statutory right to exclude as the sole basis to support an injunction, and
that each case's facts matter.7' Given the district court's finding here,
she did not believe an injunction was appropriate.87 1
863. Id. at 1364.
864. Id. at 1365.
865. Id.
866. Id.
867. Id. at 1366.
868. Id. at 1366-74 (ReynaJ., concurring).
869. See id. at 1370.
870. Id. at 1373.
871. Id. at 1374.
872. Id. at 1375-76 (Prost, C.J., dissenting).
873. Id. at 1376-77.
874. Id. at 1380-81.
875. Id. at 1381.
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VII. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. FederalJurisdiction
In 2015, the Federal Circuit dismissed two suits for lack of federal
jurisdiction where they turned on state law claims.
The first, NeuroRepair, Inc. v. Nath Law Group,17 1 was a malpractice
action against patent prosecutors.77 The Federal Circuit applied the
new test from Gunn v. Minton,878 which allows federal jurisdiction
over a state law claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, in cases in which a
patent law, or any federal, issue is "(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually
disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal
court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by
Congress.""' The claim here failed multiple parts of the test.
First, the claim did not "necessarily" raise a patent issue because
the plaintiff alleged multiple grounds of professional negligence that
did not involve patent law, so it was possible for the plaintiff to obtain
relief without ever reaching the patent issues.' In addition, the
plaintiff alleged other alternative causes of action that did not involve
patent law at all and might also provide relief without the need to
reach the patent questions."'
Furthermore, the patent issues were not "substantial," because
none were dispositive, and it was unclear if the state court would
need to interpret the scope of the patent, provisions about prior art,
or the timing of office action responses.8 The result of this case also
would not control other patent cases. Instead, the plaintiffs
allegations were mainly about "failure to communicate, overbilling,
failure to accurately record time billed, failure to deliver work
product, and misrepresentation of [the lawyer]'s expertise."8  There
was also no federal government interest in this dispute between
private parties over malpractice.88 4
876. 781 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
877. Id. at 1342.
878. 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
879. NeuroRepair, 781 F.3d at 1344 (quoting Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065).
880. Id. at 1344-45.
881. Id.
882. Id. at 1345-46.
883. Id. at 1346.
884. Id. at 1347.
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Finally, hearing this case in federal court would usurp the state
judiciary's role in resolving the state issues here."^ It was no answer
for the defendants to distinguish Gunn on the ground that the case at
hand involved malpractice claims over patent litigation rather than
patent prosecution." The court concluded that contemplating a
hypothetical in which the defendant did not commit the alleged bad
acts was the type of analysis rejected in Gunn, and, therefore, federal
jurisdiction was improper. 887
The other case, Vermont v. MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC,as1
involved a claim under Vermont's Consumer Protection Act against a
patent troll who had been harassing various businesses with
allegations of patent infringement.88 1 Vermont initially filed its
complaint in state court, the defendant filed counterclaims
(including an assertion that the complaint was preempted by Title
35), and removed the case to federal court.8 " The federal court then
sent the case back to state court, after which the state amended its
complaint, and the defendant removed again, arguing that the
amended complaint asserted a claim under the newly-passed
Vermont Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act.8 9' This
appeal arises after a veritable game ofjudicial hot potato between the
district and state courts. While Vermont initially filed in state court,
the defendants moved to remove the case on no fewer than two
occasions, claiming that the Vermont Bad Faith Assertions of Patent
Infringement Act was violated by Vermont's amended complaint.
Following the district court's second order removing the case back
to state court, the defendant appealed to the Federal Circuit,
alleging that a patent case arose under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)."9 The
Federal Circuit affirmed.893
The Federal Circuit first held it had jurisdiction to review the
remand.14  The America Invents Act had expanded the court's
885. Id. at 1348.
886. Id.
887. Id. at 1349 ("Addressing what would have happened had the alleged bad acts
of Defendants not occurred requires a court to engage in precisely the sort of
backward-looking, hypothetical analysis contemplated in Gunn.").
888. 803 F.3d 635 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2016 WL 1551166 (U.S. Apr. 18,
2016) (No. 15-838).
889. Id. at 638.
890. Id. at 639-40.
891. Id. at 640-41.
892. Id. at 641-42.
893. Id. at 638.
894. Id. at 642, 647.
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jurisdiction to entertain appeals involving a compulsory counterclaim
that arose under the patent laws. 9" The preemption counterclaim
here was compulsory because the same underlying facts were involved
in both the counterclaim and the state's claim."' Further, the
counterclaim arose under federal aw, because, under Gunn v. Minton, it
raised significant federal issues with consequences beyond this case that
could impact future patent litigation, and allowing the state court to
resolve it would risk inconsistentjudgments with federal courts."
Turning to the merits, though, the court held that removal was not
proper under § 1442(a), the only basis argued to it." 8 Section
1442(a) allows for removal by, among others, owners of federally
derived property rights where the suit impacts the validity of any
federal law; the defendant here removed on the theory that the
patent was a federally derived property right granted by the Patent
Office, and that the complaint called into question federal law by
seeking relief under Vermont's Bad Faith Assertions of Patent
Infringement Act (BFAPIA). " The court rejected the argument that
the complaint sought relief under the BFAPIA because the language
in the complaint (seeking relief under "Vermont law") was vague, the
state had disavowed seeking relief under the BFAPIA, and other
extrinsic evidence suggested that the state had not intended to do so.o
Because the defendant admitted that its removal request turned on
whether the state sought relief under the BFAPIA, the court affirmed
the refusal to remove and did not reach any additional arguments.90'
The two results here are an odd juxtaposition. The Federal Circuit
held it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because there was a
counterclaim arising under federal patent law.902 That same
counterclaim would seem to necessarily give the defendant the right
to remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1454, which states that "[a] civil action in
which any party asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress
relating to patents. . . may be removed to [federal] district court."0 s
But the defendant did not argue this route of removal on appeal.
895. Id. at 643-45.
896. Id. at 645.
897. Id. at 645-47.
898. Id. at 652.
899. Id. at 647.
900. Id. at 647-51.
901. Id. at 648, 651-52.
902. Id. at 645-47.




The Federal Circuit decided two cases on issue preclusion, holding
that it applied in one, but not the other. The court also extended the
Supreme Court's Kessler doctrine,o4 a preclusion doctrine that had long
been dormant until revived in 2014 by Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc."o0
The first case, Soverain Software LLC v. Victoria's Secret Direct Brand
Management, LLC,o' held that the patentee's asserted claims were
invalid based on issue preclusion.0 ' Three of the claims had been
invalidated in a prior appeal, but the patentee argued that it did not
have a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate their validity.o' The
procedural posture of the prior case was odd: during trial, the
district court had granted JMOL of non-obviousness, but the Federal
Circuit reversed and entered JMOL of obviousness, even though the
defendant there sought only a new trial (notJMOL) ." The patentee
argued that it would have pursued different or additional arguments
in the prior appeal if it knew outright reversal was possible.9 0 But
this did not prevent the patentee from fairly litigating the issue, as it
had the incentive to raise all its arguments in the prior appeal.' A
fourth claim was also invalidated based on issue preclusion.9 1' The
validity of the fourth claim had not been explicitly addressed in the
prior case, but depended on a claim that had been invalidated.' The
claim's additional limitation did not add anything to materially impact
the obviousness analysis, so issue preclusion applied to it as well.'
By contrast, United Access Technologies, LLC v. CenturyTel Broadband
Services LLC,9" held that collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) did not
apply to a general jury verdict of non-infringement from a prior
case."' In that case, the district court denied JMOL of infringement,
explaining that there was substantial evidence supporting two
904. See Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285, 288-90 (1907) (allowing a company that
successfully defends against a claim of patent infringement to continue business as
usual without the fear of nuisance suits).
905. 746 F.3d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
906. 778 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
907. Id. at 1320.
908. Id. at 1315.
909. Id. at 1316-17.
910. Id. at 1317.
911. Id. at 1317-19.
912. Id. at 1319-20.
913. Id. at 1319.
914. Id. at 1319-20.
915. 778 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
916. Id. at 1335-36.
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different grounds upon which the jury could have based its
conclusion.9 17 Neither ground was "necessary" to the verdict because
the jury could have found non-infringement under either, and it was
not clear what the jury actually relied upon."' The district court's
JMOL order did not clarify matters-it simply held that substantial
evidence could have supported either ground.919 Thus, this issue was
different from a case in which it was clear that the prior tribunal had
explicitly adopted and relied upon both independent grounds and the
second court could apply estoppel confident that the same issue had
been actually decided previously.92 0
SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc."' upheld a dismissal based on
the Kessler doctrine, which "bars a patent infringement action against
a customer of a seller who has previously prevailed against the
patentee because of invalidity or noninfringement [sic] of the
patent."' The plaintiff had previously lost an infringement case
against retailers for using Oracle software in a particular way, and
then filed this second suit against another customer using the same
Oracle software.9 " The court rejected all three of the plaintiffs
arguments that Kessler did not bar the second suit.924
First, a customer (like Office Depot) could invoke the doctrine
itself and did not have to attempt to have the seller (Oracle)
intervene and become a party2 .:
Allowing customers to assert a Kessler defense is consistent with the
[c]ourt's goal of protecting the manufacturer's right to sell an
exonerated product free from interference or restraint. A
manufacturer cannot sell freely if it has no customers who can buy
freely. Indeed, the [c]ourt subsequently explained that the Kessler
doctrine grants a limited trade right that attaches to the "product-
to a particular thing-as an article of lawful commerce."926
917. Id. at 1329.
918. Id. at 1333.
919. Id. at 1334.
920. Id. at 1334-35.
921. 791 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 801 (2016).
922. Id. at 1323 (quoting MGA, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 734 (Fed.
Cir. 1987)).
923. Id. at 1321.
924. Id. at 1329.
925. Id. at 1325-27.
926. Id. at 1326-27 (quoting Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 232 U.S. 413, 418-19 (1914)). It is interesting to contrast the Federal Circuit's
view that the Kessler doctrine follows the product, with its conclusion in Helferich,
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Second, it did not matter that Oracle was selling only a component
of the accused method because the plaintiff could not identify any
material differences between the current defendant's accused use of
that software and the prior defendant's accused use, which had been
found to be non-infringing.2 1
Third, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that the Kessler doctrine
remains binding precedent because, although the case is over a
century old and was decided when rules of mutuality strictly
circumscribed other preclusion doctrines, the Supreme Court has
never overruled it.92
C. Mootness
Two Federal Circuit opinions dealt with mootness issues that
occurred due to settlements. Versata Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software,
Inc.92' held that, when the parties stipulate to dismiss the complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), it moots any pending
interlocutory appeal that has not yet been decided."o Here, the
parties had not flagged the stipulated dismissal for the Federal
Circuit before it issued its opinion, which addressed the issue of
whether a stay was appropriate pending a covered business method
proceeding."' The court thus granted a subsequent motion to
vacate its prior opinion because the stipulated dismissal had
rendered the appeal moot.9 32
Tesco Corp. v. National Oilwell Varco, L.P.13 was an appeal from a
dismissal of a suit based on the court's inherent authority to address
misrepresentations by one side's lawyers during trial. While the
appeal was pending, the parties and their lawyers signed a settlement
agreement with releases, yet the lawyers still pressed an appeal of the
court's order, arguing statements in the opinion constituted a
discussed in Part V.B. below, that the exhaustion doctrine does not necessarily follow
a product and applies only to "authorized purchasers."
927. Id. at 1328.
928. Id. at 1329.
929. 780 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
930. Id. at 1136.
931. Id. at 1135.
932. Id. at 1136.
933. 804 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
934. Id. at 1369.
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sanction that continued to harm their reputation.'3 A split panel
held the appeal moot.'
The majority first noted that the lawyers could pursue an appeal
only if the statements in the district court's order amounted to "a
formal sanction or reprimand."3 But this issue was unnecessary to
resolve because there was nothing that could be done to redress any
lingering injury, given the settlement:
Once all parties entered into the settlement agreement, no party-
except the Attorneys for reputational reasons-had any enduring
interest in the underlying order dismissing the case with prejudice.
The case was, for all purposes, complete, considering that the
settlement resolved the outstanding motion for attorney[] fees
under 35 U.S.C. § 285. The fact that the sanction was directed
at Tesco in the opinion, not the Attorneys, further supports the
conclusion that no party retains an interest in the judgment by
the district court.9 3 8
There was no redressable reputational injury either. The court
could not vacate the underlying order because it was mooted by the
settlement. Nor could the court simply critique specific parts of the
order-the Federal Circuit reviews judgments, not opinions. The
only other option would be to remand for a full hearing on litigation
misconduct, but that would "be an unnecessary use of the district
court's and the parties' resources," and, in any event, the court had
"no authority to order a court to conduct a hearing in a case that is
closed and cannot be reopened."'
Judge Newman dissented, arguing that the lawyers should be given
a chance to clear their names because a lawyer's reputation is his
most valuable asset."o She discussed how other circuits allowed
appeals of sanctions orders even after settlement, and pointed out
that, here, the lawyers had been denied the opportunity to present
privileged documents in camera that they said would support their
version of the facts."' By denying the lawyers this opportunity, Judge
Newman felt that the court was interfering with their due process
right to defend themselves.
935. Id.
936. Id. at 1379.
937. Id. at 1376.
938. Id. at 1377-78.
939. Id. at 1379.
940. Id. at 1379-80 (Newman, J., dissenting).
941. Id. at 1380.
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D. Time to Appeal
The Federal Circuit dismissed one rather infamous appeal, Two-
Way Media LLC v. AT&T, Inc.,"4 as untimely because the defendant
missed the deadline for filing a notice of appeal."' The problem
arose from a kerfuffle about how the court's order denying most of
the post-trial motions was labeled in the electronic notice sent to the
parties.' The email sent from the court was labeled "ORDER
GRANTING [ ] Motion For Leave to File Sealed Document," but, in
fact, the order-which could have been accessed by clicking the link
in the email-denied the post-trial motions.9" The parties also
received separate email notices that same day denying another post-
trial motion and an order on the plaintiffs bill of costs.' The court
fixed its description on the docket a few days later but did not send
the parties a follow-up email reflecting the correction.94 ' The
deadline for appeal began to run on the day the court resolved all the
post-trial motions, but the defendant's outside counsel did not realize
this had happened until after the appeal window closed."' They filed
a motion to reopen the period under Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure 4(a) (5) and 4(a) (6), but the district court denied it, and a
split Federal Circuit panel affirmed."'
With respect to Rule 4(a) (5), the district court did not abuse its
discretion by finding a lack of "excusable neglect or good cause," as
required under the rule.' As an initial matter, the defendant had to
show something more than lack of knowledge of the order because,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) (2), even a complete
lack of notice would not toll the appeal clock. 5' The defendant
argued that the "something more" was that it received an
affirmatively misleading notice.9 5 2  But the lawyers would have
realized the substance of the order had they read it, and the
942. 782 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
943. Id. at 1313.
944. Id. at 1313-14.
945. Id. at 1313.
946. Id.
947. Id.
948. Id. at 1314.
949. Id. at 1313-14.
950. Id. at 1315-17.
951. FED. R. Civ. P. 77(d) (2) ("Lack of notice of the [docket] entry does not affect
the time for appeal or relieve-or authorize the court to relieve-a party for failing
to appeal within the time allowed, except as allowed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure (4) (a).").
952. Two-Way Media, 782 F.3d at 1315.
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surrounding circumstances (including the correctly captioned
notices denying another post-trial motion and awarding costs, which
could only be issued if the plaintiff were the "prevailing party" on all
the post-trial motions) suggested their failure to read the order or
check the docket, which was not excusable. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 79 did not help the defendant's case because it simply
required the district court to correct its docket (which it did), not to
re-send corrected e-mail notices.15
With respect to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a) (6),
the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a
prerequisite to relief-failure to receive "notice under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry of the judgment or order
sought to be appealed"954-- was absent.9 " The defendant did receive
notice when its counsel received the emails alerting them to the
court's order, and at least someone on the team downloaded a copy
of the order."' The court found that Rule 4(a) (6) applies only when
a party did not receive notice of an order, not when the party
received but failed to read an order.17 The panel added that, even if
the defendant had not received notice, Rule 4(a) (6) still made
reopening the appeal time discretionary, and the district court did
not abuse its discretion by refusing to do so:
In this era of electronic filing-post-dating by some 60 years the era
in which the cases cited by the dissent were issued-we find no
abuse of discretion in a district court's decision to impose an
obligation to monitor an electronic docket for entry of an order
which a party and its counsel already have in their possession and
know that the clerk at least attempted to enter.958
Judge Dyk dissented, arguing that Rule 4(a) (6) required reopening
the time to appeal.9" In his view, the order denying post-trial
motions was not "entered on the docket" until after the district court
corrected its description, yet the defendant never received notice of
this event from the court."' The defendant, thus, did not receive
953. Id. at 1316.
954. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) (6) (A).
955. Two-Way Media, 782 F.3d at 1317-20 (concluding that the defendant did
receive notice of the entry ofjudgment).
956. Id. at 1315.
957. Id. at 1318.
958. Id. at 1319-20.
959. Id. at 1320-24 (Dyk,J., dissenting).
960. Id. at 1323.
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notice of the "entry of the judgment,"9"' even though it had notice of
the underlying order itself, and hence met this requirement of Rule
4(a) (6).96 The denial of relief could not be affirmed on
discretionary grounds either, as the district court had not premised
its decision on discretion but instead on a legal mistake about the
meaning of Rule 4(a) (6).963
The panel's result here seems right, because otherwise it would
effectively immunize a party that did not read the court's order. That
said, the defendant's mistake is perfectly understandable-the
mislabeled docket entries were issued a couple days before
Thanksgiving, most people don't double-click on a boilerplate order
granting a standard motion to seal, and, on a big trial team, you often
assume that someone junior to you will alert you to any problems. It
is a mistake that anyone could make, and one that calls to mind the
phrase, "there, but for the grace of God, go I."
E. No Ability to Review a Patent Office's Revival Decision
In Exela Pharma Sciences, LLC v. Lee,"' a two-judge panel issued a
per curiam opinion holding that the courts do not have jurisdiction
to use an APA suit to review the Patent Office's decision to revive a
patent because, under the Patent Act's scheme and framework, such
challenges "under the APA [are] not legislatively intended.""' Judge
Dyk concurred but noted that the decision had the unfortunate effect
of precluding any court review of a revival decision because Aristocrat
Technologies Australia Proprietary Ltd. v. International Game Technolog96
barred raising improper revival as a defense in a patent infringement
action."' He would reconsider Aristocrat en banc because (1) there is
now no avenue to review improper revival, (2) improper revival is not
a minor procedural error, (3) Morganroth v. Quigg" held that PTO
refusal to revive is reviewable under the APA, creating an asymmetry
in which the refusal but not the grant of revival is reviewable, and (4)
there are numerous non-statutory defenses in infringement
actions." Judge Newman also concurred and responded that
961. FED. R. App. P. 4(a) (6) (A).
962. Two-Way Media, 782 F.3d at 1323 (DykJ., dissenting).
963. Id. at 1323-24.
964. 781 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
965. Id. at 1353.
966. 543 F.3d 657 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
967. Exela Pharma Scis., LLC, 781 F.3d at 1354-55 (Dyk, J., concurring).
968. 885 F.2d 843 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
969. Exela Pharma Scis., 781 F.3d at 1354-56 (DykJ., concurring).
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Aristocrat was correctly decided because the Patent Act is explicit
about defenses available in infringement actions in district courts and
does not include improper revival among them."'o
F No Jurisdiction to Review the Patent Office's Refusal to Terminate an
Inter Partes Reexamination
Automated Merchandising Systems, Inc. v. Lee" involved a situation
where two parties settled a patent suit, agreed to a consent judgment
stipulating that the patents were valid, and dismissed the suit.'
Thereafter, the plaintiff sought to terminate the pending inter partes
reexamination on the patents, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b), which
requires a reexamination to halt upon a final decision entered
against the requestor in district court.17' The Patent Office refused to
terminate the proceedings, precipitating an APA suit by the patentee
against the Patent Office's Director.9 74
The Federal Circuit held that the Patent Office's decision was not a
"final agency action," as required by 5 U.S.C. § 704,17 and thus could
not be reviewed.97 6  The Patent Office's decision "was as
interlocutory, as far from final, as the run-of-the-mill district-court
denial of a motion to dismiss."77 The claims' patentability might be
confirmed, which would moot any concerns about how to interpret
§ 317(b). Moreover, the order did not determine either of the
parties' legal rights or obligations-the patentee had not yet lost any
patent rights, and the mere requirement that it continue
participating in agency proceedings to defend its rights was not
enough to make the decision here final.17 1
970. Id. at 1353-54 (Newman,J., concurring).
971. 782 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir.), cer. denied, 136 S. Ct. 419 (2015).
972. Id. at 1377.
973. 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) (2012) (requiring "[a]ny agreement or understanding
between the patent owner and a petitioner" to be in writing); Automated Merch. Sys.,
Inc., 782 F.3d at 1377.
974. Automated Merch. Sys., Inc., 782 F.3d at 1377.
975. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (limiting judicial review of agency actions to actions
"made reviewable by statute [or a] final agency action").
976. Automated Merch. Sys., Inc., 782 F.3d at 1377-78. The court also noted that the
Patent Office was raising this argument for the first time on appeal, but agreed to
consider the issue because its resolution was "beyond doubt," it presented an
ongoing issue of "public concern" in other proceedings, and it was fully briefed on
appeal. Id. at 1379-80.
977. Id. at 1380.
978. Id. at 1381.
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For completeness, the panel also noted that mandamus was
unavailable because the patentee would have an adequate remedy as
part of any appeal from a final decision.'" Nor was review available
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, as this cannot be used to
circumvent the normal procedures forjudicial review under the APA.so
G. Exclusive Licensee Standing
2015 yielded two cases addressing an exclusive licensee's standing
to sue in its own name, both authored by Judge Chen. One found
standing, while the other did not.
Alps South, LLC v. Ohio Willow Wood Co.9" reversed a damages
judgment because the exclusive licensee was required to join the
patent owner as a co-plaintiff but failed to do so. 82 The licensee had
argued that it had "all substantial rights" to the patent, entitling it to
sue in its own name."' But the original license restricted the
licensee's right to sue for infringement to a particular field of use,
which was "fatal" to the licensee's standing to sue on its own."
Moreover, a later assignment, executed after the suit was filed, could
not fix the problem because " [n]unc pro tunc assignments are not
sufficient to confer retroactive standing.""' Precedent permitting a
licensee to prevent dismissal by joining the patent owner under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) (2) was inapplicable because
no such joinder was attempted here. It also did not matter that
the licensee had filed a supplemental complaint after a
reexamination certificate issued because standing had to be
established as of the original complaint.
By contrast, in Keranos, LLC v. Silicon Storage Technology, Inc.,... the
court determined the exclusive licensee had "all substantial rights" in
the patent and thus standing to sue.9" The licensee had "the
exclusive past, present, and future rights to sue and recover for
infringement, to make, use, import, and sell products covered by the
979. Id. at 1381-82.
980. Id.
981. 787 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 897 (2016).
982. Id. at 1386.
983. Id. at 1383.
984. Id. at 1383-84.
985. Id. at 1384 (quoting Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090,
1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
986. 797 F.3d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
987. Id. at 1031.
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patents, and to negotiate and grant sublicenses."' That the
agreement blocked the patentee from suing infringers or even
participating in any lawsuit was a strong indication that it conveyed all
substantial rights.' Another confidential provision gave the licensee
"an exclusive right" that was "a proprietary interest in the patents,"
while yet another catch-all conveyed "any and all other substantial
rights... necessary and sufficient under any applicable law or
precedent o confer standing and permit [the licensee] to initiate any
actions on its own."9 0 Nevertheless, the defendants argued that Mars,
Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc."' held that only one with legal title could
sue on an expired patent (like this one)."' The court rejected that
position: "Mars merely reiterates the established rule that for any
patent, expired or not, transferring only the right to sue for past
damages, divorced from title, is not enough to give the owner of that
right standing under the Patent Act.""' It thus refused to create
different standing rules for expired and unexpired patents.
H. Requirement o Pursue Infringement in the Court of Claims
The Federal Circuit in Astornet Technologies Inc. v. BAE Systems,
Inc."' affirmed dismissal of a district court patent suit where the
patentee's ole remedy was a suit against the United States in the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1498."91 The statute says
that a patentee's remedy where an invention "is used . . . by . . . the
United States" is a suit against it in the Court of Federal Claims."
Here, the operative complaints alleged that several government
contractors were liable for inducing and contributing to
infringement by a government agency, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA)."' Those allegations necessarily included an
988. Id.
989. Id. at 1031-32.
990. Id. at 1032.
991. 527 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
992. See Keranos, 797 F.3d at 1032-33.
993. Id. at 1033.
994. 802 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
995. Id. at 1273.
996. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012) ("Whenever an invention described in and
covered by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the
United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or
manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall be by action against the United
States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable
and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.").
997. Astornet Techs., 802 F.3d at 1273.
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allegation of underlying direct infringement by the United States, by
virtue of its use of the defendants' products: "The direct
infringement alleged as a prerequisite for the alleged indirect
infringement is a use of the patented invention 'by ... the United
States,"' and thus falls within the ambit of § 1498.' Section 1498's
language "is not limited to claims that are filed against the United
States or its government agencies" and "it would cut a substantial hole
in the provision, and its intended function, to read it to be limited in
that way."9 '9  The patentee had made no allegation of direct
infringement by the contractors in its complaint, so it was thus
unnecessary to address whether such a claim could survive or if it
would also be barred based on government consent or authorization
to conduct the use. 1000
L Finality
The Federal Circuit has struggled in recent years over the
relationship between district court judgments and simultaneous
Patent Office proceedings that result in an invalidity determination.
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter International, Inc."oo0 ultimately concluded
that when the Patent Office's determination is upheld on appeal
before the district court judgment becomes final, it moots the
ongoing district court proceedings.'.o2  By contrast, in Versata
Computer Industry Solutions, Inc. v. SAP A G,1.oo the court refused to set
aside a district court damages judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60 that had become final before the Patent Office's
determination could be affirmed in an Article III court.100 4
The Federal Circuit faced another question in the race between a
reexamination and district court proceedings in ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson
Software, Inc.0 " The original panel opinion was from 2014, but the
court denied rehearing en banc in 2015 and issued a revised panel
opinion, so it is worth revisiting.o0 In the modified opinion, the
998. Id. at 1277 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)).
999. Id. (emphasis omitted).
1000. Id. at 1278.
1001. 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
1002. Id. at 1332.
1003. 564 F. App'x 600 (Fed. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1013 (2014).
1004. Id. at 600-01.
1005. 760 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014), modified by 789 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
reh'g en banc denied, 790 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1006. See 789 F.3d at 1351 (modifying the panel's 2014 decision, 760 F.3d 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2014)); 790 F.3d at 1370 (denying a petition for rehearing en banc).
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court unanimously held that an injunction must be vacated once a
final judgment of invalidity is made regarding the patent at issue.100
7
But the panel split over whether sanctions for civil contempt based
on the now-vacated injunction must also be vacated. 100
The majority held that the civil contempt sanctions must be set
aside too.009 It cited Fresenius for the proposition that "where the
scope of relief remains to be determined, there is no final judgment
binding the parties (or the court)."oo It then concluded that the
injunction was not actually "final" because the original judgment had
been modified on appeal to invalidate two claims, and it was unclear
whether a similarly broad injunction could be supported by the
remaining claim that had not been invalidated.0 "" In particular, the
prior opinion had invalidated system claims, leaving only a method
claim, which might not have supported a continued injunction on
selling and manufacturing the accused products, as opposed to just
internal use of them.""2 Although it was possible the original
injunction might still stand based on an inducement theory, this was
an open issue because the prior opinion had not found the
defendant's sale necessarily an inducing act.1 '
Judge O'Malley dissented from the panel decision, arguing that the
injunction was indeed final, and that, to the extent it was not,
Fresenius should be reconsidered given the problematic result
here.'0'" Judge O'Malley noted that the prior opinion had affirmed
the judgment of inducement on the remaining claim, and so there was
no issue of changing the injunction on that issue.'" Judge O'Malley
distinguished Fresenius on the basis that (1) the defendant here did not
appeal the validity of the remaining claim, making the district court
judgment immediately final as to that issue, and (2) Fresenius had
vacated and remanded the damages judgment, while the prior panel
1007. 789 F.3d at 1355-56.
1008. Compare id. at 1361 (holding that the contempt sanctions must be vacated),
with id. at 1362 (O'Malley, J., dissenting) (dissenting with respect to the majority's
holding on contempt sanctions).
1009. Id. at 1361 (majority opinion).
1010. Id. at 1358 (quoting Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330,
1341 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2295 (2013)).
1011. Id.
1012. Id. at 1360-61.
1013. Id.
1014. Id. at 1362 (O'Malley, J., dissenting).
1015. Id. at 1365. Another part of the injunction had to be modified based on the
invalidation of other claims, but that was irrelevant.
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opinion here had not vacated the injunction."o1 Finally, she expressed
concern that the panel's "approach to finality will further displace the
critical role of district courts in patent infringement suits" by allowing the
Patent Office's decision to displace a federal court's final judgment, and
she argued that the majority was taking the "stingiest" view of finality in
this context, despite taking a liberal view of finality in the context of
whether ajudgment is immediately appealable."o"
Judge Newman, joined by Judges O'Malley and Wallach, dissented
from denial of rehearing en banc, arguing that the majority's rule
conflicted with regional circuit precedent and undermined the
interest in finality of district court judgments. o0s The fact that the
injunction was later dissolved did not "erase past contempt. "1019
Judge Moore, joined by Judges O'Malley, Reyna, and Wallach, also
dissented from denial of rehearing en banc, because she believed the
injunction was final." 2o She thought the majority's rule "encourages
defendants to scrap and fight to keep underlying litigation pending
in the hope that they will fare better with the PTO and then be able
to unravel the district courtjudgment against them." 21 She had "no
problem with the dual track system Congress has created," but added
that "for at least a subset of cases, defendants are abusing the process
by doing both," which "is wasteful of judicial, executive, and party
resources, and it is just plain unfair."
10 22
Both sides have strong points. It is unpalatable to require a
defendant to pay a large damages judgment on a patent later
invalidated simply because the district court litigation was able to beat
the Patent Office to final judgment. On the other hand, everyone
has an interest in finality regardless of whether an arguably more
correct result could have been reached.
It will be interesting to see how the law continues to develop in this
area. The court may announce decisions similar to ePlus over the
next couple of years, as some of the remaining reexamination
proceedings become final. But, once that crop of cases works
through the system, these issues may disappear with the introduction
of the new, faster post-grant proceedings of the America Invents Act.
1016. Id. at 1367.
1017. Id. at 1370-71.
1018. ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Newman,J., dissenting), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
1019. Id. at 1313-14.
1020. Id. at 1314 (Moore,J., dissenting).
1021. Id. at 1314 (footnote omitted).
1022. Id. at 1315.
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Not only are the new IPR and CBM proceedings finished sooner, but
district courts have been more willing to stay cases in favor of them
than they were with the slower reexamination proceedings. So there
may be fewer races between the district court and the Patent Office if
litigation proceeds exclusively in the Patent Office. And any races
that still remain may not be as close as they once were because the
Patent Office proceedings are now more likely to beat the district
court to judgment.
J. Standing to Bring a False Marking Suit
After a deluge of harassing false marking claims, Congress
amended 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) to restrict the suits to plaintiffs who
could show they had suffered a "competitive injury" from the
defendant's acts, rather than allowing any private citizen to file a qui
tam claim.1 o 23 The Federal Circuit decided its first case interpreting
the term "competitive injury," Sukumar v. Nautilus, Inc.,'02  and
affirmed the dismissal of a suit because the plaintiff had not been
injured.o22 The plaintiff admitted that he was not an actual
competitor because he was not currently selling products, but argued
that he still suffered an injury because he might potentially have
competed with the defendant.10 26 The court held that "a potential
competitor may suffer a competitive injury if it has attempted to enter
the market," elaborating that "[a]n attempt is made up of two
components: (1) intent to enter the market with a reasonable
possibility of success, and (2) an action to enter the market."
0 27
However, "a subjective intent to compete" alone was not sufficient. 2 1
The plaintiffs evidence was insufficient to meet these
requirements. The parties' prior licensing negotiations implied that
the plaintiff "intended only to open senior rehabilitation centers,
which would not operate in competition with Nautilus." 2  Plus, the
plaintiff had not taken action to enter the market by the time it filed
the case-it had no business plan, prototype, employees, or
1023. 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2012) ("A person who has suffered a competitive injury
as a result of a violation of this section may file a civil action in a district court of the
United States for recovery of damages adequate o compensate for the injury.").
1024. 785 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1025. Id. at 1398, 1404.
1026. Id. at 1400.
1027. Id.
1028. Id. at 1402.
1029. Id. at 1403.
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engineering knowledge, and did not even investigate developing
manufacturing capacity."I0
K Court Review of Interference Proceedings
Biogen MA, Inc. v. Japanese Foundation for Cancer Research03 dealt
with a quirky procedural issue-what type of review can a party that
loses an interference proceeding obtain after the statutory
amendments in the AIA?10 82 Before the AIA, the losing party had two
options-(1) it could file a direct appeal to the Federal Circuit under 35
U.S.C. § 141,1033 or (2) it could file suit in federal district court under 35
U.S.C. § 146.1034 The major difference between the two regimes was the
standard of review and scope of the evidentiary record. Under the
direct appeal route, Federal Circuit review was limited to the record
compiled before the agency, and the agency's factual findings are
upheld if supported by substantial evidence.10os By contrast, with the
district court route, the parties had a chance to submit completely new
evidence, and the district court reviews all issues de novo.1on
But Congress changed that regime in 2011 when it passed the AIA
and again in 2013 the subsequent Technical Corrections Act
(TCA) With the change to a first-to-file system, interference
proceedings would no longer be necessary for patents with priority
dates on or after September 16, 2012 and were eliminated.3 s Earlier
patents filed under the first-to-invent regime might still be subject to
interferences, but only if they expired on or after September 16,
2012. Congress removed all the references to interferences from
§ 141 and § 146 in the AIA to reflect that they would not be available
for first-to-file patents, but then addressed court review of ongoing
1030. Id. at 1403-04.
1031. 785 F.3d 648 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1450 (2016) (mem.).
1032. Id. at 649, 654.
1033. Id. at 652 at n.4.
1034. Id.
1035. Id.; see Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 150, 164 (1999) (discussing the
development of "substantial evidence" standard in direct review).
1036. Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
1037. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Technical Corrections Act (TCA), Pub. L.
No. 112-274, 126 Stat. 2456 (2013).
1038. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2012); TCA § 1(k), 126 Stat. 2456, 2457-58; see also Biogen,
785 F.3d at 654 (noting that "[t]he AIA changed the patent system, among other
things, from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file regime for determining patent priority.
In doing so, it amended the patent statute's central provisions on patentability,....
established derivation proceedings and eliminated interference proceedings"
(citations omitted)).
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interference proceedings by preserving § 141 and § 146 review for
interferences declared before September 16, 2012 (but not after).039
However, Congress had forgotten about interference proceedings
that might still be declared after September 16, 2012 on existing first-
to-file patents, so it fixed this glitch in the TCA by adding a provision
for § 141 review for those interferences (but not § 146 district court
review).104 0 The question in Biogen was whether these provisions still
left § 146 review available for interferences declared on or after
September 16, 2012.1041
Biogen held that § 146 review is not available for such
interferences.10 42  The "express provisions in the statute" had
eliminated § 146 review for all interferences, but then restored it for
those declared before September 16, 2012.1043 The implication was
that § 146 review did not survive for later-declared interferences.
Indeed, if the old statute's court review provisions had remained in
force, then there would have been no need for Congress to pass the
TCA to restore § 141 review for later declared interferences. That the
TCA revived § 141 review but not § 146 review was also a strong sign
that Congress did not intend for interference losing parties to still be
able to run to district court. 1044
L. Standing to Correct Inventorship
Shukh v. Seagate Technology, LLC14o held that an omitted inventor
has standing to correct inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256 if it will
redress a concrete and particularized reputational injury, even if the
inventor does not have any ownership or financial interest in the
patent.10 46 The evidence established at least an issue of fact regarding
whether the plaintiffs reputation was harmed based on his omission,
including the fact that, in this industry, both scientists and Seagate
itself valued the number of patents a person had.04 1
1039. AIA, Pub. L. 112-29, § 6(f) (3) (C), 125 Stat. 284, 311 (2011).
1040. TCA, § 1(k) (3), 126 Stat. at 2458.
1041. 785 F.3d at 654.
1042. Id. at 657.
1043. Id.
1044. On the merits, Biogen affirmed a finding that the losing party was estopped by
an adverse judgment in a prior interference where it could not show that the count
in this one was patentability distinct. Id. at 657-58.
1045. 803 F.3d 659 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1046. Id. at 663.




One case, Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., 0 4 8 affirmed a dismissal
for lack of personal jurisdiction.0 4 ' The suit was filed in North
Carolina against a South Korean company that made battery parts to
be used in Kia electric vehicles.0 5 0 Dismissal was appropriate under
any potential personal jurisdiction theory.'0o5
First, the defendant had not "purposefully directed" activities
toward North Carolina.0 5 ' Advertisements by local Kia dealers for a car
that might have included the defendant's components were irrelevant
because the dealers were not the defendant's agents or alter egos."05 s
Likewise, it did not matter whether there was a joint venture between
the defendant and Kia's parent company, as there was no evidence that
the North Carolina dealers knew of the agreement.0 4
A "stream of commerce theory" would not work either. The panel
acknowledged the continuing uncertainty in Supreme Court
precedent over whether "mere placement" of goods into the stream
of commerce was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, "or
whether intent that the products reach the forum is required."5 5
The plaintiff did not show either; there was no evidence that any of
defendant's products actually entered North Carolina or that
defendant was aware that its products entered into the forum
state.'o Further, the plaintiffs proffer of data that was "not
inconsistent with" the presence of the defendant's product in a North
Carolina vehicle was not enough because the data did not rule out
the possibility that it was another manufacturer's component.'o
1048. 792 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1049. Id. at 1375.
1050. Id. at 1376.
1051. Id. at 1378-82 (discussing and then dismissing the plaintiffs two arguments
for personal jurisdiction: the "purposeful direction" theory and the "stream of
commerce" theory). The panel also noted that it was appropriate to decide personal
jurisdiction by assuming the plaintiffs allegations were true because the district court
did not hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1378. Proof by a preponderance of the
evidence was not required in this posture, but none of this mattered because the
plaintiff could not have won under even the lesser burden of proof.
1052. Id. at 1379.
1053. Id.
1054. Id. at 1379-80.
1055. Id. at 1381.
1056. Id. at 1382.
1057. Id.
2016] 907
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
N. Protective Order Modification
The Federal Circuit typically does not review protective order
disputes, but In re Poscooss issued a writ of mandamus directing a
district court to reconsider its modification of a protective order
allowing foreign court access to discovery in the United States."os"
The district court applied a Third Circuit decision to grant a motion to
permit the plaintiff to use the defendant's manufacturing documents
against it in co-pending Japanese and Korean litigation if the courts
there agreed that the material would be kept confidential.'01o
The Federal Circuit concluded that this was legal error because the
court had not considered any of the relevant factors under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782(a).'0o' Section 1782(a) establishes a procedure for a U.S.
court to direct a defendant to produce documents for use in foreign
litigation.o6 2 The panel acknowledged that it did not directly govern
here and is not the exclusive remedy for obtaining documents for
foreign litigation. 63 But the factors relevant under § 1782(a) were
pertinent here, including:
(1) whether "the person from whom discovery is sought is a
participant in the foreign proceeding"; (2) "the nature of the
foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway
abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court
or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance"; (3)
"whether the § 1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent
foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign
country or the United States"; and (4) whether the request is
otherwise "unduly intrusive or burdensome."1
0 4
Because the district court did not address these factors, the
Federal Circuit remanded the case instructing the lower court to
reconsider the issue.065
Judge Hughes disagreed that § 1782 had any bearing on the
dispute because the plaintiff here already had the documents it
wanted to use, whereas a section 1782 case is a stand-alone action
1058. 794 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1059. Id. at 1377.
1060. Id. at 1374; seePansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994).
1061. 794 F.3d at 1377.
1062. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2012).
1063. See Posco, 794 F.3d at 1377.
1064. Id. (quoting Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264-
65 (2004)).
1065. Posco, 794 F.3d at 1377.
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seeking to compel a new production.'o.. Nevertheless, he agreed that
mandamus was appropriate because the district court's order had
purported to restrict how a foreign court would use the produced
information, contrary to principles of comity.067 He would set aside
the order and instruct the district court to reconsider "whether 'good
cause' exists to modify the protective order independent of a
restriction on the foreign court's discretion."o1068
VIII.PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOLOGICs LITIGATION
A. The Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to facilitate the entry of
generic drugs onto the market, while also ensuring that they did not
infringe valid patent rights. Congress wanted generic drug
companies to be able to launch immediately after patent expiration
(or after the patent was found invalid or not infringed), so it created
a safe harbor'o that allows them to manufacture and test products
without facing liability for infringement.o0 70 Without the safe harbor,
such preparatory activity would have infringed under § 271 (a) if
conducted in the United States (e.g., manufacturing test batches of
the drug here), and the generic would have been unable to start
testing its product.0 71 The scope of the safe harbor has been the
source of much debate, however, because its broad language might
be thought to sweep in more than was necessary to achieve its specific
purpose. The Federal Circuit decided three cases addressing the safe
harbor's scope in 2015.
1066. See id. at 1377-78, 1380 (Hughes, J., concurring) (stating that § 1782 applies
only to new discovery).
1067. Id. at 1381.
1068. Id.
1069. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1) (2012) ("It shall not be an act of infringement to
make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United
States a patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.").
1070. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15, 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2648 ("The purpose of sections 271(e) (1) and (2) is to establish that
experimentation with a patented drug product, when the purpose is to prepare for
commercial activity which will begin after a valid patent expires, is not a patent
infringement.").
1071. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (noting that,
under the safe harbor provision, a party may begin preparatory activity "as long as
the development was done to determine whether or not an application for approval
would be sought").
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One case, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Elan Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,1o72 held that some post-approval testing can fall within the safe
harbor's scope. 107 The generic defendant conducted an additional
clinical trial on its product's bioavailability and submitted that
information to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
revise its product label.o107  After observing that "the statutory
language does not categorically exclude post-approval activities from
the ambit of the safe harbor," and that some of those activities "serve
similar purposes as pre-approval studies in ensuring the safety and
efficacy of approved drugs," the court explained that Elan's trials to
characterize the effect of food on the drug's absorption served such a
purpose.0 75  The post-approval testing was not "routine" behavior
that might be outside the safe harbor, but, in fact, "necessary" to
maintaining the generic's approval.0 7
Classen also cast doubt on the patentee's arguments that the
defendant's other behavior was outside the safe harbor. The court
stressed that "subsequent disclosure or use of information obtained
from an exempt clinical study, even for purposes other than
regulatory approval, does not repeal that exemption of the clinical
study, provided that the subsequent disclosure or use is itself not an
act of infringement of the asserted claims."07 7 As a result, putting
information from the study into a patent application was unlikely to
change the outcome because filing a patent usually is not an act of
infringement since it does not involve an act specified in § 271 (a). 1078
Likewise, "placing the information submitted to the FDA on the
product label after sNDA approval generally cannot be an
infringement," because the information remains protected under the
safe-harbor even after approval.1079 A subsequent sale or use of the
product with the new label might infringe, depending on what the
patent covered, but that did not appear to be the case here.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit remanded for the district court to
sort out the particulars.0 8 0
1072. 786 F.3d 892 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1073. Id. at 893-94.
1074. Id. at 896.
1075. Id. at 897.
1076. Id.
1077. Id. at 898 (citing Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d
1520,1523-24 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1078. Id. at 898-99.




But the second case, Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.,"os" shows that not all post-approval testing is
within the safe harbor. Here, the defendant used the patented
method of analyzing its commercial product for impurities, yet
argued that this use was protected because it retained the
information in accordance with an FDA regulation.1 0 82  The court
rejected this argument, noting that the patented testing was
"routine[]," because it was regularly and repeatedly conducted for
each batch of the commercial product.o Section 271(e) (1) "does
not apply to information that may be routinely reported to the FDA,
long after marketing approval has been obtained."" The court
contrasted this from other non-routine submissions such as the (pre-
or post-approval) submission of an application to market the drug,
and noted also that the testing had nothing to do with obtaining FDA
approval.o8 It was thus outside § 271 (e)'s safe harbor.'"
The holding in the third case-Shire, LLC v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals,
LLC"0 -was straightforward: a manufacturer was not liable for its sale
of the active ingredient to a generic manufacturer for pre-approval
testing to include in its abbreviated new drug application (ANDA).i'
The generic's testing was covered by the § 27 1(e) (1) safe harbor, so it
was not a direct infringer, and the manufacturer thus could not be an
inducer."o8 It also noted that the manufacturer was not liable under
§ 271 (e) (2) because it did not submit the ANDA itself.090
B. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA)
The healthcare reform legislation in 2010 included a new
provision, the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act
(BPCIA),'0o' which created an abbreviated FDA approval pathway for
follow-on biological products that are "highly similar" to a previously
1081. 809 F.3d 610 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1082. Id. at 614-15.
1083. Id. at 620.
1084. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen
IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
1085. Id.
1086. Id. at 621.
1087. 802 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1088. Id. at 1304.
1089. Id. at 1310-11.
1090. Id.
1091. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-03, 124 Stat. 119, 804-21 (2010) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012), 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), 28 U.S.C. § 2201(b), 21
U.S.C. § 355 et seq.).
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approved "reference product."092  The Act gives the "reference
product's" sponsor a twelve-year exclusivity period, and then allows
others to seek approval to sell a biosimilar product by relying on the
sponsor's clinical data if they can convince the FDA of the products'
similarity.109 s The Act also includes intricate provisions for resolving
patent disputes between the sponsor and the biosimilar applicant. 1094
The Act is widely expected to generate many new applications for
biosimilars and lead to extensive patent litigation.10
95 The Federal
Circuit decided its first case interpreting BPCIA in 2015, Amgen Inc. v.
Sandoz Inc.,'"" and dealt with two important provisions.
09 '
Some background on the statutory scheme is necessary to
understand the court's decision. The BPCIA's system for resolving
patent disputes contemplates an information exchange between the
sponsor of the "reference product" and the biosimilar applicant.1
0 9 8
The biosimilar applicant first grants the patentee access to its
application within twenty days after the FDA accepts it for review.
1099
The parties then exchange lists of patents that might be at issue,
along with their positions on infringement, validity, and
enforceability, and negotiate over which patents will be the subject of
an immediate lawsuit.11co When the parties finalize the list, the
patentee has thirty days to sue the biosimilar applicant.'
0 "
Separately, the biosimilar applicant must also give the patentee at
least 180-days' notice before the biosimilar applicant can begin
commercially marketing its product, and, once the patentee receives
that notice (but not before), it can seek a preliminary injunction on
any non-listed patents.110 2 Another provision allows the patentee, but
1092. § 7002(k) (2) (A) (i) (I) (aa), 124 Stat. at 805.
1093. § 7002(k)(3)-(4), 124 Stat. at806-07.
1094. See Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff & Kristel Schorr, Patent Watch: Have the
Biosimilar Floodgates Been Opened in the United States?, 14 NATURE REvs. DRUG DISCOVERY
303, 303 (2015) (describing the Bioligics Price Competition and Innovation Act's
(BPCIA) provisions that resolve patent disputes, and noting that all litigation thus far
has resulted from applications trying to avoid the Act's negotiation processes).
1095. Id.
1096. 794 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that this was the first case to
interpret BPCIA).
1097. Id. at 1350-52 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)-() of the BPCIA).
1098. § 7002(k) (6)-(7) (A), 124 Stat. at 807-09.
1099. 42 U.S.C. § 262(o (1)-(2) (2012).
1100. Id. § 262(1 (3)-(5).
1101. Id. § 262(o (6).
1102. Id. § 262() (7)-(9).
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not the biosimilar applicant, to seek declaratory relief if the applicant
does not cooperate in the listing process.' 110
The first dispute in Amgen involved whether the statute required
the biosimilar applicant to disclose its application and engage in the
"patent dance" described above.""o The panel majority held that it
did not."0o Although § 262(1) (2) (A) says that the biosimilar
applicant (Sandoz) "shall provide" its application to the sponsor
company (Amgen) within twenty days after the FDA accepts the
application, the rest of the statute demonstrated that "shall" did not
mean "must."""o In particular, § 262(1) (9) (C) says that, if the
biosimilar applicant "fails to provide the application," the sponsor
may bring a declaratory judgment claim for infringement, validity,
and enforceability of any patent."ro Mandatory disclosure would
render the latter provision superfluous. Further, the statute provided
no procedure for Amgen to compel disclosure, which was consistent
with the view that disclosure was optional."0 o The biosimilar
applicant does face a potential downside from non-disclosure-it
loses the right to bring a declaratory judgment of noninfringement
because, under § 262(0(9) (C), only Amgen could bring suit.""o But
the biosimilar applicant has the right to choose.
Judge Newman dissented on this issue, arguing that Sandoz had
forfeited its ability to obtain FDA licensure under the Act by failing to
comply with the Act's disclosure requirements."0 In particular, she
thought that § 262(0 (2) required Sandoz to disclose its application
because the "shall" language was mandatory."" Judge Newman
disagreed with the majority's reading of § 262(1 (9), noting that it did
not provide a complete remedy for the sponsor because it does not
permit bringing suit regarding manufacturing process patents. " 2
The second dispute in Amgen related to when the biosimilar
applicant may send its notice of commercial marketing (and thereby
start the 180-day statutory clock for a preliminary injunction suit)."1
1103. Id. § 262(0(9).
1104. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1105. Id. at 1357.
1106. Id. at 1355-57.
1107. 42 U.S.C. § 262(0 (9) (C).
1108. Amgen, 794 F.3d at 1356.
1109. Id. at 1352, 1356.
1110. Id. at 1363 (Newman,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
1111. Id.
1112. Id. at 1364.
1113. Id. at 1357 (majority opinion).
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The court held that the statute barred sending the notice before the
biosimilar applicant received FDA approval because the statute ties
the notice to a "biological product licensed under subsection (k),"""
and a biosimilar is not "licensed" until after it is approved."'
5 If
Congress intended a different meaning, it could have referred to a
biosimilar that was the "subject of the application," as it did
elsewhere.11 6  Furthermore, the biosimilar product's uses and
manufacturing are not set until FDA licensure, and it makes sense for
any preliminary injunction suit to wait until "the scope of the
approved license is known and the marketing of the proposed
biosimilar product is imminent."" Requiring FDA licensure before
the notice of commercial marketing did not improperly extend the
sponsor's twelve-year statutory exclusivity."
1  Most biosimilar
applications will be filed (and approved) during the twelve-year
period, even though the application here was filed much later.""
Amgen further held that the biosimilar applicant could not avoid
the 180-day exclusivity simply by refusing to give any notice at all.
1 "o
Here, the term "shall" in § 262(0 (8) signals a mandatory
requirement, because, unlike with § 262(1) (2), no other statutory
provisions specify consequences for failing to meet it."
2 1  In
particular, § 262(1) (9) did not specify such a consequence because it
applied only where the biosimilar applicant provides its application to
the sponsor, which Sandoz did not do here." 22 Therefore, where the
biosimilar applicant refuses to provide its application, it must provide
notice of commercial marketing. As a result, Sandoz's initial notice
was ineffective because Sandoz sent the notice upon acceptance of its
application but before approval, and Sandoz was instead temporarily
enjoined for 180 days following its second notice, which Sandoz sent
upon FDA approval."2 3
Judge Chen dissented on this issue, arguing that once a biosimilar
applicant decides not to disclose its application, it is not required to
1114. Id. at 1357-58 (emphasis omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 262() (8) (A) (2012)).
1115. Id. at 1357-58.
1116. Id.at1358.
1117. Id. ("We believe that Congress intended the notice to follow licensure, at which time
the product, its therapeutic uses, and its manufacturing processes are fixed.").
1118. Id. (noting that the extra 180 days of market exclusion will be atypical, as
most cases will be filed during the twelve-year exclusivity period).
1119. See id.
1120. Id. at 1358-60.
1121. Id. at 1359-60.
1122. Id. at 1359.
1123. Id. at 1359-60.
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give the § 262(1) (8) notice of intent to commercially market a
product because the sponsor is already permitted to file suit
immediately.H24  He viewed the majority's interpretation of
§ 262(1) (8) as an extra 180-day exclusivity windfall to Amgen."2 5
The split among the three panel members underscores how difficult
and complicated the BPCIA will be to interpret. There are surely many
other provisions with similar ambiguities, and the Federal Circuit will
resolve many more of these disputes in the coming years as more
biosimilar applications are filed, accepted, and approved.
C. Generic Manufacturers' Standing to Seek Declaratory Relief
Another Hatch-Waxman case, Apotex, Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc.,"26
involved a unique situation in which two generic manufacturers were
jockeying for position over the Hatch-Waxman Act's 180-day
exclusivity for the first generic filer. 127 The controversy began when
Daiichi, the patent owner, filed a prior suit against the first generic
filer, Mylan." 2 ' Daiichi obtained a judgment of infringement and
validity on one patent, but disclaimed the second, later-expiring
patent after receiving Mylan's paragraph IV certification alleging it
was not infringed and invalid." 2  Apotex, a second generic filer,
subsequently sought FDA approval and made a paragraph III
certification that it would not launch before the first patent expired,
but Apotex filed the present suit against Daiichi seeking a declaratory
judgment that the disclaimed patent was not infringed."" The
district court refused to allow Mylan to intervene and then dismissed
Apotex's suit for lack of an Article III controversy."3 ' The Federal
Circuit reversed on both issues.u1 2
As an initial matter, Mylan had a right to intervene because, under
various Hatch-Waxman Act provisions, the outcome of this litigation
could impact whether Mylan, as the first ANDA-filer, was entitled to a
180-day period of initial marketing exclusivity, or whether the results
of this litigation might cause it to forfeit that right."3 3
1124. Id. at 1366-70 (Chen,J., dissenting in part).
1125. Id. at 1367.
1126. 781 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 481 (2015).
1127. Id. at 1358-60.
1128. Id. at 1359.
1129. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2) (A) (vii) (IV) (2012).
1130. Id. at 1358-60.
1131. Id. at 1358-61.
1132. Id. at 1358.
1133. Id. at 1361.
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As for jurisdiction, Apotex's claim against Daiichi met the Article III
standards for concreteness, causation, and redressability. Apotex sought
concrete relief in this suit because, if successful, such relief would
remove one barrier to its ability to launch its product, and a potential
launch had monetary stakes for Apotex, Daiichi, and Mylan. Daiichi's
disclaimer was irrelevant because the patent was still listed in the Orange
Book, so Apotex could not launch without winning this suit.""
Daiichi caused the alleged harm by initially listing the patent in the
Orange Book, regardless of whether that was proper at the time and
despite its subsequent unsuccessful attempts to remove the listing.
Apotex's lack of tentative FDA approval did not render the possibility
of Apotex's relief too uncertain because the Hatch-Waxman Act
contemplates litigation before tentative approval."35
Finally, this action would redress Apotex's injury because a victory
would likely allow it to launch its product sooner. Although Apotex
was also blocked from entering the market by Mylan's 180-day
exclusivity period, it could trigger a forfeiture of that period by
obtaining the non-infringement judgment here and tentative
approval of its product. There was no reason to require Apotex to
obtain tentative approval before filing this action. The statute
imposed no timing requirement that would force Apotex to obtain
tentative approval before bringing this suit, so it was free to try to





Given the potential damages upside of asserting design patents
discussed above,"'" the Federal Circuit's substantive jurisprudence of
the construction, infringement, and validity of such patents may
become increasingly important. The key challenge in all these
inquiries is separating the ornamental from the structural aspects of
the design, as two cases demonstrated.
The first, Apple Inc. v. Sansung Electronics Co., rejected a nitpicky
argument about the jury instruction on functionality."3 8  The
defendant argued that a design's functional aspects must be ignored
1134. Id. at 1362-63.
1135. Id. at 1363-64.
1136. Id. at 1367-71.
1137. See supra Section VLE and accompanying text.
1138. 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part on a different issue, 84
U.S.L.W. 3350 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2016) (No. 15-777).
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entirely in determining claim scope.' 9 But, here, the district court
correctly instructed the jury that only the design's ornamental aspects
are pertinent to infringement, and, given that context, it was fine for
the district judge to tell the jury to compare the "overall appearance"
of the designs, as opposed to the "overall ornamental appearance."1 1
Likewise, the instructions also correctly told the jury that actual
deception is not required for infringement and that they "must"
consider the prior art.1141
The other case, Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc.,"' dealt
with a district court decision that ignored the ornamental aspects of
the claimed ultrasonic surgical device."" The Federal Circuit
initially reversed a determination that the patented design was invalid
as dictated by function and an accompanying claim construction.1 44
After reviewing precedent, the panel held that "an inquiry into
whether a claimed design is primarily functional should begin with an
inquiry into the existence of alternative designs."ll4 5  Here, the
defendant admitted there were alternatives, but argued that they did
not work equally well.""6 That did not matter because (1) the
surgeons' preferences were based on differences in design, not
functionality, and (2) the products need only have "similar" functional
capabilities to be alternatives." '" The district court also erred by
analyzing the designs at "too high of a level of abstraction," rather than
focusing on just the ornamental aspects. 1 48  So the Federal Circuit
reversed the invalidity determination and likewise reversed a claim
construction, which incorrectly ignored ornamental aspects of the
surgical device's trigger, torque knob, and activation buttons.1 1 49
Nevertheless, Ethicon affirmed a summary judgment of non-
infringement. Having narrowed the claim construction to
particular ornamental features, the court noted that the "conceptual"
similarity between the patent and the accused product were not
enough and that the district court correctly identified specific parts
1139. Id. at 998.
1140. Id. at 999 (emphasis omitted).
1141. Id. at 1000.
1142. 796 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1143. Id. at 1314-15.
1144. Id. at 1328-32.
1145. Id. at 1330.
1146. Id.
1147. Id. at 1331.
1148. Id.
1149. Id. at 1334.
1150. Id. at 1315.
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of the ornamental features that made the designs "plainly
dissimilar."'151 Given the plain dissimilarity, the district court did not
need to compare the claimed and accused designs with the prior art.
X. PATENT TERM ADJUSTMENT
The Federal Circuit decided three cases interpreting the Patent
Term Adjustment Statute, 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). Congress enacted the
statute as part of the switch from a patent term that was seventeen
years from issuance to a term of twenty years from the earliest filing
date."1 Congress recognized that, as a consequence of the switch,
Patent Office delays in examining and issuing the patent could result
in a shorter patent term, so it provided for certain adjustments to
restore patent term day-for-day for any periods of Patent Office
delay.1153 But Congress also wanted to ensure that an applicant who
bore some or all responsibility for the delay did not benefit, and it
thus provided for reductions during periods in which the applicant
"failed to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude prosecution of the
application.""" The Federal Circuit's decisions dealt with various
provisions implementing the details of this balance, and they all went
against the patentees.
Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Lee'15 interpreted the "reasonable efforts"
offset for applicant delay.1116 Congress delegated to the Patent Office
the ability to prescribe regulations specifying what applicant behavior
amounts to a failure to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude
prosecution."5 7  The Patent Office determined that one such
behavior is when an applicant submits a supplemental paper or reply
after its initial response because this could theoretically cause the
patent examiner to restart work on his response (if he had already
begun looking at the applicant's initial submission).
5  But many
supplemental replies do not actually cause any delay, and Gilead's
was one such example-Gilead submitted a supplemental
information disclosure statement (IDS) after previously submitting a
response to a restriction requirement, but the examiner did not pick
1151. Id. at 1334-36.
1152. See Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Lee, 778 F.3d 1341, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting
Congress's modification of patent terms).
1153. Id. at 1344; see 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (1) (2012).
1154. § 154(b) (2) (C) (i); Gilead, 778 F.3d at 1344.
1155. 778 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1156. Id. at 1348.
1157. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2) (C) (iii).
1158. 37 C.F.R. § 1.704(c) (8) (2011).
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up the application (or indeed, even receive the initial response from
the mailroom) until well after Gilead submitted the supplemental
IDS." 5 ' The Patent Office nevertheless offset Gilead's term adjustment
for the 57 days between its initial response and the supplemental IDS,
and the Federal Circuit affirmed."'o The panel found that the statute
did not speak. precisely to this question and thus gave Chevron
deference to the Patent Office's interpretation, concluding that "a
reasonable interpretation of the statute is that Congress intended to
sanction not only applicant conduct or behavior that result in actual
delay, but also those having the potential to result in delay irrespective
of whether such delay actually occurred.""'
Mohsenzadeh v. Lee"" held that adjustments for Patent Office delay
during a parent application did not carry forward to extend the term
of a divisional application.116 3 The statute's plain language resolved
the issue because 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (1) (A) refers to the adjustment
of a single patent (and application) throughout:
if the issue of an original patent is delayed due to the failure of the
Patent and Trademark Office to-
(i) provide at least one of the notifications under section 132 or a
notice of allowance under section 151 not later than 14 months
after-
(I) the date on which an application was filed under section 111(a); or
(II) the date of commencement of the national stage under section
371 in an international application ...
the term of the patent shall be extended I day for each day [of delay].'164
By contrast, other provisions of the same statute defined the term
of a continuing application specifically by reference to the filing date
of an original application, which showed that, when Congress wanted
to make events in a parent application relevant to the term of the
child, it knew how to do so. 1 65 A later statutory amendment adding a
provision for international applications confirmed that the phrase
"an application" referred only to a singular application."' The
court's decision seems correct as a matter of the statutory text but
unfortunate as a matter of policy. When an applicant winds up with a
1159. Gilead, 778 F.3d at 1345-46.
1160. Id. at 1345, 1351.
1161. Gilead, 778 F.3d at 1349.
1162. 790 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1163. Id. at 1382.
1164. Id. at 1378, 1380 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (1) (A) (2012)).
1165. Id. at 1382 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2)).
1166. Id.
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divisional patent, it is because the Patent Office has issued a
restriction requirement. But, here, the Patent Office was four years
late in acting on the original application and issuing the
restriction.1 167 The applicant could not have done anything to speed
up that process, or to pursue prosecution of the claims that were
subjected to the restriction and that wound up in the divisional
application."' Absent a Congressional fix, an applicant's best bets
for protecting itself from losing patent term are (1) to fight any late
restriction requirements if they are not proper and (2) to proactively
separate claims that an applicant expects would be subject to a
restriction into different applications, so that each can receive any
appropriate term adjustment.
Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Lee"e" dealt with some unique procedural
issues related to challenging the Patent Office's determination of
term adjustment.1170 The issues arose after Wyeth v. Kappos"7' held
that the Patent Office had been undercounting certain delays.1172
The Patent Office set up an interim procedure allowing patentees
whose patents were issued after August 5, 2009 to request
reconsideration of the term calculations within a 180-day window.173
Two of Daiichi's patents were issued before August 5, 2009 and so
were not eligible for the interim procedure, and Daiichi also missed
the 180-day deadline for judicial review under 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(b) (4) (A)." 7  Daiichi argued that the Patent Office acted
arbitrarily in limiting its interim procedure to patents issued after
August 5, 2009."117 The court rejected this argument because the
Patent Office acted consistently with Congress's intent that term
adjustment disputes be resolved promptly." 6  The Patent Office's
deadlines made sense because they were tailored to extend the
deadlines for agency review to be co-extensive with the deadline for
1167. Id. at 1379.
1168. In this respect, a divisional application's claims are different from those in
other types of continuing applications, where the applicant has an option to file and
pursue them earlier. Id. at 1378-79, 1381 & n.1.
1169. 791 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1491 (2016).
1170. Id. at 1374-75.
1171. 591 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
1172. Id. at 1366, 1371-72.
1173. Daiichi Sankyo, 791 F.3d at 1375-76.
1174. Id. at 1376.
1175. Id. at 1377, 1380.
1176. Id. at 1379-80.
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judicial review."n The court's decision was logical; if Daiichi really
thought its interpretation of the statute was right, it could have
diligently pursued it from day one (just as Wyeth had done), rather
than waiting for the Wyeth case to be decided and only then seeking
reconsideration of its own case.
These decisions show the value of having a patent prosecutor who
is well versed in the specifics of the patent adjustment statute.
Prosecution decisions often have profound consequences for patent
term. For example, if Gilead had held onto its supplemental IDS
until it received the next office action, and then submitted it with a
subsequent response, it would not have lost any patent term because
it would not have filed a supplemental reply. Likewise, if
Mohsenzadeh had fought harder against the restriction requirement
or done a better job of separating the claims into multiple
applications that would not have triggered a restriction, maybe it would
have saved its patent term adjustment argument for the claims that
wound up in its divisional application. And, of course, Daiichi should
have pushed the Wyeth issue sooner. There may well be strategic reasons
why a patent prosecutor would sacrifice patent term adjustment for
some other goal. But applicants should make sure that any such trade is
made in service of a thoughtful strategy, not ignorance.
XI. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION AUTHORITY
The International Trade Commission can remedy patent
infringement that harms a U.S. domestic industry by issuing an
exclusion order to prohibit the defendant from importing or selling
products in the United States."" The Commission is a popular
forum for patent owners to file suit because it gives them several
advantages. Most are due to the Commission's accelerated schedule.
A plaintiff can expect a trial within nine months after the
Commission institutes an investigation, with a recommended
disposition by the Administrative Law Judge within a year of
institution, and a final decision within 16 months of institution. The
fast schedule puts defendants at a severe disadvantage. Because a
plaintiff knows the suit is coming, it can prepare much of its case
before filing. But defendants are often caught by surprise and must
1177. See id. at 1380 (deciding that the Patent Office acted within its discretion
when concluding "its authority to conduct administrative reviews extends no further
than the period for judicial review").
1178. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012) (containing the statutory framework
addressing unfair practices in import trade).
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scramble to find prior art, respond to discovery, hire an expert, and
the like. Filing suit with the Commission allows the plaintiff to get a
fast injunction. In most district courts, a plaintiff will not even get to
trial for years, much less reach the stage where it may obtain a
permanent injunction.
The Commission's sustained popularity and potent remedies have
triggered increased scrutiny about the scope of its power and
jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit resolved three important issues in
this area in 2015, restoring the Commission's authority to address
inducement, but eliminating two other sources of its power.
A. Power to Address Inducement
The en banc Federal Circuit restored the Commission's authority
to remedy induced infringement in Suprema, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission,"" reversing a split panel decision that held the
Commission did not have jurisdiction to stop inducement if the
underlying direct infringement did not occur until after the accused
product was imported into the United States.""so The panel's
holding, if left undisturbed, would have made it impossible for the
Commission to enforce most method patents, because they usually
involve cover activity by a U.S. customer that occurs after the
customer buys an imported product.
The statutory construction dispute turned on a seeming mismatch
in the drafting of the infringement statute (35 U.S.C. § 271) and the
Commission's enabling statute (19 U.S.C. § 1337). The infringement
statute is written so that a person's activity (e.g., making, selling,
using, inducing, etc.) is what infringes."" But the Commission's
enabling statute is written to give it in rem authority over "articles
that infringe," without referring to a particular person's
infringement. 1182 That is consistent with how patent lawyers
1179. 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
1180. Suprema, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 742 F.3d 1350, 1357-63 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
see aso id. at 1371-78 (Reyna, J., dissenting in part) (believing that the Commission
should have "statutory authority to stop induced infringement at the border").
1181. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) ("[W]hoever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent."); id. § 271(b) ("Whoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.").
1182. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2012) (designating "[t]he importation into the
United States, the sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after
importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that ... infringe a valid
and enforceable United States patent" as an unlawful activity).
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colloquially speak, for we often refer to the "accused product" or
"infringing product." But this is really just shorthand, because an
article itself cannot infringe a patent. Only a person's actions with
respect to that article-making, selling, using, etc.-are what actually
infringe under 35 U.S.C. § 271. So how should we understand the
term "articles that infringe" in § 1337, and, in particular, does it imply
that the articles must infringe by the time they are imported?
The en banc majority resolved these questions through the
interpretive lens of the Chevron framework11 3 in reviewing the
Commission's statutory interpretation."" The majority believed that
the statutory text did not definitively resolve the question because the
term "articles that infringe" in § 1337 "does not narrow the provision
to exclude inducement of post-importation infringement," but
instead "introduces textual uncertainty."15 That the phrase "articles
that infringe" is written in the present tense does not require that the
infringement must occur before importation-it could just refer to
the fact that the provision of the articles is part of an ongoing act of
inducement that begins with importation and is completed with a
customer's direct infringement after importation."8 6 In fact, such a
reading would have caused problems with a prior version of § 271 (a),
which did not make importation a directly infringing act until 1994,
and which therefore would have referred only to infringing acts that
occur after importation (i.e., making, using, selling)."8 If § 1337 were
restricted to articles for which infringement is already complete upon
importation, then the Commission would not have even reached the
issue of direct infringement for many years." 8 The upshot was that,
under Chevron step one,""' the text's act was ambiguous.9 0
1183. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
1184. Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1345-46 (reviewing the Commission's interpretation of
§ 1337 pursuant to Chevron).
1185. Id. at 1346 (emphasis omitted).
1186. Id. at 1347-48.
1187. Id. at 1348.
1188. See id. ("If Congress meant to forbid the Commission from looking past the
time of importation in defining Section 337's reach, Section 337 would not have
reached even garden-variety direct infringement.").
1189. The first step of the Chevron analysis asks whether Congress has spoken
directly to the precise issue in question, or whether the statute is silent or ambiguous.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
1190. Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1349.
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The court thus had to consider, under Chevron step two,1191 the
reasonableness of the Commission's view that it could exclude articles
that are used to infringe post-importation.1192 The majority thought
the statutory text supported this view because § 1337 defines as
unlawful "the sale within the United States after importation ... of
articles that-(i) infringe," and thus suggested that the Commission
could focus on post-importation activity. 11s The majority also
pointed to legislative history that suggested the Commission had
broad authority to protect U.S. domestic industry, the Commission's
long history of making inducement findings, and the fact that
Congress enacted the current statutory language in 1988 against the
backdrop of the Commission addressing inducement."" Finally, the
Commission's interpretation closed a potential loophole that could
have been exploited by foreign infringers:
the practical consequence would be an open invitation to foreign
entities (which might for various reasons not be subject to a district
court injunction) to circumvent Section 337 by importing articles
in a state requiring post-importation combination or modification
before direct infringement could be shown.19 5
The Commission thus reasonably concluded that it had statutory
authority to exclude articles that can be used to infringe after
importation into the United States. "9 6
Judge O'Malley, joined by Chief Judge Prost, and Judges Lourie
and Dyk, dissented."7 The dissenters thought that the statutory term
"articles that infringe" was unambiguous and was directed to physical
objects that are imported or sold, not a method."98 They stressed that
method patents can only be infringed under § 271 (a) by use, not by
1191. If the statute it silent or ambiguous to the question at issue, the second step
of the Chevron analysis asks whether the agency's interpretation is a reasonable and
permissible construction of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
1192. Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1349.
1193. Id. at 1349 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012)). Note, though,
that this seems to contradict the majority's earlier point that § 1337 would not have
covered garden-variety direct infringement before 1994, because § 1337 refers to
"sale" after importation, which has always been an infringing act in § 271 (a).
1194. See Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1350-52 (pointing to legislative history to show that
Congress intended to give the Commission broad authority over investigating and
remedying unfair trade acts).
1195. Id. at 1352.
1196. See id. (holding that the Commission's interpretation was reasonable under
Chevron step two).
1197. Id. at 1354 (O'Malley,J., dissenting).
1198. Id. at 1355-56.
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sale or importation, and thought it significant that § 1337 did not
mention use."99 The dissenters also expressed concern that allowing
the Commission to exclude articles based on assumptions about post-
importation activity could lead to overly broad exclusion orders if the
article has both infringing and non-infringing uses:
[T]here is no actual harm to a patentee until an infringing use,
and that harm only occurs after importation for method claims
such as the ones at issue in this appeal. This is especially true for
staple goods like Suprema's scanners, where a broad assertion of
the Commission's power could prevent non-infringing goods from
entering the country on the basis of what a customer may do with
that item once it enters U.S. territory. Such considerations are the
purview of the district courts, and fall outside the limited statutory
jurisdiction of the Commission.12o
The dissent dismissed the legislative history and Commission
practice as unsupportive of the majority's decision and irrelevant in
any event given the plain statutory text.10' Any policy concerns about
creating a "loophole" for infringing method patents was properly
addressed to Congress, not the courts.
The majority seems to have the better statutory argument because
there really is a mismatch in the person-centric language of § 271 and
the article-centric language of § 1337.1202 It is not clear what
Congress intended, or, indeed, if it even thought about method
patents when enacting § 1337. And the dissent's suggestion that
Congress could simply amend the statute to close any perceived
1199. Id. at 1356 (citing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1200. Id. at 1356-57 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 1353-54 (Dyk, J., dissenting)
("[Section 1337] does not allow the Commission to enter an exclusion order
directed to all of the subject articles, even those that ultimately may never be used to
infringe, on the theory that some of the articles may be used in an infringing manner
after importation."). Notice that there would not be a similar problem with allowing
the Commission to enforce § 271(c), which everyone agreed it can do because
§ 271 (c) explicitly says that provision of staple articles, is not contributory
infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c) (2006) (excluding non-staple articles from
contributory infringement liability).
1201. See Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1361-66 (O'Malley,J., dissenting) ("Though we need
not reach the legislative history or past Commission practice to perform our duty of
saying what the law is for unambiguous statutory language, I am unconvinced that
any of the 'evidence' . . . the majority relies [on] alters a fair reading of the language
that . .. Congress agreed to: 'articles that-infringe"').
1202. Compare id. at 1347 (majority opinion) ("The relevant portions of § 271
define persons' actions as infringement."), with id. at 1346 ("[Section 1337] refers not
just to infringement, but to 'articles that infringe."').
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loophole seems unrealistic given the typical Congressional gridlock
on even the most uncontroversial issues.
Nevertheless, the dissenters have at least one thing right-the
Commission should not be allowed to broadly exclude all
importation of a staple article, even when it is sold for use in a non-
infringing manner. The majority did not address this point, which
seems to leave open the question of whether the Commission must
tailor any exclusion order involving a method patent to carve out any
imports used in a non-infringing manner. Such a caveat would seem
appropriate, indeed necessary. The Commission has no authority to
restrain non-infringing conduct because it can address a violation of
§ 1337 by excluding only "the article concerned," not articles that are
unrelated to the infringement.120s
Any carve-out would make exclusion orders difficult to enforce-
how is the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol supposed to confirm
whether each particular shipment is for the non-infringing, rather
than infringing use? Maybe the Commission could deal with this by
requiring the importer to include instructions with its articles saying
that customers cannot use it in an infringing manner and to send its
customers letters warning them against infringement. The
Commission could also impose stiff civil penalties ($100,000 per day)
for importers that are caught trying to take advantage of the carve-out
to discourage infringement.1204
B. Digital Transmissions
The statute's "articles that infringe" language was the source of a
second important dispute: do digital transmissions from an overseas
defendant into the United States count as "articles" that the
Commission can exclude? This has been a pressing issue in recent
years, attracting significant commentary.1205 A split panel in
1203. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012) ("If the Commission determines, as a result
of an investigation under this section, that there is a violation of this section, it shall
direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person violating the provision of this
section, be excluded from entry into the United States. . . .") (emphasis added).
1204. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2) (allowing a civil penalty of $100,000 whenever one
violates a cease and desist order issued by the Commission).
1205. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent
Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1319, 1324-25 (2015)
(exploring whether the patent system should recognize digital patent infringement,
specifically in the context of 3D printing); Sapna Kumar, Regulating Digital Trade, 67
FLA. L. REv. 1909 (2015) (arguing that the International Trade Commission lacks
jurisdiction over digital information as neither courts nor agencies can control
information in the abstract).
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ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade Commission,1206 held
that they do not, because "articles" must be "material things."207
Applying the Chevron framework, the majority held that the
statutory text unambiguously resolved the dispute because
dictionaries published contemporaneously with the 1922 Tariff Act
(which introduced the word "articles") all defined an article as being
a "material thing," or were consistent with that meaning.120 s The
majority also observed that an "article" must be a physical thing
because it cannot be stopped at the border, cannot be "seized" or
"forfeited" under one of the other statutory provisions, and is not
something subject to "attempted entry" into the United States
through a "port of entry," as contemplated by other statutory
subsections.120" The Commission's authority to issue cease and desist
orders did not expand its jurisdiction to include digital transmissions
because Congress added it in 1974 as a "softer remedy" than
exclusion orders and said that "[n]o change [was] made in the
substance of the jurisdiction" conferred on the Commission.1210
Moreover, the Commission's authority under § 1337 has long been
tied to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, which,
of course, lists duties on physical articles.12 1' The legislative history
further supports confining "articles" to material things because it
used "articles" interchangeably with the word "goods," which itself
referred to physical items.1212 The statute was thus unambiguous and
definitely resolved the issue.
The majority also noted that it would reach the same result even
under Chevron step two because the Commission's position was
unreasonable.21 1 It criticized the Commission's analysis of the relevant
dictionary definitions, noted that the Commission had ignored contrary
definitions without explanation, and, most notably, exposed the
Commission's omission of a phrase from the relevant legislative history,
which made the Commission's authority seem much broader than it really
1206. 810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1207. See id. at 1286-87 (reversing the Commission's conclusion that "articles"
under § 1337(a) included "electronic transmission of digital data").
1208. See id. at 1299.
1209. Id. at 1295 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(i)(1),(3) (2012)).
1210. Id. at 1296 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 194 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7327 (1974)).
1211. Id. at 1297-98.
1212. See id. at 1298-99 (concluding that "goods" and "articles" each were limited
to material things, after examining the respective dictionary definitions in place at
the time of enactment).
1213. Id. at 1300.
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is.1214 The Commission also erred by citing recent proposed bills in
Congress to expand its authority that had never been passed.2
15
Judge O'Malley filed a concurring opinion in which she agreed
with the majority's Chevron analysis, but also argued that resorting to
Chevron was unnecessary because Congress had not delegated the
Commission any authority to interpret the scope of the term "article."
Judge Newman dissented, making several strong points.
2'1 One
was a larger point about statutory interpretation-she thought the
meaning of the term "articles" should not be based on existing
technology in 1922 and was instead adaptable as technology
advanced.2'1 Judge Newman thus found it irrelevant (and
unsurprising) that the older dictionaries did not mention digital
transmission, although she did think some of them defined "articles"
broadly enough to cover it.1219 Judge Newman next questioned the
majority's assertion that digital transmissions are not material things:
"the particles and waveforms of electronics and photonics and
electromagnetism are not intangible, although not visible to the
unaided eye." 22 0 Judge Newman seems to have a point here-
everything is, at some level, composed of subatomic particles.
1221
Moreover, the panel hinted that a thumb drive or CD with the same
digital data might count as a physical article that could be
excluded.222 Judge Newman rightly noted that there is no pragmatic
1214. Id. In particular, the Commission omitted words "in the importation of
goods," from the following sentence without adding an ellipsis. Id. at 1301; see also S.
REP. No. 67-595, at 3 (1922) ("The provision relating to unfair methods of
competition in the importation of goods is broad enough to prevent every type and form
of unfair practice and is, therefore, a more adequate protection to American industry
than any antidumping statute the country ever had.") (emphasis added).
1215. ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1301-02.
1216. Id. at 1302-03 (O'Malley,J., concurring).
1217. See generally id. at 1304-12 (Newman,J., dissenting).
1218. See id. at 1306-07 ("Patents are for things that did not previously exist,
including kinds of technology that were not previously known.").
1219. Id. at 1307-08.
1220. Id.
1221. The Federal Circuit has treated digital data differently on other occasions
too, however, including some of its recent jurisprudence under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See
Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (declining to find a device profile, which was a "collection of intangible
color and spatial information," eligible for patent protection because the device
profile lacked a physical form); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(concluding that a transitory, propagating signal is not patentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
1222. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1290 (majority opinion) ("Here, the only
purported 'article' found to have been imported was digital data that was transferred
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reason to treat these things differently as digital signals.2 2 1 People
now transmit digital data over the Internet rather than mailing
someone a thumb drive because it is quicker and cheaper. The
panel's interpretation thus hamstrings the Commission's ability to
deal with some types of patents in the current age. The court should
interpret the statute to keep pace with the modern age.
C. Domestic Industry Must Be Assessed Quantitatively
The Federal Circuit cut back on the Commission's jurisdiction in
Lelo Inc. v. International Trade Commission,'... although the decision's
broader impact remains to be seen. Lelo deals with the "domestic
industry" requirement, which permits the Commission to issue an
exclusion order "only if an industry in the United States, relating to
the articles protected by the patent . .. exists or is in the process of
being established.""" Such an industry exists if there is "significant"
U.S. investment in plant and equipment or U.S. employment of labor
and capital, or "substantial investment" in exploitation of the
patented technology, including engineering, research and
development, and licensing.'2 26
The Commission held that the investment at issue was "significant"
and "substantial" in a qualitative sense.2 2 1 In particular, the
Commission held that the plaintiffs investments in several U.S.-
manufactured components of the patented sex toys were
"significant," because they were "crucial" to the toys' functionality
(allowing the right flexibility and resistance), while also enabling the
toys' ability to function as vibrators, even though the components'
cost was less than five percent of the toys' overall cost.1228
The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the statute required
that "significant" or "substantial" investment be quantitatively
significant.1229 The court focused on the statute's plain text: "the terms
electronically, i.e., not digital data on a physical medium such as a compact disk or
thumb drive.").
1223. See id. at 1309-10 (Newman, J., dissenting) (explaining that the distinction
between digital goods transported electronically and digital goods contained in a
physical medium has "been discarded as unjustifiable").
1224. 786 F.3d 879 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1225. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2012).
1226. Id. § 1337(a) (3).
1227. Lelo, 786 F.3d at 882-83.
1228. Id.
1229. See id. at 883-85 (concluding that "qualitative factors alone" are not enough
to satisfy § 1337(a) (3)).
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'significant' and 'substantial' refer to an increase in quantity, or to a
benchmark in numbers,"2 30 and an "investment" is "an expenditure of
money for income or profit or to purchase something of intrinsic
value."'"" Putting these meanings together showed that the statute
required "a quantitative analysis in order to determine whether there is a
'significant' increase or attribution by virtue of the claimant's asserted
commercial activity in the United States.""" The court added that
"[q]ualitative factors cannot compensate for quantitative data that
indicate insignificant investment and employment."2" This conclusion
seems correct given the statutory purpose, which is to protect U.S. jobs
and investment.1234 And the investments in Lelo were plainly insignificant
when viewed quantitatively--the Commission itself had acknowledged
they were numerically "modest."1235
The result may be to keep patent owners with more attenuated
connections to the United States out of the International Trade
Commission. Patent owners will now need to meet their burden of
proof with hard numbers, not just a slick tale about the importance of
quantitatively minor components. In this respect, the decision
mirrors much of the Federal Circuit's damages jurisprudence, which
has required patentees to apportion the value of the patented
feature, rather than rely on generalities about its importance.
123
1 The
Federal Circuit also remarked that those numbers must reflect the
true investment in labor, capital, or the other statutory categories-
"pricing data" showing what the patentee paid for the components of
its patented sex toys did "not reflect the magnitude of labor
expended to produce the components, or the amount the suppliers
invested in their equipment to fulfill [the patentee's] orders." 
2 37
D. Exclusion Order Civil Penalties
The final case dealing with the Commission's power involved an
issue that has received increasing attention in recent years-what is
the effect on a judgment entered by a tribunal when another tribunal
1230. Id. at 883.
1231. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1190 (1986)).
1232. Id. at 883.
1233. Id. at 885.
1234. See Suprema, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (en banc) (describing § 1337's purpose as aiming to curb "unfair trade
practices that involve the entry of goods into the U.S. market via importation").
1235. Lelo, 786 F.3d at 885.
1236. See supra Section VI.A and accompanying text.
1237. Lelo, 786 F.3d at 884.
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enters judgment invalidating the patent? One recent decision holds
that a final judgment in a reexamination (rendered by the Patent
Office, affirmed by the Federal Circuit, and not subject to further
review) nullifies a non-final district court damages judgment.12s
Another decision vacated a district court's non-final injunction (and
an accompanying civil contempt sanction) based on the Patent
Office's intervening invalidation of the claims.2 19
The Federal Circuit faced a variation on these themes in DeLorme
Publishing Co. v. International Trade Commission,1240 where the
Commission had imposed an over $6 million civil penalty for
violation of a consent order, and the defendant sought to set aside
the penalty on the ground that a district court had since invalidated
the patent.1241' A split panel affirmed the penalty based on the
language of the consent order.24 2 The majority relied on the consent
order's statement that its provisions cease to apply when the patent
has "expired or been found or adjudicated invalid or unenforceable"
to infer that it remains in force until one of those events occurs.2 43
The consent order did not suggest that an invalidity finding would
retroactively revoke the order's effect, and "unambiguously indicates
that the invalidation trigger" applies "only prospectively."244
Therefore, the order remained binding at the time of the
defendant's violation, and the Commission was within its discretion
to impose the civil penalty.2 4 5
The majority distinguished the ePlus121 decision because the
injunction there was non-final at the time the patent was invalidated,
and noted that both ePlus and Fresenius'2 11 involved situations where the
Patent Office's cancellation of claims rendered the patent void "ab
1238. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2295 (2014).
1239. ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 789 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
1240. 805 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1241. Id. at 1331, 1334.
1242. Id. at 1333-36. The same panel also unanimously affirmed the district court's
invalidity judgment in DeLorme Publishing Co. v. BriarTek IP, Inc., 622 F. App'x 912,
913 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1477 (2016).
1243. DeLorme, 805 F.3d at 1334.
1244. Id. at 1335.
1245. Id.
1246. ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 760 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014), modified
by 789 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
1247. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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initio." 2 11 would seem to be that a district court judgment of invalidity
does not render the patent iivalid ab initio, which is an odd
suggestion-why should the Patent Office's invalidity determination in a
reexamination have broader effect than a district court judgment of
invalidity? The majority did not say. Interestingly, the majority was
composed of two dissenters from the denial of the rehearing en banc in
ePlus, which might provide insight into what is really going on here.
12 49
Judge Taranto dissented and would have remanded for the
Commission to reconsider its imposition of civil penalties in the first
instance now that the patent had been invalidated.""o He identified
several sources of potential ambiguity in the consent order and
noted that the Commission's lawyers requested a remand rather
than outright affirmance.125 1
DeLorme may have a limited effect because it was based on the
specific language of the exclusion order here. Defendants would be
well advised in the future to push for language in any consent order
(or, for that matter, any consent decree in district court) that makes
the order retroactively void once the patent is invalidated.
CONCLUSION
While the Federal Circuit resolved many interesting patent issues in
2015, plenty of other issues remain unanswered. The next year will
bring new directives from the Supreme Court on enhanced damages,
claim construction in inter partes review, jurisdiction in IPR appeals,
design patent damages, and laches. We will have a new en banc
decision on the on-sale bar. Several other decisions will provide
guidance on what works in IPR appeals, and address the Patent
Office's procedural powers in IPR. And we can hope for more
guidance on § 101 as more and more district court decisions under
Mayo and Alice Corp. make it through the appellate process.
1248. DeLorme, 805 F.3d at 1336 (citing Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1346).
1249. The majority in DeLorme consisted of Judges Reyna and Moore, see DeLorme,
805 F.3d at 1330, who also dissented from the denial of rehearing on banc in ePlus,
see ePlus, 790 F.3d at 1314.
1250. DeLorme, 805 F.3d at 1337 (Taranto, J., dissenting in part).
1251. See id. at 1337-39 (detailing several reasons for ambiguity in the consent
order, one of which being that "until" could be interpreted retrospectively); id. at
1337 (noting that the Commission specifically argued that remand was necessary).
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